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Abstract 
 
This thesis will show that the concept of Great Yasa is not supported by the contemporary 
sources and that alternative approaches are needed to investigate law in the Toluid empire. 
While the concept of Yasa tends to reinforce the perception of Mongol law as being rigid, in 
fact, considerable room for flexibility and negotiation was embedded within the Mongol legal 
tradition.  
 
This flexibility can be seen in the traditional Mongol institution of the quriltai, an institution 
which was important not only in terms of the election of khans and taking various decisions, 
but also in legal terms. The principle of collegiality which was at its foundation was central to 
Mongol legal culture and its effects can be discerned in the Ilkhanate and the Yuan dynasty. 
While there was little political will on the part of the Mongol rulers to impose any particular 
legal practices, including Mongol customs, on the conquered populations, the principle of 
collegiality had a significant impact on how they dealt with legal matters, and how they and 
their officials interacted with Persian and Chinese legal traditions. In the many legal cases 
decided by conference, where many different stakeholders were present, can be seen the 
enduring effects of the principle of collegiality.  
 
The flexibility of the Mongol approach to law is also seen in the differences in the influence 
of Mongol law in Persia and China. While in China the eagerness of officials and judges to 
have the Qa’ans produce legislation led to significant mutual influence and the integration of 
several characteristics of Mongol law into Chinese legislation and into practice even on the 
local level, in Persia the restrained attitude of the qadis led to Mongol influence being 
significantly less marked, and coming about through cultural influence or imitation.  
 
In conclusion, Mongol law as seen in the Toluid empire was characterized by significant 
flexibility, which cannot be attributed simply to the failure or abandonment of Mongol legal 
traditions, since this flexibility was itself an influential and genuine expression of the Mongol 
steppe legal tradition. 
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i. Physical prisons on the steppe were impractical. Methods of restraint could thus 
include collars such as the above; and punishments were often the death penalty, a 
beating, or being forced to serve in the army. 
Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, The monks of Kûblâi Khân, London: The Religious Tract Society, 1928, facing p. 264 
 
 
 
 
ii. The belief in the sacred nature of blood persists. A ‘bloodless’ animal sacrifice among 
the Buryats. 
Adolf Zeman, V kraji šamanů a lamů, Prague: Náklad Památníku odboje v Praze, 1923, p. 110 
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Note on transliteration and use of terms 
 
Chinese has been transliterated using pinyin. The Library of Congress Romanization tables 
have been used for Persian and Arabic.  
 
English names for the offices within the Yuan dynasty government have been taken from 
Farquhar, David M., The Government of China under Mongolian Rule: a Reference Guide, 
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990 
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Introduction 
 
 
Laws and a legal system are a fundamental aspect of governance. Laws can be a way to 
resolve conflicts, punish transgressions, or demarcate ‘belonging’ through the privileging of 
certain groups above others. In the case of a conquest empire, the conquerors have a choice of 
whether to try to impose their own laws, or recognize existing laws, or some combination of 
both.   
  
The Toluid empire is a particularly important focus of study as it provides the contrast 
between Mongol law, which was the legal system of a nomadic people, and the Persian and 
Chinese legal systems, each of which had a long written tradition. Many studies have 
examined the nature and content of Mongol law and how it interacted with these two legal 
systems. However, there has been no study to date focusing on the flexibility of the Toluid 
rulers and officials in the area of law, or on how this flexibility helps us understand the 
developments in law in medieval Persia and China. This thesis will show that a flexible 
attitude towards decision-making, involving as many stakeholders as possible, was integral to 
the Mongol approach to law, and greatly influenced both the process and the outcomes of 
interaction with non-Mongols in the area of law.   
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Chronological and geographical scope of the thesis 
 
This thesis will focus on Mongol rule in Persia and in China: the Ilkhanate (1258-1335) and 
the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368), as well as the Mongol legal culture which influenced 
developments in these polities.The Ilkhanate and the Yuan dynasty, which were ruled by the 
same branch of Chinggis Khan’s descendants and closely connected in military, political and 
cultural terms, are known together as the Toluid empire. The thesis will compare and contrast 
the interactions of Mongol law with the local legal systems prevalent in Persia and in China.  
 
The name ‘Toluid’ refers to Tolui, Chinggis Khan’s fourth and youngest son, whose 
descendants won the qa’anship (the position of ruling over the entire Mongol empire) in 1251, 
and subsequently ruled the major sedentary territories of Persia and China. However, their 
rule was not unopposed: opposition from other descendants of Chinggis Khan resulted in 
1260 in the de facto split of the Mongol empire into Toluid and non-Toluid parts.  
 
The Ilkhanate and the Yuan dynasty had more in common than merely being ruled by 
descendants of Tolui. The seeds for the two polities were sown when the qa’an Möngke, 
aware of the importance of the sedentary populations and their territories, sent his two 
brothers Qubilai and Hülegü to rule China and Persia respectively. This situation was indeed 
unique: “The formation of the Mongol empire marked a break in the history of Eurasia, as 
countries with a long sedentary tradition, such as China and Iran, were made subject to a 
single people of the steppes for over a century.”1 
 
                                                 
1
 Aigle, “Iran under Mongol domination,” pp. 65 – 78 
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Möngke also strengthened the administrative structure through which he with some success 
controlled the far-flung regions of the empire.2 After Möngke’s death, another power struggle 
pitted two of Möngke’s brothers, Qubilai and Arigh Boke, against each other. While Qubilai, 
who had been governing China for some time was willing to adapt to Chinese patterns in 
order to gain support,3 Arigh Boke was more suspicious of adapting to a sedentary life style 
and preferred the steppe way of life, and many Mongols who thought similarly supported him. 
Eventually, after a bitterly divisive civil war often trivialized by Toluid chroniclers, Qubilai 
prevailed over his adversaries, and became qa’an though one without universal recognition. 
He also moved the capital from Karakorum, Mongolia to Dadu (now Beijing) in China. His 
brother, Hülegü Khan in Persia, who acknowledging his dependency on the Qa’an adopted 
the title of Ilkhan, remained his only princely supporter, linked to him by politics, by 
concerns of legitimacy, and by the willingness to directly govern and interact with the 
sedentary population.  
 
In terms of economic ties, these resulted not only from the ‘natural’ penchant of merchants to 
use all available opportunities to exchange goods and make money, but the Qa’ans and 
Ilkhans deliberately promoted trade, including long-distance trade, by providing capital and 
loans to merchants.4 In terms of military ties, Persia and China continued to exchange both 
military technology and personnel, an exchange which had started early as Chinggis Khan 
employed Chinese mangonel-makers and experts in siege warfare in the campaign in Central 
Asia and Khorasan. In terms of cultural and other ties, Allsen has in his book Culture and 
Conquest in Mongol Eurasia drawn attention to the many connections in fields as diverse as 
                                                 
2
 Allsen, Mongol imperialism, pp. 219-221 
3
 Rossabi,“The reign of Khubilai khan,” pp. 421-2; Rossabi, Khubilai Khan, pp. 47-8; Langlois, China under 
Mongol rule, p. 5  
4
 Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners, 1200-1260,” p. 91 
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agriculture, geography, history-writing, and medicine between the Yuan dynasty and the 
Ilkhanate. This exchange was based on the transmission of material artifacts and written 
documents as well as voluntary or forced transfers of people, among whom were soldiers, 
merchants, artisans and many others.5  
 
Another issue which bound the Persian Ilkhanate with Yuan China was the issue of 
legitimacy. Unlike the other khanates which were founded by a directive of Chinggis Khan, 
the Ilkhanate was founded as a result of Möngke’s specific orders to Hülegü to go west, 
destroy the Ismailis and subdue the Caliphate. Whether Hülegü was meant to stay in Persia is 
debatable.6 In any case, he remained and styled himself as Il-khan, a title with implications of 
a subordinate position;7 and for most if not all of the dynasty the Ilkhans recognized their 
subordination to and dependence on the qa’ans in China, in terms of legitimacy. From Hülegü 
to Baidu (with the partial exception of Ahmad Tegüder), the Ilkhans proclaimed, in their title 
‘Ilkhan’ and in their coinage, the supremacy of the qa’an;8 and Hülegü, Abaqa and Arghun all 
requested and gratefully received patents of investiture from the qa’an. Even though with 
Ghazan the mention of the qa’an on coins largely ceased, contacts, embassies and exchanges 
of personnel with the Yuan dynasty by no means ended.9 Of particular note is also the fact 
that up until Abu Sa’id’s time, most of the extant edicts produced by Ilkhanid rulers still 
display a seal with Chinese characters; the text of one of these seals says: “Seal (attesting the 
mandate) to sustain the state and to bring peace to the people.” Such seals were in the earlier 
period of the Ilkhanate brought from China on the occasions of delivering patents of 
                                                 
5
 Allsen, Culture and conquest, p. 6 
6
 Morgan, The Mongols, pp. 130-1; Jackson, “The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire,” pp. 221-2, 230-5 
7
 Allsen, Culture and conquest, pp. 21-22 
8
 Allsen, Culture and conquest, pp. 21-30 
9
 Allsen, Culture and conquest, pp. 31-34 
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investiture, however, even later, when the actual seals were produced in Persia, the Chinese 
writing, and thus the reference to the authority of the Great Khan, remained.10 
 
There were still further mutual influences between the two Toluid polities. It is crucial to note 
that mutual influence touched not only issues of personal tastes such as cooking or literature, 
or symbolic issues such as legitimacy, but also government policies which decisively 
impacted ordinary people. For example, the short-lived adoption of paper money, or the chao, 
in the Ilkhanate is merely one of the best-known instances of such influence. In trying to find 
a solution for those Mongols who had become impoverished, Ghazan turned to expertise 
from the Yuan dynasty in the shape of Bolad Aqa, who had travelled to Persia and remained 
there as a kind of permanent envoy of the Qa’an.11 There are also other policies of the 
Ilkhanate with real or alleged origins in Chinese influence.12 Similarly, there are hints that 
some policies in Yuan China, such as laws which discriminated against Muslims which were 
in force for a short period, may have been influenced by events in the Ilkhanate.13  
 
Therefore, this thesis will consider the possibility of direct or indirect influence in the area of 
law between the two polities making up the Toluid empire. However, it will mainly be 
comparing the interaction between Mongol and Persian and Mongol and Chinese laws. The 
conclusions of this research are all the more significant because of the close interaction 
between the khans and the indigenous governmental traditions. The khans did not rule the 
                                                 
10
 Herrmann, Persische Urkunden der Mongolenzeit, pp. 34, 36   
11
 Allsen, Culture and conquest, p. 79 
12
 Morgan, “Who ran the Mongol empire,” p. 130, writes that the motivation for appointing joint viziers may 
have come from China; Martinez, “Institutional development, revenues and trade,” p. 95, attributes the ‘uhda or 
mutual responsibility system to Chinese baojia.  
13
 As to the question of whether the conversion to Islam of the Ilkhans influenced Yuan policy towards Muslims 
in China, see Ratchnevsky, “Rašīd ad-Dīn über die Mohammedanerverfolgungen,” pp. 163-180 
16 
 
sedentary populations from a distance, as was largely the case in the Golden Horde and also 
in the Chaghatai Khanate.14 On the contrary, Persia and China were places where Mongols 
were closely integrated and where they did not keep any issue related to the governance of 
the territories at arms’ length. The khans surrounded themselves with Persian and Chinese 
administrators, historians, scholars, fortune tellers, doctors, and any other people who might 
contribute to the successful running of an empire. The entourages of the Ilkhans and the Yuan 
emperors also included jurists or those with strong opinions on legal matters, as can be seen 
from the Confucians who tried to convince the Mongol rulers to issue a law code, and from 
the presence of a qadi al-qudat (chief qadi) alongside the Ilkhan in the later Ilkhanate.15 For 
this reason, when the khans engaged with the local legal systems, the flexibility of the Toluid 
khans and their officials with regards to legal matters cannot be attributed merely to 
indifference. Rather, this thesis will show that it was at least partly due to the traditional 
Mongol approach to resolving legal conflicts.     
 
 
The thesis 
  
This thesis will explain that in the Toluid empire, consisting of the Yuan dynasty and the 
Ilkhanate, the Mongol rulers engaged with local legal systems, recognizing their legitimacy 
while requiring basic obedience to themselves as legitimate rulers. They showed considerable 
flexibility, working together with local legal personnel and seldom demanding that Mongol 
laws be imposed on non-Mongols.  
 
                                                 
14
 Biran, Qaidu and the rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia, pp. 95-7   
15
 See chapters 6 and 7.  
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In fact there was no single Mongol ideology requiring the imposition of Mongol laws on 
other peoples, but rather a plurality of responses to the encounters with non-Mongols. 
Therefore Mongol legal tradition should not be characterized as embodying rigid customs, 
rather, there was considerable room for flexibility and negotiation within Mongol legal 
tradition, and there was some, if limited idea of allowing other tribes or chiefs to implement 
justice within their own spheres of authority as they saw fit. A whole range of options was 
available as ‘cultural capital’ to the Mongols as they conquered their empire, and the Toluids 
chose the more flexible approaches while building up relationships with local legal personnel.  
 
This relative flexibility of the Toluid rulers cannot be attributed simply to the failure or 
abandonment of Mongol legal traditions, since it was itself an influential and genuine 
expression of the Mongol steppe legal tradition. The engagement with local legal systems 
represents a tendency towards flexibility and consultation within the Mongol legal tradition, 
which is sometimes known as the principle of collegiality and parallels collegial decision-
making practices in other fields, such as the administrative field. The principle of collegiality 
had great influence in the Toluid empire both within and outside of the legal sphere, and was 
one of the most important factors influencing the Toluids to adopt a flexible attitude in legal 
matters.      
 
This flexibility was manifested in the Toluids’ frequent acceptance of Persian and Chinese 
legal principles and practices. It will be shown that while the khans’ officials were expected 
to be subject to the khans, and therefore to Mongol law, Mongol personnel at the local level 
seldom even tried to impose Mongol legal principles. In addition, the Ilkhans and the Qa’ans 
failed to take advantage of links to expertise from each other’s khanates in legal matters, as 
they did in so many other matters. It can be concluded that personal relationships with the 
18 
 
local legal specialists were more important than imposition of any particular legal ideas 
which demanded considerable political will.  
 
Further, it will be argued that this flexibility and cooperation with local legal officials is the 
best explanation for different results in terms of Mongol influence on law in Persia and China. 
While there were some similarities in the yarghus (trials), punishments and execution 
methods, there were also great differences, especially in the framework of the legal system 
and in the degree of Mongol influence in society. The flexibility on the part of the Mongols 
allowed the choices of Persians and Chinese on whether and how far to engage with the 
Mongol rulers to have major long-term influence. Most long-term Mongol influence came 
about not through Mongols imposing law but through compromise and negotiation. This 
confirms that view that the Toluids did not seek to impose Mongol law, but rather, significant 
involvement of the Toluids in the existing legal systems occurred when the subjects of the 
Toluids called for such involvement. When the Toluids became involved in legal matters 
therefore, it was mostly in response to local legal officials, and often in terms of their own 
consultative tradition.  
 
These arguments will be pursued mostly in the context of what can be termed ‘criminal law,’ 
defined for the purposes of this study as laws that carry the death penalty or other serious 
punishments;16 civil laws such as tax law and commercial law, marriage laws, and land law 
do not form part of this study in themselves, although some will be discussed, but only 
insofar as the competencies of the judges and the conduct of the trials are concerned. This 
focus on criminal laws is in order to provide a manageable focus for this thesis, and to make 
the most of the available sources.  
                                                 
16
 Both physical punishment and the confiscation of the family members and property of the condemned will be 
discussed in this work.  
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Sources and methodology 
 
This thesis will make use of both legal documents and other historical sources. Legal sources 
are relatively few and unevenly distributed, while non-legal sources provide essential 
alternative perspectives.  
 
There is no extant Mongol law code.17 Legal sources for the Ilkhanate include some extant 
edicts preserved in the archive of Sheikh Safi al-Din of Ardabil, discovered by Alexander 
Morton and Gottfried Herrman independently, and collected and published by Herrmann as 
“Persische Urkunden der Mongolenzeit;”18 the volume contains both transcriptions and 
translations of these edicts, as well as photographs of the edicts themselves. In addition, there 
are edicts preserved in the section on Ghazan of Rashid al-Din’s Jami al-tavarikh. Even 
though these are a fraction of the documents produced at the time, they still give an indication 
of the kind and extent of involvement in law on the part of the Ilkhans, especially in the 
absence of any information on the compilation of any law code in the Ilkhanate. These edicts 
are also crucial in giving information on who signed and issued these edicts, and who they 
were addressed to, showing who was meant to obey them and who was meant to assist in 
their enforcement. Therefore, they provide crucial information on the intentions of the 
Ilkhans in making laws and some information on relationships with local legal officials, in 
particular those who were involved in writing or issuing these edicts. Additionally, the 
language used in the edicts shows the ideology or religious belief that the rulers wished to 
emphasize. A further important source is the Dastur al-katib, which provides documents on 
                                                 
17
 This will be discussed in detail in chapter one.  
18
 Herrmann, Persische Urkunden der Mongolenzeit: Text- und Bildteil, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004, p. 1 
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the later period of Ilkhanid rule, such as a document for the appointment of an amir yarghu 
(leader of a trial).19 
 
There are additionally a number of documents from Shari’a courts, also preserved in the 
archive of Sheikh Safi al-Din of Ardabil; these have been partially edited and translated, but 
to use them more fully was impractical because of my lack of knowledge of Arabic. While 
the documents give some important insights into the development of law in the Shari’a 
courts,20 the very fact that the vast majority are in Arabic is emblematic of the disconnect 
between the Shari’a courts and the Ilkhanid administration, which used mostly Persian and 
Mongol.21 In fact there seems to be so little change following the Mongol invasion that 
Monika Gronke remarks: “We can forego a detailed description of historical events, since 
they play no role in these documents.”22 
 
A far greater number of legal documents are available for China. Leaving aside the vexed 
question of whether these are ‘law codes’ or merely ‘compilations of edicts,’23 several 
compilations, including formal and private ones, are extant.  
 
The earliest, which is not strictly from the Yuan dynasty period, is the Taihelü 泰和律, which 
was the recognized law code of the Jin 金 dynasty, which preceded the Mongols in northern 
China. This code is relevant because it continued to be used at times even under the Yuan, 
                                                 
19
 Nakhjavānī, Dastūr al-kātib fī ta'yyīn al-marātib, vol. 2, pp. 29-33   
20
 Gronke, Derwische im Vorhof der Macht, p. 213 
21
 Morgan,“Persian as a lingua franca in the Mongol Empire”, pp. 160-70 
22
 Gronke, Arabische und persische Privaturkunden des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts aus Ardabil (Aserbeidschan), 
p. 1 n. 5; in this book, Monika Gronke edited documents from 1123 up to 1256.  
23
 Huang Shijian , Tongzhi tiaoge, dianjiao shuoming p. 2   
21 
 
and in fact it is largely through quotations in Yuan-era sources that this work is known.24 The 
Jin code was modelled on the Tang code but contained some features characteristic of the 
Jurchen, originally a semi-nomadic people. When the Yuan dynasty was officially 
proclaimed and the name Yuan 元 adopted, the Jin code was abolished but no substitute was 
immediately provided; this may be why some officials continued to refer to it in their 
judgments on legal cases.  
 
The Dayuan tongzhi 大元通制 comes closest to being the ‘representative’ legal 
accomplishment of the Yuan dynasty;25 it was completed in 1316 and promulgated in 1321. 
Only a portion of this is extant as the Tongzhi tiaoge 通制条格, containing documents from 
the years 1234 to 1316.26 Analysis of the content shows that a part was the same or similar to 
the Tang code (on which most Chinese dynasties have modeled a code) but there were many 
differences as well.27 
 
The Zhiyuan Xin’ge 至元新格 was issued in 1291; it has been translated,28 but it is quite 
concise and consists mostly of administrative regulations. Another, later compilation, the 
Jingshi dadian 经世大典, has been preserved in the Yuan history or Yuan Shi 元史.29   
 
However the most interesting source is the Yuan Dianzhang 元典章 because, as Birge argues, 
it was a private effort, published to satisfy a commercial market, based on documents coming 
                                                 
24
 Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 290; Birge, Women, property, and Confucian reaction, p. 210 n. 26  
25
 Huang Shijian, Tongzhi tiaoge, dianjiao shuoming p. 2 
26
 Birge, Women, property, and Confucian reaction, pp. 212-213 
27
 Huang Shijian, Tongzhi tiaoge, dianjiao shuoming p. 2 
28
 Ch’en, Chinese legal tradition under the Mongols: the Code of 1291 as reconstructed, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979 
29
 Ratchnevsky, Un Code des Yuan, vol. 1, p. xx 
22 
 
from a local yamen archive in either Jiangxi or Fujian, including unedited documents dating 
from 1260 to 1317, organised by subject.30 This text is thus more valuable than official 
publications because the original language is preserved and changes over time and 
contrasting rulings are not edited out. 
 
While these legal edicts and codes provide very varied and, in the case of China, a huge 
amount of information, in this study it has been possible to use only a limited amount of this 
information. In particular, these legal sources have been very valuable in order to determine 
the intentions of the khans, both in terms of attempts to impose Mongol laws and in terms of 
acceptance of local legal systems.  
 
However, a thesis about the flexible nature of much of Mongol law cannot be tested on the 
basis of legal documents alone. A crucial point regarding the methodology of this research 
has been the concurrent reliance on non-legal sources to glean information on the legal 
system, most often through examining and collating individual legal cases.31 Looking at 
individual cases as represented in the narrative sources makes it possible to take the focus off 
ideological and religious discussions of the legal situation, and to focus instead on the 
mechanisms such as the principle of collegiality which enabled the khans, intellectuals and 
judges to interact and work together in shaping the legal system and individual laws. With 
much of the research on law in the Mongol empire to date focusing on ‘customs’ and 
stressing the conflicts between Mongols and other peoples, using non-legal sources enables 
us to look beyond at the ways in which legal conflicts were resolved in practice.  
 
                                                 
30
 Birge, Women, property, and Confucian reaction, pp. 213-217 
31
 Nielson used this approach to study the mazalim trials under the Mamluks. Nielson, Secular Justice in an 
Islamic State: Maẓālim under the Baḥrī Mamlūks, 662/1264-789/1387, pp. 35-6 
23 
 
Although the non-legal sources have their own problems in terms of bias, in gleaning 
‘incidental’ information from these sources, rather than information which the writers of the 
sources were specifically focusing on, the problems caused by bias in these sources are 
greatly reduced.32 Bias which sometimes occurs in the case of religiously contentious or 
highly politicized trials has been counteracted as much as possible by using multiple sources, 
including Persian local histories and some of the writings of Yuan officials. These sources 
which consist of histories, both official and unofficial, chronicles, and other writings have 
been crucial for this research. 
 
These include both local histories and those with a more universal focus; among the latter are 
Ata Malik Juvaynī’s Tārīkhī Jahāngushā, Rashid al-Din’s Jamī’ al-tavarīkh and Vassaf’s 
history known as Tārīkhī Vaṣṣaf. These histories cover not only history of the Ilkhanate, but 
also provide information on Chinggis Khan’s early years and rise, and Mongol achievements 
in other regions such as China and Central Asia. Rashid al-Din’s history is even known as the 
first world history33 because of its breadth of information. The histories recount high-profile 
cases of trials or executions, including trials the outcomes of which the writers disagreed with. 
They give information on the trials of pretenders to the throne, princes, military leaders, 
bureaucrats, and rebels. Sometimes there is not much detail, at other times there is 
considerable detail on who conducted the trials, who was present, how the interrogation 
occurred, what punishment was imposed. The histories also provide some background 
information and the authors’ opinions about the justice or injustice of the verdicts given.   
 
                                                 
32
 Tosh, The pursuit of history, pp. 66-68; Bloch, The Historian's Craft, p. 61   
33
 Boyle,“Rashīd al-Dīn: The First World Historian,” pp. 20-21 
24 
 
Despite the various biases of these histories, they often agree on at least the basic facts of 
judicial cases. Ata Malik Juvaynī’s veracity is supported by the close similarity of the events 
he describes with the very anti-Mongol Tabakat-i Nasiri of Juzjani.34 The Zafarnamah of 
Mustawfī is another valuable source, a verse chronicle recounting the vicissitudes of the 
Ilkhans in some detail. 
 
For trials of less illustrious personages, the local histories provide numerous important stories. 
Some of these can be cross-checked with other sources. The local histories include the 
Tarikhi shahi Qarakhitayan concentrating on events in Kerman; the Tarikhi Tabriz, and the 
Simt al-‘ula by Nasir al-Din Munshi.  
 
Sources on the later Ilkhanate include Qashani’s Tarikh-i Uljaytu; the Zayl Jami’ al-tavarikh 
by Hafiz Abru; the Tarikhi Shaykh Uwais by Ahri; and the Majma’ al-ansab by Shabankara’i, 
which covers events in various provinces, and contains the accounts of several trials. The 
Safvat al-Safa, the history of the religious order of Sufis at Ardabil, provides anecdotes not 
found elsewhere.  
 
Alternative perspectives are provided by Mamluk historians including al-‘Umari and al-
Maqrizi who, because of the ideological divide between the Mamluk sultanate and the 
Ilkhanate gave often radically different assessments of Mongol law and its impact. The anti-
Mongol fatwas of Ibn Taimiyya also fall into this category.35 
 
                                                 
34
 Lane, Early Mongol Rule, p. 3 
35
 Aigle, D., “Loi mongole vs loi islamique?” p. 994 
25 
 
Other perspectives are also provided by the more locally-focussed Armenian and Georgian 
sources, which have been translated, such as Stephanos Orbelian,36 Kirakos Gandzaketsʿi, and 
the anonymous Georgian history entitled Kartlis Cxovreba.37  
 
Among the Chinese sources, the most prominent is the Yuan history or Yuan Shi 元史, 
compiled, as was customary in China, under the Ming dynasty after the demise of the Yuan. 
Since the compilation was rather hasty, it is not absolutely complete, but this may also be an 
advantage since much of the material was compied largely unaltered from original sources. 
The Yuan history contains the most extensive collection of biographies from the Yuan 
dynasty. Although some of the biographies are biased (a few are specifically grouped under 
jianchen 奸臣 ‘evil ministers,’38 and in others, a Confucian emphasis is clearly present), they 
are nonetheless extremely valuable. The Yuan history also chronicles the salient events of 
each year. 
 
Other sources which despite their non-legal nature are extremely valuable are the Qiujian 
xiansheng daquan wenji 秋澗先生大全文集 by Wang Yun 王惲 (1227-1304), who came 
from an important Chinese legal family and served in the Censorate under the Qa’ans; the 
Mumin zhonggao 牧民忠告, a book of advice for magistrates; and the Lixue zhinan 吏學指南, 
a collection of legal terms and their explanations.39 
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All of these sources provide differing insights into the attitudes of Mongols and local legal 
officials and their interactions. They provide the raw data showing the extent and quality of 
interaction between Mongols and non-Mongol legal officials during the Toluid empire.  
 
However, this interaction, and the flexibility which the Mongols often showed, naturally 
leads to the question of how such interaction came about. Whether it represented a deviation 
from Mongol tradition, or whether it instead reflected Mongol tradition, can only be 
answered by an understanding of Mongol culture. The Secret History of the Mongols (Mongɣ
ol-un niɣuca tobčiyan) is the only substantial extant source written by a Mongol (or Mongols) 
from a Mongol point of view.40 The case can be made that Šigi Qutuqu, Chinggis Khan’s 
adopted brother or son, was its author, although other views remain.41 It includes information 
about some legal trials, and its insistence on Mongol values (and occasional criticism of 
Chinggis Khan) show how it was part of an attempt to preserve Mongol values that some felt 
were being threatened. 
 
While its Mongol authorship means that its content is extremely valuable, it is also the case 
that many things which were obvious to nomadic Mongols are left unsaid in the text. This is 
of particular concern since no other source reflects nomadic culture to this extent. While the 
Secret History mentions yasa (commands) and yosun (customs), other aspects of Mongol law 
are not stressed, or are not immediately obvious to the modern reader.  
 
Therefore, it is worth considering what anthropology can contribute to the study of Mongol 
law. While caution is required in allowing modern studies to complement our knowledge 
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from the historical sources, the influence of anthropology has inspired historians to see 
Mongol law in broader terms. In 1940 Eric Voegelin wrote about the legal character of the 
orders of submission that the Mongols sent to foreign powers, demonstrating their legal 
character although they are usually considered to be simply diplomatic.42 More recently, 
Roberte Hamayon, Françoise Aubin and others have written about Mongol marriage customs 
and the vengeance system,43 arguing that these, as much as yasa and yosun, deserve the title 
of laws.      
 
Law can include many different aspects, and does not necessarily need to be similar to the 
law that we, as modern historians of the Mongol empire, are familiar with. Rather, 
anthropological research on the laws of nomads and tribal peoples has been extremely useful 
in challenging a text-based and state-centred view of the nature of law.  
 
While there is no generally accepted definition of law, the major challenge in defining it is 
how to differentiate it from morality on the one hand and from custom on the other. Like law, 
morality has a normative character, while both law and custom are usually obeyed.44 But 
while defining law is challenging, whether laws are written down or not has no bearing on the 
issue. We cannot conclude that certain societies have no laws, simply because they have no 
writing or because none of their writing has come down to us.  
 
One way of differentiating law from morality and custom is to postulate that only what is 
recognized as law by the ‘state’ or the legitimate authority in any given territory is truly law. 
However, this leaves ambiguous the position of international law, as well as the ‘customary 
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law’ of societies lacking a ‘state’ (however ‘state’ is defined). Rather, law is a common 
feature of human existence, and exists in every society. This thesis will take the view that 
laws are norms the violation of which attracts a punishment, however, the punishment does 
not need to be carried out by a ‘state’ actor.45  
 
Therefore, in the course of this thesis reference will be made to anthropological and historico-
anthropological studies of the Mongols in particular, and of other peoples where these can 
provide additional insight. While these studies do not substitute for a thorough understanding 
of the primary sources from the Mongol period, they can assist in understanding these 
sources better.  
 
Thus, this thesis will mention numerous aspects of Mongol law, including those which are 
more traditionally recognized as ‘law’ and others which characterized the Mongols’ nomadic 
life. In addition, the thesis will, in chapters six and seven, include discussion of intellectual 
and cultural trends which had an impact on the legal history in the Ilkhanate and the Yuan 
empire. The thesis will therefore go beyond what can be strictly termed ‘legal history,’ in 
order to understand more deeply the impact of Mongol law in the Toluid empire.   
 
 
Literature review  
 
Western scholarly study of Mongol law started with the idea of a law code, the Great Yasa, 
promulgated by Chinggis Khan at his enthronement in 1206. This was the picture painted by 
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Petis de la Croix in 1710,46 a picture which long remained popular. Because of his work, 
other scholars such as D’Ohsson, de Sacy, Vernadsky, Alinge and Poliak, also believed that 
Chinggis Khan had issued a Great Yasa and set about translating some of the primary 
sources.47 It was in this tradition that Riasanovsky wrote his Fundamental Principles of 
Mongol law in 1937, which lists a whole 36 laws contained in the Great Yasa, not counting 
additional maxims of Chinggis Khan.48 Unfortunately, as David Ayalon has since 
conclusively demonstrated, this work was based on a shaky foundation, since the mostly 
Mamluk primary sources that these scholars were relying on were all based on a single source, 
the Tarikhe Jahangosha of Juvaynī, from which work they copied with some distortions. 
Ayalon’s articles, which appeared in the 1970s, effectively ended this era of the study of 
Mongol law, and opened up new avenues.  
 
In 1986, David Morgan made the then revolutionary claim that the ‘Great Yasa’ did not exist, 
or more precisely that if it existed, it was not a well ordered law code which had been 
promulgated, but more like a collection of case law. He and Prof. de Rachewiltz debated 
whether the Chinese sources, in the absence of firm proof from the Persian and Arabic 
sources, implied the existence of the Great Yasa as a law code. Finally, painstaking linguistic 
research by scholars such as Aigle and Chogt has shown that there is no linguistic basis for 
the concept of ‘Great Yasa.’49 The nail in the coffin is Chogt’s 2010 book about the Great 
Yasa which shows that the Chinese sources do not support the existence of such a law code 
any more than the Persian sources.50  
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However, the idea of the Great Yasa continues to be popular until today. This is not only 
because some scholars are unaware of the latest research, but also because it is an attractive 
concept which gives us the illusion of understanding Mongol law. By being understood as a 
law code, Mongol law is rendered similar to the forms of law that we are familiar with, and it 
is assumed that we can summarize it under a number of ‘points’ or substantive laws.   
 
In addition, no alternative grand narrative to that of the Great Yasa has emerged. While the 
research inspired by anthropology is eye-opening, it offers mostly correction on specific 
points, in particular, that the Mongol marriage practices as well as the vengeance system 
deserve the title of ‘laws,’ rather than being called ‘customs’ which leads us to devalue their 
importance, normative character and function within Mongol society. However in terms of 
the interaction of Mongol law with Chinese and Islamic law, the concept of the Yasa is still 
very much in the foreground of how such an encounter is conceptualized. 
 
Perhaps because of the dominance of the Yasa paradigm, there has been comparatively little 
research on case law. This is especially true for the Ilkhanate where there are no extant legal 
codes. Thomas Allsen gave an insightful analysis of yarghus in Möngke’s time in his PhD 
thesis,51 and Lambton devoted half a chapter of her book Continuity and change52 to the topic. 
There is also a collection of case studies by Ma’dankan which, however, is accompanied by 
very little analysis. Though the author points out some unique features of Mongol 
punishments such as the number of strokes in beatings typically being a number ending in 
seven, the analysis is largely coloured by denigration of the Ilkhans for their executions of 
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Persians.53 Other authors, notably Aigle,54 Halperin, Spuler, Ratchnevsky,55 and Gronke56 
have referred in passing to the yarghu. On the Chinese side, Hu Xingdong has given 
considerable and detailed attention to the procedure of civil cases during the Yuan dynasty, 
and yuehui 約會 (joint trials) as well as criminal trials have also been the subject of recent 
research. The relative dearth of research on legal cases means that our conception of Mongol 
law is incomplete. While knowledge of Mongol substantive law is now fairly extensive, there 
is little acknowledgment of the processes by which Mongols made, promulgated and 
enforced laws. 
 
These processes are however key to our understanding of the encounter of Mongol law with 
other legal systems. Too often, research on this question is overshadowed by the concept of 
the Great Yasa and the consequent over-emphasis on substantive law at the expense of 
procedure and case law. Li Yunian and Narenchaogetu are among the many who assume that 
the Great Yasa was of supreme importance even in the conquered territories and 
consequently evaluate the encounter of Mongol and non-Mongol law simply as a clash of 
differing laws.57  
 
On the other hand, some recent works have tended to emphasize the flexibility or tolerance in 
the Mongol approach to non-Mongol legal systems. Lapidus mentions an “alliance” between 
Mongol rulers and local elites such as qadis, thereby hinting at a much more flexible 
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approach to Islamic law, though he attributes this flexibility to dependence on the support of 
local notable families.58 Denise Aigle has remarked that it is extremely unlikely that the 
Mongols tried to enforce a law code based on custom, since even Ibn Taimiyya in his fatwas 
never denounced the Ilkhans for trying to impose their customs on Muslims.59 Peter Jackson 
has pointed out that Chaghatai’s decree on the proper method of slaughtering animals was 
probably not imposed anywhere far from the Mongol centres of power, namely their 
encampments.60 George Lane has remarked on the flexibility inherent in the institution of the 
yarghu;61 while Françoise Aubin speaks more generally of the “profound juridical and legal 
sensibility of the Mongols.”62   
 
It has also been acknowledged that in specific instances, Mongol and non-Mongol practices 
combined to form novel regulations which were then anchored in law. One example is the 
shaomaiyin, a fusion of the Mongol practice of blood money (a reparatory punishment) and 
Chinese concern for ancestor worship.63  
 
However, these works do not provide a detailed analysis as to why the Toluids should be 
flexible in matters of law. This is despite the acknowledged flexibility or even tolerance of 
the Mongols in the areas of religion64 and administrative practice, where Endicott-West 
speaks of their “conciliar, deliberative style of decision-making.”65 The relevance of the 
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Mongol consultative tradition for legal matters has never been mentioned except very briefly 
by Mansura Haidar,66 and in the work of a political anthropologist, Laura Sabloff.67 
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Chapter 1 – The Great Yasa 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Historically, research on Mongol law in the Mongol empire as well as in the Toluid khanates 
has been focussed around the concept of the ‘Great Yasa.’ Many books which mention law in 
the Mongol empire discuss primarily or even exclusively the ‘Great Yasa.’ The present 
chapter will review this approach to Mongol law. It will be argued that, in line with recent 
criticism, the concept of ‘Great Yasa’ is inadequate for understanding either the substance or 
central features of Mongol law.  
 
The first part of the chapter will review evidence for the ‘Great Yasa,’ arguing that such 
evidence is clearly inadequate, and that the Mongol approach to different laws and legal 
systems was in any case more complex than assumed on the basis of the concept of ‘Great 
Yasa.’ The second part of the chapter will argue that the ‘Great Yasa’ is best understood and 
treated as an idea with its own history, separate from the historical reality of Mongols 
encountering and reacting to non-Mongol legal systems. The ‘Great Yasa’ is best studied as a 
concept within intellectual history. The reality of Mongol law on the other hand and practices 
which had an impact on the encounter with non-Mongol legal systems will be discussed in 
chapter 2.  
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The ‘Great Yasa’ and the need for reviewing this concept 
 
The Great Yasa68 is held to be a law code issued by Chinggis Khan or his successors. 
Scholars have also assumed that the Great Yasa was a codification of Mongol customary law 
and that the lists of Mongol laws contained in the works of Juvaynī, al-Maqrizi, al-‘Umari, 
Bar Hebraeus and Rashid al-Din are fragments of this law code. Much energy has been 
invested in attempts to reconstruct the code based on the supposed fragments.69   
 
The debate about the Great Yasa is not simply a debate about a concept. Rather, the Great 
Yasa has been seen as embodying the essence of Mongol law in the Mongol empire and has 
had paramount influence on how the encounter of the Mongols with non-Mongol legal 
systems is conceptualized. The concept of Great Yasa has been current since the time of Petis 
de la Croix in the 18th century,70 but this research will reiterate recent calls to discard it. 
Because the concept of Great Yasa has encouraged scholars to see Mongol law as a series of 
substantive laws, other aspects of Mongol legal practice which are not plainly and directly 
recorded in the sources are most often ignored. Moreover, the focus on substantive laws 
means that the clash between opposing legal norms is the almost exclusive focus of most 
research.  
 
The Great Yasa has been used to stress Mongol ‘otherness’ and opposition to Islamic and 
Chinese values, to the point where the Yasa is used as a catch-all concept for Mongol 
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customary law and state ideology, including unrelated authoritarian demands of Mongol 
khans.71 This reinforces the idea that the Mongol khans were uncompromising and wished all 
the conquered peoples to follow their laws, which feeds into the existing stereotype of the 
Mongols as being in a class apart due to their desire to exploit others.72 The Great Yasa is 
problematic as a concept because it is not clearly defined, and therefore lends itself to being 
used without appropriate methodological rigour.  
 
Moreover, the Great Yasa has negatively impacted our ability to judge the long-term 
influence of the Mongols on legal matters in Persia and China. This is because, if Mongol law 
is seen primarily as consisting of a set of customs which it would have been impractical to try 
and impose on the conquered populations - such as not washing in running water, 
slaughtering animals in a particular manner, not treading on thresholds and other similar laws 
– then the conclusion is naturally made that there was little long-term impact, despite the 
brief imposition of some of these customs in Yuan China. Many authors simply assume the 
basic incompatibility of Islamic and Mongol law, and suggest that the influence of Mongol 
law faded with time,73 in harmony with the assumptions of Mamluks such as the amir Sayf 
al-Din Aytamish al-Nasiri who stated that after Ghazan’s death “the Yasa of the Mongols 
passed away.”74 If one equates the Great Yasa with Mongol law, it is easy to mistakenly 
assume that simply because references to the Mongol word ‘yasa’ in the sources diminish 
over time, so did the influence of Mongol law. 
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In short, the concept of Great Yasa has encouraged research on Mongol law to proceed within 
narrow and predictable boundaries. There is the need for a new approach to law in the Toluid 
empire, one which recognizes that Mongols reacted in various ways to non-Mongol laws and 
legal sytems and that Toluid khans were often flexible in their approach. Therefore, it is 
indispensable that the concept of Great Yasa be critically examined and, if the criticism is 
justified as this thesis argues, abandoned.   
 
 
An evaluation of the evidence for the Great Yasa 
 
The existence of a law code known as the Great Yasa has been postulated on the basis of 
several passages in the primary sources which seem to support the existence of such a code. 
One that has often been cited to support the idea of the ‘Great Yasa’ law code is the following 
passage from the Secret History of the Mongols, where Chinggis Khan says to his foster-son 
(or foster-brother)75 Shigi-Qutuqu: 
 
“Divide up all the subject people and apportion them to Our mother, to Us, to Our 
younger brothers and sons according to the name of the people, 
Splitting up those that live in felt-walled tents, 
Separating those that live in dwellings with wooden doors. 
Let no one disobey your word!' 
Further, he entrusted Shigi-qutuqu with the power of judgement over all and said to 
him, 'Of the entire people 
Chastising the robber, 
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Checking the liar, 
execute those who deserve death, punish those who deserve punishment. Furthermore, 
writing in a blue (-Script) register all decisions about the distribution and about the 
judicial matters of the entire population, make it into a book (i. e. a permanent record). 
Until the offspring of my offspring, let no one change any of the blue writing that 
Shigi-Qutuqu, after deciding in accordance with me, shall make into a book with 
white paper. Anyone who changes it shall be guilty.”76 
 
As Morgan points out however, this passage does not in any way imply the promulgation of a 
law code.77 The ‘blue book,’ according to the text of the passage was meant to record 
particular judicial decisions, as well as the allocation of conquered peoples among the princes 
of the imperial family. Morgan therefore refers to it as “a kind of case law, a body of written 
legal precedents.”78 Chinese sources refer to the ‘blue book’ as a register or census rather 
than a law code.79 The book has not survived.  
 
Secondly, the following passage from Ala al-Din Juvaynī seems to support the existence of a 
written code: 
 
“In accordance and agreement with his own mind he [Chinggiz Khan] established a 
rule for every occasion and a regulation for every circumstance; while for every crime 
he fixed a penalty. And since the Tartar peoples had no script of their own, he gave 
orders that the Mongol children should learn from the Uighur and that these yasas and 
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ordinances should be written down on rolls. These rolls are called the Great Book of 
Yasas [  ! گر$%  'ٔ() ] and are kept in the treasury of the chief princes. Wherever a 
khan ascends the throne, or a great army is mobilized, or the princes assemble and 
begin [to consult together] concerning affairs of state and the administration thereof, 
they produce these rolls and model their actions thereon; and proceed with the 
disposition of armies or the destruction of provinces and cities in the manner therein 
prescribed.”80 
 
The conventional view is that the yāsā-nāmah-ī buzurg is the Great Yasa. Scholars such as 
Ratchnevsky argue, partly on the basis of this passage, that the Yasa dealt mainly with affairs 
of state, including military matters and administration. Togan points out that the yasa (jasagh 
in Mongolian) is rendered in the Chinese glossary of the Secret History as junfa 军法, 
‘military law.’81 It is argued that the relative paucity of information on the Great Yasa and its 
contents could be due to secrecy which this kind of information deserved.82  
 
“It is these [military] injunctions that lent the Yasa of Cinggis khan the nimbus of 
their almost magical efficacy. To them was attributed the invincibility of the Mongol 
people and their meteoric rise as a world power.”83    
 
“The aim which Cinggis khan pursued by writing down his jasaq [commands] was 
the perpetuation of the military-political order introduced by him and the reign of the 
Cinggisids over their world empire. The [main] instrument for the realisation of this 
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goal was the military; a substantial part of the injunctions of the Yasa was 
undoubtedly dedicated to military discipline and organisation.” 84 
 
Morgan, however, argues that this passage from Juvaynī is to be understood in the context of 
the chapter as a general reference to the recording of Chinggis Khan’s precepts; although the 
term yasa-name-ye bozorg is difficult to explain, it does not necessarily refer to a systematic 
legal code.85 In addition, there may be an element of distortion or misunderstanding here. As 
Chogt emphasizes, it is only reasonable to suppose that historians from sedentary cultures, 
including Juvaynī, may have either misunderstood Mongol law, or wished to present it in a 
way more familiar to their readers.86 Therefore, this passage does not show that there 
definitely was a legal code known as Great Yasa. 
 
Juvaynī also has a whole chapter,87 supposedly on the Great Yasa, in his Ta'rīkh-i-Jahān-
gushā. The chapter deals mostly with military and hunting regulations, and the postal system, 
which would accord with the view that the Great Yasa dealt mainly with state and 
administrative matters. Morgan argues that the title of the chapter has been mistranslated; that 
it does in fact deal with Chinggis Khan’s injunctions, but that this chapter likewise does not 
support the existence of a systematic law code.88  
 
A seemingly incontrovertible claim as to the existence of a law code is found in al-Maqrizi’s 
work: he writes of a certain Ibn al-Burhan who claimed to have seen a copy of the Great Yasa 
                                                 
84
 Ratchnevsky, “Die Yasa (Jasaq) Cinggis-khans und ihre Problematik,” 485 
85
 Morgan, “The ‘Great “Yasa” of Chingiz Khan,’” p. 167 
86
 Chogt, Chingisu Kan no hō, pp. 33-49 
87
 Juvaynī, pp. 16-25; Juvaynī/Boyle, pp. 23-34 
88
 Morgan, “The ‘Great “Yasa” of Chingiz Khan,’” p. 168 
41 
 
in Baghdad. A description of the contents of the Yasa follows this information.89 However, in 
1971 Ayalon convincingly debunked this claim: Ibn al-Burhan can be identified as Ahmad 
bin Muhammad, biographies of whom can be found in al-Sakhawi, Ibn Taghribirdi and other 
works90. According to these biographies, it is very improbable that he spoke any language 
apart from Arabic, so he would not have been able to read a copy of the Yasa written in 
Mongolian in Uighur characters (there is no evidence of any translations).91 Rather, al-
Maqrizi’s material was taken unacknowledged from al-'Umari,92 who took his material, with 
acknowledgement, from Juvaynī. Thus what were previously thought to be independent 
accounts of the Yasa, the closeness of which confirmed the reliability of the reporting, are in 
fact all taken from a single source. There is no evidence that Chinggis Khan himself was 
responsible for most of the laws as claimed by al-Maqrizi, and it also seems that he 
deliberately selected those laws he thought Muslims would most abhor, for his own 
purposes.93 Since al-Maqrizi’s ‘evidence’ has been shown to be false and the other passages 
can be interpreted in different ways, the logical outcome seems to be to reject the idea that a 
formal law code (Great Yasa) ever existed.  
 
Igor de Rachewiltz argued that though the evidence from the sources from the Western part 
of the empire is inconclusive, the existence of an actual code is demonstrated by Chinese 
sources.94 In recent research by scholars within China, the existence of the Great Yasa is 
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accepted as a fact.95 The Yuan Shi contains references to a “dà” 大 or “imperial” yasa 
(transliterated as “zha-sa” 扎撒 or 劄撒). One of these is in the account of the quriltai96 at 
which Ögödei was enthroned, which says that: Ban da zhasa 頒大札撒 “the/a great/imperial 
yasa97 was promulgated.”98 As for the definition of “great yasa,” the text edited by Song Lian 
(1310-1381) contains the note: 華言大法令也。“This (i. e. the da zha-sa) is called in 
Chinese ‘Imperial law’”;99 however, this could refer to the emperor’s edicts rather than a law 
code.100 In addition the Lixue zhinan, written around 1301 by a Chinese in Mongol employ 
around 1301,101 defines “da zha sa” as “大扎撒，謂依條例法度也” “… a system of law 
based on tiaoli.” The same section defines tiaoli as being similar to a lü (law code), but then 
says that tiaoli are cited to decide legal cases.102 Although Hu Xingdong takes this as 
evidence that the Great Yasa existed and had some effect,103 it is not conclusive evidence, 
and points rather to the possibility of a legal system based on precedents.  
 
Speculation has also centred on the meaning of the expression baoxun 寶訓 “precious 
precept,” which has been held to refer to the Great Yasa. The expression occurs in the Yuan 
Shi in the biography of Bayan 伯颜,104 and in Huang Jin 黃溍’s Jinhua huang xiansheng 
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wenji 金華黃先生文集. While earlier literature suggests that the “precious precept” is the 
Great Yasa, according to the most recent research by Chogt it is much more likely that this 
expression refers to pronouncements of wisdom known as bilig. This is because sources such 
as Rashid al-Din frequently refer to the reading or recalling from memory of biligs at 
quriltais.105  
 
A strong reason to reject the concept of Great Yasa is the meaning of the word “yasa” itself. 
Both the French scholar Denise Aigle106 and the Inner Mongolian scholar Chogt107 on 
analysing the word linguistically have concluded that “yasa” is a command given by a khan, 
or a chief, which derives its authority from the khan’s authority. The word is often used in the 
plural, and sometimes paired with other words such as ahkam (ordinances) for example, in 
such a way that it could be seen as synonymous with ahkam.108  Indeed the vast majority of 
references to ‘yasa’ are unproblematic and refer simply to a ‘command;’ only a few, most of 
which have been discussed above, refer to a ‘great’ or ‘imperial’ yasa. To illustrate how 
ostensible references to the Great Yasa actually refer to a ‘yasa’ or ‘command,’ al-Maqrizi 
claims that a law by Chinggis Khan setting down the tax immunity of clergy (of all religions) 
was included in the Great Yasa. But Juvaynī, from whom al-Maqrizi had ultimately gained 
this information, speaks in this respect only of a yasa, i. e. a command.109 
 
In conclusion, there is no solid evidence for the existence of a law code, known as the “Great 
Yasa.”110 The attraction of the concept is that it gives us the illusion of being about to ‘grasp’ 
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Mongol law. Since most modern researchers on the Mongols come from sedentary cultures, 
we find law codes easily understandable.  However, the existence of such a code is simply 
not supported by the Mongolian sources, and evidence in non-Mongol sources is weak and 
probably due to misunderstanding or deception. The Chinese sources do not imply a written 
law code.111 
 
 
Evidence from initial encounters with non-Mongol practices    
 
While the existence of the Great Yasa could be taken as an indication that the Mongol laws 
were working towards imposing their laws on the conquered peoples, the actual situation can 
only be learned through examining the encounters of Mongols with non-Mongol practices. 
These, rather than chroniclers’ direct claims about the Great Yasa, show what the 
Chinggisids’ attitude was.  
 
What the evidence shows is that there were varied reactions to non-Mongol legal practices. 
Since the opinions of individual Mongols on whether to impose Mongol laws on their 
subjects varied, there was no consistent project to impose Mongol customary law on the 
conquered populations. The imposition of Mongol laws cannot be seen as general Chinggisid 
policy, or as a principle guiding Toluid policy-making. 
 
For example, there was inconsistency among different Mongols as to whether to expect 
others to eat meat from animals slaughtered in the Mongol way or whether to expect them to 
slaughter their animals in this way. Due to their shamanist beliefs, the Mongols slaughtered 
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animals without shedding their blood, often through opening the chest and squeezing the 
heart, as result of which the animal’s blood remained in the carcass.112 This was the opposite 
of the Muslim method which aimed at draining blood from the animal, and was also unusual 
in the Chinese context. 
 
There were occasional attempts to impose the Mongol slaughtering method, but they were 
few and cannot be taken as a consistent policy. An edict from Qubilai’s time claims that 
Chinggis Khan himself once told some Muslim merchants: “With the help of heaven I have 
conquered you. You are my slaves. If you do not eat [the food provided at the imperial court], 
how is that right?”113 However, this episode is only known from Qubilai’s edict, and not 
confirmed by other sources. Chaghatai is also said to have forbidden the Muslim slaughtering 
method: “The yasa forbidding the slaughter of sheep in a lawful manner he sent to every land; 
and for a time no man slaughtered sheep openly in Khorasan.”114  
 
The claim that Chaghatai sent this yasa, or command, “to every land” makes it seem as if it 
was the aim of the Mongol leadership to impose Mongol laws wherever possible. However, 
apart from the fact that implementation must have been difficult,115 Chaghatai was among the 
stricter members of the Golden Family, and others members of the Golden Family disagreed 
with his approach.  
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Qubilai, as mentioned in the edict and as confirmed by Rashid al-Din,116 did impose a policy 
of not allowing animals to be slaughtered in the Muslim way for several years. This was in 
response to what he perceived as an affront to Mongol “national pride,”117 or possibly, it was 
due to political reasons. It is significant that Qubilai imposed the policy as a result of this 
perceived affront from the Muslim merchants, and not as a matter of course at the beginning 
of his rule. If the idea of imposing Mongol laws whenever possible had been the prevailing 
attitude, Qubilai would have imposed, or tried to impose such a policy from the beginning.  
 
An opposite attitude can be seen in the case of Ögödei and other Mongols. According to Ala 
al-Din Juvaynī, 
 
“A Moslem bought a sheep in the market, took it home, closed the gates securely and 
slaughtered the animal after the Moslem fashion in [the lane between] two or three 
houses, not knowing that he was being watched by a Qipchaq, who, awaiting his 
opportunity, had followed him from the market. When he drew the knife across the 
sheep’s throat, the Qipchaq leapt down from the roof, bound him tight and bore him 
off to the Court of the World-Emperor. Qa’an examined the case and sent out scribes 
to investigate. When the circumstances were made known to his clear intellect, he 
spoke as follows: ‘This poor man has observed the commandment of our yasa and this 
Turk has infringed it.’ The Moslem’s life was spared and he was treated with favour, 
while the ill-natured Qipchaq was handed over to the executioners of Fate.”118 
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Whether the motives for the judgment could be found in Chinggis Khan’s dislike for 
traitors,119 or in the characteristic Mongol tolerance of private matters,120 the episode shows a 
lenient attitude to non-Mongol practices. While this anecdote is clearly intended to portray 
Ögödei in a positive light, nevertheless it is significant that he is portrayed as being so lenient 
with regards to legal matters.  
 
In addition, meat was prepared in the Muslim way for Möngke’s enthronement in 
consideration of Berke, who was Muslim.121 But not only Muslim historians report Mongol 
leniency: Kirakos reports an instance where a Georgian prince and his entourage, in 1230s, 
refused to eat the food offered them by the Mongol general Chormaghun, “on the grounds 
that much of it was forbidden to Christians. In response, far from exploding with rage, 
Chormaghun simply had them provided with food which was acceptable to them.”122 Thus, 
while there were several attempts to impose Mongol ways in the issue of how animals were 
to be slaughtered, there are equally as many instances of leniency on the part of Mongols in 
this issue. 
 
The diversity of opinion among the Mongols on whether to impose Mongol laws is also 
illustrated by the story of the man who was caught washing in a stream.123 Mongols, due to 
their nomadic customs or religious beliefs, avoided washing in running water. According to 
Juvaynī, they feared that washing in running water would increase the severity of storms and 
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lightning,124 although the belief system which included belief in gods of particular locations 
(mountains, rivers) may be the deeper reason.125  
 
“One day Qa’an was returning from his hunting ground together with Chaghatai when 
at noon they beheld a Moslem sitting in midstream washing himself. Now Chaghatai 
was extremely zealous in enforcing the yasa and spared no one who had deviated 
even slightly from it. When he caught sight of this man in the water, from the flame of 
the fire of his anger he wished to commit the earth of his being to the wind of 
annihilation and to cut off the source of his life. But Qa’an said: ‘To-day it is late and 
we are tired. This man shall be held in custody until tomorrow, when we can inquire 
into his case and ascertain the reason for his violating our yasa.’ And he ordered 
Danishmand Hajib to take charge of the man till the morning, when his innocence or 
guilt might be discovered; he also told Danishmand, in secret, to have a balish of 
silver thrown in the water where the man had been sitting and to instruct the man, 
when he was examined, to say that he was a poor man with many obligations, that this 
balish was his whole capital and that it was for this reason that he had acted so rashly. 
On the next day the guilty man was examined in the Qa’an’s presence. Qa’an listened 
to the excuse with the ear of acceptance, but by way of precaution someone went to 
the spot and the balish was taken out of the water. Then Qa’an said: ‘To whom could 
it occur to meditate breaking our yasa and commandment or swerving a single hair’s-
breadth therefrom? But it seems to be that this man is a person of poor estate and little 
property and so has sacrificed himself for a single balish.’ He commanded that the 
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man should be given ten more balish in addition to the one; and a written statement 
was taken from him that he would not commit a similar action again.”126 
 
Here, Chaghatai’s strictness clashes with Ögödei’s leniency. It could be argued that, since the 
acquittal of the man was obtained through a subterfuge, the prevailing atmosphere at court 
was one which saw the imposition of Mongol laws as desirable. However, the particular 
resolution of this case could also be seen merely as a ruse to feign harmony within the royal 
family, a quality which had been highly emphasized by Chinggis Khan himself.127 
 
Ögödei’s final decision shows that in fact there was no unanimity on whether to impose 
Mongol laws on non-Mongols. Chinggis Khan had given Chaghatai a special role with 
regards to Mongol law: “For each of [his sons by his principal wife] Chingiz-Khan had 
selected a special office. … To Chaghatai… fell the administration of the yasa and the law 
(  !   و+ , ), both the enforcement thereof and the reprimanding and chastisement of those 
that contravened it.”128 Chaghatai fulfilled this role by making sure that the case came to trial. 
However, as Togan points out, he was not in fact given the supreme position of power which 
would have enabled him to truly enforce Mongol laws, being instead under the Qa’anship of 
Ögödei who was much more lenient.129  The one who made the final decision was Chinggis 
Khan’s successor, Ögödei, who did not feel compelled to follow Chaghatai’s wishes. The 
difference of opinion shows that the Chinggisids had no overall policy to impose Mongol law. 
Given the number of examples in which Mongols showed leniency, there is no particular 
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reason to consider Chaghatai’s attitude as more typical than that of Ögödei among those in 
power.  
 
In China, where most issues ended up being discussed and legislated in writing, the 
applicability of Mongol customs to Chinese subjects was explicitly discussed. A petition to 
the Yuan emperor remarked that Mongol livestock thieves were condemned to confiscation 
of nine times as many animals as they had stolen and possibly a beating in addition; whilst if 
the thief was a Chinese, these regulations did not apply. The emperor ordered that a 
consultation should take place with Orlug-Noyan (Uz-temur) and other dignitaries, who came 
to the decision that this rule should apply to the Chinese as well. They reported to the 
emperor who ruled that their decision should be implemented, whereupon documents were 
sent to various administrative organs from which we can learn about these decisions; to what 
extent they were implemented is not known in detail.130  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the discussion took place shows that imposition of Mongol 
customs was not a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, the emperor in this case did 
something which was typical of Mongol practices: he put together Chinese and Mongol 
advisors and let them come to a consensus. Of course there were power relations involved, 
and it was not always a level playing field. However, discussion and arriving at a consensus 
were integral to Mongol lawmaking practices. (This will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter on the quriltai.) From this data it can be seen that there was a diversity of 
attitudes towards the imposition of Mongol laws on non-Mongols, and that the decision to 
enforce Mongol laws was by no means a foregone conclusion.  
 
                                                 
130
 Ratchnevsky, “Die mongolische Rechtsinstitution der Busse,“ p. 177  
51 
 
 
The Great Yasa in intellectual history 
 
Although the Great Yasa probably never existed in reality as a law code, in ideology it had a 
distinguished history. The malleability of the Great Yasa as an intellectual construct is 
illustrated by Morgan thus: 
 
“There was probably believed to be a ‘Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan’, derived in part 
from Chingiz himself and perhaps in part from earlier Mongol custom. But this was 
not written down in any coherent form, and it was therefore possible to attribute to it a 
wide variety of provisions as was thought necessary or desirable.”131  
 
McChesney puts it in even starker terms: “Indeed I think it ought to be asked, was the 
elaboration and perhaps even outright creation of the idea of a great code of Chinggis Khan 
part of a continuing public discourse about law and authority in society?”132 
 
Within the Western Islamic world, the Great Yasa played a great role in the “ideological 
war”133 between the Ilkhanate and the Mamluk Sultanate. Both rulers and scholars were 
engaged in this ideological war. For example, Baybars declared in a letter to Abaqa that “Our 
yasa is superior to that of Chinggis Khan;” in this instance, ‘yasa’ = ‘Shari’a’ or ‘Islamic 
legal system.’134 What Baybars meant was that the law practiced in the Mamluk Sultanate, 
based on Shari’a, was superior to the legal system used in the Ilkhanate, which was ostensibly 
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based primarily on the laws of Chinggis Khan. Meanwhile, Al-Maqrizi and Ibn Taghribirdi 
tried to convince their readers that the term “siyasa” (a branch of law within Muslim lands 
dealing mostly with the law as practiced by the ‘secular’ ruler, or sultan) was in fact derived 
from “yasa,” and this allegation was used to press for more strict adherence to religious 
law.135 Al-Maqrizi and Ibn Taghribirdi were unhappy with the growing influence of hakims’ 
(chamberlains’) courts in the Mamluk sultanate,136 and as a way of arguing against them 
alleged that the law they were implementing was influenced by the “yasa,” i.e. by Mongol 
laws and ideology. Al-Maqrizi even uses the word hakim to describe Mongol judges, thus 
linking the aspects of Mamluk law he considered undesirable with Mongol law.137 Thus, 
Mamluk rulers and scholars used legal discourse as anti-Mongol propaganda, and the 
scholars also used legal discourse to argue against internal practices of the Mamluk sultanate.  
 
Likewise, the roles of the Yasa and Shari’a were also a focus of controversy over a long 
period in Central Asia. Here, the word ‘yasa’ was gradually replaced with ‘töre,’ the meaning 
of which is still disputed.138 Irwin points to the perception of töre as “the pagan steppe 
equivalent of the Muslim sunna,”139 while it may have acquired more broadly the meaning of 
a kind of etiquette. Unlike in the Mamluk Sultanate, the Yasa was sometimes viewed 
positively, and sometimes as in harmony with the Shari’a,140 though at other times it was 
clearly perceived as in conflict with the Shari’a.        
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The Chagadaid Khan Tarmashirin (r. 1331-34) is said to have abrogated specific aspects of 
the Yasa or even abolished it altogether.141 When one looks more specifically at what this 
entailed, however, it appears the complaint against him was that he had failed to conduct the 
annual toy (an assembly of princes and nobility similar to the quriltai, which however met 
every year and had the power to despose a khan).142 Timur, in accordance with his intention 
to recreate much of the Mongol empire, highly valued the Yasa, or töre.143 In practice, the 
töre was mostly about “hunting and raiding, military discipline, and ceremonial” i. e. means 
of maintaining an identity.144 But in 1411 Timur’s son Shah Rukh, according to Jalal al-Din 
Qa’ini, “abandoned the Mongol law court and gave up the Mongol customary laws in favour 
of the Sharia,” prohibiting alcohol in Herat, declining to keep a descendant of Chinggisid 
Khan as the nominal ruler, and purifying the tomb of his father Timur in Samarkand of its 
non-Islamic elements.145 
 
The Shaybanids likewise dealt with this controversial issue. Ibn Ruzbehan in the Mehman-
name-ye Bokhara reports on a discussion about inheritance rights under Shaybani Khan, 
which took place around 1507-8. It concluded with the implementation of Islamic law which 
forbids representation in inheritance law, as opposed to the practice supposedly going back to 
“the rule of Chingiz Khan,” which allowed it.146 Here, it seems that any Turko-Mongol 
practice could be referred to as a “rule of Chingiz Khan,” as Chinggis Khan never made a 
regulation concerning this question of inheritance or even seriously tried to modify Mongol 
practices or initiate a new practice regarding inheritance law. Later in the Shaybanid dynasty, 
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Hafiz Tanish reports that Abdallah Khan II (r. 1583 to 1598) performed Muslim prayers at 
the Idgah, a large open space outside the city, “in accordance with the Yasa of Chinggis 
Khan.”147 
 
Zahir al-din Babur viewed the töre as custom and argued that it need not be followed in its 
entirety:  
 
“Previously our ancestors had shown extraordinary respect for Chinggisid custom 
(tora). They did nothing to contradict it either at their formal audiences or in [the 
etiquette they observed in] sitting and standing. But Chinggisid custom is not a 
definitive text (nas.s.-i qāt.i‘) that a person must adhere to. If someone institutes a good 
regulation (qā‘ida) it should be followed, but if an ancestor leaves behind something 
bad, then something good should be substituted for it.”148 
 
Feeling on this issue was still strong at the time of the Ottomans. In the Ahlak-i ‘Ala’i by 
Kinalizade ‘Ali Efendi, a leading ‘alim (he rose to rank of kadi-‘asker) under Suleyman and 
Selim II, felt the necessity to point out that secular law enacted by a ruler, such as the once 
widely accepted yasa of Chinggis Khan, was bound to be gradually disregarded as the power 
of that ruler’s dynasty waned. He contrasted this with Islamic law which, he said, though 
almost a thousand years old, had preserved its vitality unimpaired.149 This view that the yasa, 
and by implication Mongol law, was initially strong but quickly waned, is still current among 
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scholars today,150 some of whom have also argued that the Mongols were quickly 
‘conquered’ by the more ‘sophisticated’ cultures of sedentary Persia and China.151   
 
Nielsen, author of a book on secular justice in Islamic states, hits the nail on the head when 
he states that Mamluk authors were able to “shape it [the yasa] to their own preconceived 
ideas and mould it to the form of the Shari’a they knew.” He goes on to state that,  
 
“This was a comparatively easy task, since the practical validity of the Yasa among 
the Mongols, at least in their conquered territories, lasted only for a short time. The 
Yasa very soon became a symbol only, albeit a powerful one, both in Mongol Iran 
and in the Qipchaq empire of the Golden Horde, although certain elements – for 
examples its tolerance of religious differences – continued after the adoption of 
Islam.”152  
 
While it is true that the Yasa became a symbol, if one views Mongol law as encapsulated in 
‘the Yasa,’ then the conclusion naturally follows that Mongol law did not have much 
concrete, long-term influence. Therefore in order to grasp the continuing influence of Mongol 
law within the Toluid empire, it is necessary to redefine Mongol law as wider than, and 
partially different from, ‘the yasa.’ 
 
If the concept of Yasa can change over time, then it is also true that it could have been 
invented. We should be extremely cautious in applying any conclusions about the Yasa to 
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Mongol law in the Toluid empire in general. The Yasa, as an ideological concept, is far 
removed from the reality of the Mongol encounter with non-Mongol legal systems.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It can be concluded that while the “Great Yasa” is useful as a concept, it does not necessarily 
bring us any closer to understanding Mongol law as it was practiced in the unified Mongol 
empire or the Toluid empire. The “Great Yasa” developed primarily as a concept among 
historians coming from sedentary cultures, and in the “ideological war” between the 
Ilkhanate and the Mamluk sultanate and more generally, among those who had an interest in 
stressing the differences between Mongol custom and Islamic law. It is therefore more 
suitable to being analysed as a phenomenon in culture wars than as a means of understanding 
more about Mongol law itself.  
 
Together with the rejection of the “Great Yasa” should also be rejected the theory that the 
Mongols, starting with Chinggis Khan, firmly intended to impose their own laws on the 
peoples they conquered. Rather, from the beginning there was a multiplicity of reactions 
towards actions which infringed Mongol laws.  
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Chapter 2 – The quriltai 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While the last chapter has shown the danger of trying to shoehorn Mongol law into the 
categories familiar from legal systems of sedentary peoples, the present chapter will seek to 
define Mongol law more broadly, specifically discussing an institution which brought some 
flexibility to the Mongol legal system. While the substantive content of Mongol law is rightly 
seen in the commands (yasas) of Chinggis Khan as well as the customs153 of steppe life, the 
institution of the quriltai provided a forum where legal matters could be discussed or agreed 
among Mongol leaders.  
 
The quriltai has not been recognized as a legal institution before mostly because the extant 
sources do not describe it as such. But these sources were nearly all written by people from 
sedentary cultures who did not necessarily understand Mongol law deeply. Moreover, the 
only significant historical source written by a Mongol (or Mongols) from a Mongol point of 
view, the Secret History of the Mongols, presents the family history of Chinggis Khan but 
does not talk about laws in a systematic way, since there was much that was understood and 
did not apparently require explanation.154  
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Analysing the quriltai allows us to re-capture the flexibility inherent in Mongol legal thinking. 
It allows us to see that the Mongol tradition of collegial decision-making applies not only to 
the administrative field, but also to law. Therefore, the flexibility shown by many Mongols 
when they first encountered non-Mongol legal systems should not be cast as a rejection of 
Mongol law but rather as a reflection of the collegial tradition within Mongol law. The 
flexibility that Mongols and Toluids showed towards diverse legal systems is a fundamental 
aspect of their interaction with other legal systems; the impact of this flexibility was far larger 
than that of any attempts to impose Mongol laws on others. 
 
 
The quriltai 
 
A quriltai can be seen as a type of “ritualized consultation.”155 As Fletcher points out, the 
quriltai was not a regular feature of nomadic existence156 but, once a supratribal polity 
emerged, it is hardly surprising that such an institution existed in order to further the aims of 
the polity. In the Mongol case, the quriltai may be a more formal version of the yeke eye (lit. 
‘great agreement’ or ‘great consultation’), 157 mentioned in the Secret History in connection 
with the Mongols’ defeat of the Tatars, and the need to decide what to do with the defeated 
Tatars. The quriltai was an institution suited to and partially reflecting the reality of the 
Mongols’ nomadic existence. “In a pastoral nomadic economy and society in which a wide 
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dispersal of people and herds was ecologically necessary, it is not surprising to find the 
existence of a consultative institution which brought together people from great distances.”158 
It served the practical function of bringing leaders together159 to allow important decisions to 
be made, usually through creating consensus through discussion;160 it fostered unity among 
the participants and reinforced or clarified relations of superiority or inferiority.161 It 
sometimes contained extremely important ritual elements, such as the seating of the khan on 
a throne, the removing of belts and hats in order to salute the new ruler,162 or an elaborate and 
expensive redistribution of goods with the aim of promoting loyalty.163  
 
Given the nature of steppe life, it should not be considered surprising that the methods of the 
quriltai were mostly discussion and persuasion. Any coercive power within Mongol society 
was very limited, because of the ever-present possibility of flight, though social exclusion 
was possible and sometimes practiced. For example, after Temujin (the future Chinggis 
Khan)’s father was murdered and his family was no longer considered influential or powerful 
enough,164 Chinggis’ mother and her children were abandoned by the clan. Military action 
(often in the form of vengeance) was also a means of coercion.  However, coercive power 
was limited and the quriltai was an institution that enabled many decisions to be made by 
consensus, thereby limiting the need for coercion.  
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The quriltai as a legal institution 
 
The definition of a quriltai as “a conference or council of princes and nobles at which a new 
ruler was acclaimed”165 or in which important decisions were taken which regarded the 
participants, such as decisions about military campaigns,166 falls short of adequately 
describing this complex institution. It was in fact by its nature a legal institution.  
 
Institutions similar to the quriltai were characteristic of several Inner Asian societies or 
empires. The Xiongnu “held three annual assemblies, in the first, fifth, and ninth moons,”167 
at which they practiced ancestor worship, discussed tribal affairs and, at some assemblies, 
conducted a census.168 The Khitans used to convene to decide a new leader every three years, 
so they could cooperate in warfare.169 The Jurchens also had assemblies, at which generals 
and common soldiers mixed, which involved both revelry and serious secret discussions.170 
These institutions were still used in part when the Liao and Jurchen were ruling China.171 The 
Tangut also had a similar institution.172  
 
Some of these institutions which were similar to the quriltai have been recognized by 
historians as being legal in character. For example the quriltai at which the Oirat regulations 
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were produced in 1640 is seen as an event with legal importance.173 Assemblies of leading 
Mongols during the Qing dynasty known as chighulghan, were relatively formalized; there 
were fines for non-attendance, and written legislation was produced at them. Therefore, the 
chighulghan is seen as a legal institution.174 However, seeing only these later assemblies as 
legal in character displays a bias towards assemblies which produced written legal documents. 
It would be inconsistent to regard the quriltais as not legal in character, simply because no 
written legislation, such as the Great Yasa175 or any other written legal documents, were 
produced there. 
 
The quriltai was a legal institution, whether or not any written legislation was produced there. 
The decisions taken at quriltais were legal decisions and it was the institution of the quriltai 
which gave them their legal force. This is seen in that attendance was considered compulsory 
for all those, principally clan or tribal leaders, whose cooperation would be needed to 
implement a decision, a full attendance at a quriltai was sometimes indicated by the phrase 
‘aqa and ini,’ meaning literally ‘older and younger brothers.’176 The decisions were 
considered binding on all who had taken part. Moreover, there are many examples of 
decisions having already been taken, yet a quriltai was still considered necessary.177 This 
demonstrates that the quriltai was needed to give these decisions their legitimacy and legal 
force, therefore the quriltai is a legal institution. The principle function of a quriltai seems to 
have been in formally granting legitimacy to a new person or to new decisions. 
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As for attendance at quriltais being compulsory, this is demonstrated by the delays in holding 
quriltais, where one or the other of those whose presence was expected declined to come. For 
example, the quriltai for the enthronement of Güyük was delayed for three years because the 
some of the princes refused to come.178 In Möngke’s case, a quriltai was held despite the 
absence of many of the descendants of Chaghatai and Ögödei, but it was lacking in 
legitimacy, and the attendants could fulfill little of the usual business of a quriltai except the 
enthronement itself, and simply decided to meet again later.179 This shows that a refusal to 
attend by some affected the legitimacy of the quriltai. Of course, some real-world political 
and military conflicts played out partly through acceptance or refusal to attend quriltais. 
While it was difficult to coerce people to come, pressure could be applied, for example in the 
form of the the threat of Menggeser, Möngke’s yarghuchi,180 who decreed that the 
punishment for non-attendance and holding one’s own private festivities was decapitation; a 
law aimed at rivals for the qa’anship who might have tried to hold their own quriltais.181 This 
prefigures the law valid during the Qing dynasty, where non-attendance at a chighulghan 
attracted a fine in livestock.182 However difficult attendance was to enforce, it can be seen 
that the decisions or confirmed at quriltais were only considered fully legally binding once a 
quriltai with all important partipants took place.  
 
Secondly, the decisions taken were binding; ‘dissenting opinions’ were not allowed and 
everyone who attended was bound to support the quriltai’s decisions.183 It is because the 
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decisions were binding that some tried so hard to avoid attending certain quriltais, or felt 
betrayed if they attended and the outcome was not what they had anticipated.184  
 
Moreover, the main reason for holding a quriltai was often to give legal force to decisions 
which, in fact had already been taken. Despite occasional heated discussions, rarely was the 
outcome of a quriltai for the election of a khan in doubt;185 rather, the quriltai existed to 
legitimize a consensus that had already been reached. Various concrete actions, such as an 
enthronement or the distribution of gifts,186 helped to give legitimacy to the decisions taken, 
but these would not give legitimacy if the attendance were not as expected.  
 
All this shows that the quriltais were a legal institution. The implications are very important. 
This shows that what Endicott-West describes as the “conciliar, deliberative style of decision-
making [which] existed among the early thirteenth-century Mongols”187 was not limited to 
administrative, but extended to legal matters. The conciliar (or consultative) decision-making 
style was part and parcel of Mongol legal culture, and even crucial to it. It was an integral 
part of the Mongol approach to law.  
 
 
Further legal aspects of the quriltais 
 
Thus, the quriltai was an essentially legal institution which gave legitimacy to new decisions, 
despite the fact that its decisions were not necessarily recorded in writing. However, its legal 
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aspect was not restricted to the legislative task of formally making decisions about succession 
to leadership, administrative or military matters. Rather, as Mansura Haidar has noted,188 it 
also had a judicial function in that legal cases were often judged during quriltais. 
 
It should be noted that in Mongol culture, legal matters were not neatly separated from 
administrative / governmental matters; the absence of legal specialists in Mongol society is a 
well-known factor.189 While in many cultures legal personnel, or court cases, are 
distinguished through special procedures, places, clothing and other markers, in Mongol 
culture legal decisions and administrative decisions were taken in remarkably similar 
contexts. This was because the same factor, namely the presence of all the concerned parties, 
and therefore the collegial nature of decision-making, gave legitimacy to both administrative 
and legal decisions.190  
 
Both types of decisions, legislative and judicial, were routinely taken at quriltais. In fact the 
quriltais usually consisted of two major parts: firstly revelry, banqueting and the presentation 
or exchange of gifts, and secondly government business of varying nature and scope, often 
including judicial trials. For example, the quriltai held in 1235 after Ögödei’s return from 
campaign in China shows this two-fold division of the quriltai: 
 
“…all presented themselves, and he [Ögödei Qa’an] rewarded them with various 
shows of favour. For one full month he and his relatives banqueted, and, as was his 
custom, he gave away everything in the treasuries. 
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When they were finished feasting and reveling, they turned to serious matters of state 
and the military. Since some outlying areas had not been conquered, and rebellions 
were in progress in others, in order to deal with these matters he was going to assign 
one of his relatives to each and every corner […].”191 
 
This pattern was typical of most quriltais. When a new khan was enthroned, he would gain 
legitimacy through the enthronement and acclamation as well as the distribution of presents 
in the presence of all interested parties; when he had been enthroned, still in the presence of 
the aqa and ini, he would immediately start to exercise that legitimacy. While it was the 
newly enthroned khan who gave the final judgment in legal cases, the presence of the queens, 
princes, princesses and amirs was important. There may have been several motivations for 
exercising justice while they were still present: the desire to accomplish as much as possible 
while everybody was in one place, could be consulted if necessary, and reactions gauged; the 
desire to appear as an effective and forceful ruler; or the desire to strengthen unity by making 
an example of rebels.  
 
It is not simply the judicial trials in the second part of quriltais that should be considered as 
legal in character. While these provide additional confirmation of the legal nature of quriltais, 
it is the whole quriltai that should be considered as legal in nature, because it is the fact of 
meeting together itself which gave legitimacy and legal force to all the decisions taken there.    
 
When Ögödei had been made qa’an, he sought to resolve disputes that had arisen since the 
death of Chinggis Khan. He took a decision on a disputed military campaign and “silenced all 
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those who were speaking against the action.” He also gave a general ordinance pardoning any 
crimes preceding Ögödei’s enthronement.192  
 
The quriltai enthroning Güyük, probably because his election was more controversial than 
Ögödei’s,193 involved more specifically getting rid of his rivals or enemies. It was shortly 
before this quriltai that Otchigin, Chinggis’ brother, had approached with an army, giving the 
impression that he was aiming for the qa’anship. A secretive trial was held at the quriltai: 
“Since the investigation was extremely sensitive, no one was allowed to attend the 
proceedings, with only Möngkä Qa’an and Orda making the investigation, and no one else 
allowed entry.”194 The trial of Fatima Khatun, the confident of the regent Töregene, also took 
place at this quriltai according to Rashid al-Din,195 although the precise timing is difficult to 
establish; in any case the trial took place during Carpini’s stay at the ordo (Mongol 
encampment), so at most about three months after Güyük’s enthronement.196  
 
The second quriltai enthroning Möngke was even more replete with judicial activity. 
Apparently during the quriltai, a plot against Möngke was discovered. However that may be, 
the ‘plotters’ were apprehended by an army and taken to the ordo, where they were feasted 
for three days and left with guards over them. “The next day Mongka Qa’an went to Genghis 
Khan’s ordu and sat on a chair to conduct the trial of Shiramun and the princes himself.”197 
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Shiramun’s atabeg, tortured with bastinado, confessed and committed suicide. The next day 
more noyans and amirs were arrested, and finally 77 people were executed.198  
 
Then Yesün Toqa and Büri, two Chagadaid princes, arrived, with very few soldiers. “Büri 
was sent to Batu under escort by emissaries so that after his guilt was proven he could be 
executed. Qara Hülägü conducted the trial of Toqashi Khatun [Yesün Toqa’s wife] in Yesün 
Toqa ’s presence. He ordered her to be kicked to death, and thus relieved his breast of an old 
grudge.”199 Qara Hülägü was made head of the Chaghadaid ulus by Möngke.200 “The 
wardens of court” were also sent to bring Qadaq, who had been Güyük’s atabeg from 
childhood and dealt with administrative affairs while Güyük was qa’an,201 and “although his 
guilt was clearer than Satan’s infidelity, a trial was ordered. After he confessed to his crime, 
it was decreed that he be dispatched […].”202 
 
Möngke also summoned Oghul Qaimish, Guyug’s widow and her son, Khwaja, with a 
message that gave them hope they could be spared: “If you did not participate in this 
conspiracy, your welfare depends upon your coming directly to court.”203 Khwaja thought 
better of the temptation to harm the messenger, but his mother sent a message disputing 
Möngke’s legitimacy. Then she was detained, taken to court and then to Sorqaghtani Beki’s 
ordo, where she was tried by Menggeser and drowned in the river.204 
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Meanwhile in the city of Beshbaliq, some Uighurs were apparently plotting a massacre of 
Muslims. The new qa’an’s response allowed him to display his authority over all that 
happened in his empire: 
 
“A slave who was aware of the plot became Muslim and informed them. Their guilt 
was established, and after the Idiqut [leader of the Uighurs] was brought in and tried, 
he confessed to his crime. It was ordered that he be taken to Beshbaligh and executed 
in the presence of all the people on a Friday after the prayer.”205  
 
Möngke also used the quriltai to launch judicial activities covering the whole realm under 
Mongol rule:  
 
“Since several trouble-makers remained in various corners, and it would have either 
taken too long or involved too much trouble to bring them in, the emperor dispatched 
Bala Yarghuchi and a group of liege men to Yesü Möngkä’s armies to inquire about 
them and put to death all who had participated in the conspiracy. He also sent another 
commander on the same matter to Cathay.”206 
 
The quriltai for the enthronement of Geikhatu also included trials which took place after the 
main celebrations: 
 
“…they all enthroned him in the vicinity of Akhlat on Sunday the 24th of Rajab 690 [July 23, 
1291] […] When the banquets and celebrations were over, in early Sha’ban [early August 
1291] all the amirs were arrested and trials were begun, for Gaikhatu wanted to have an 
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investigation made of his brother Arghun Khan’s death and the murders of the amirs and 
viziers. […].”207  
 
It is also noteworthy that, in Köden’s note to Töregene about why he was protecting Mahmud 
Yalavach and other officials from her, he contemplates the prospect of them being tried at a 
quriltai:  
 
“…Since they have sought refuge with us, to send them back would be unchivalrous. 
In the near future a quriltai will be held, and I will bring them there with me. In the 
presence of my relatives and the amirs an investigation into their crimes can be 
undertaken, and they can be punished accordingly.”208 
 
While the majority of quriltais had both an enthronement and feasting as well as 
governmental business and legal trials, some did not include all these elements. The first 
quriltai enthroning Möngke in the Qipchaq steppe consisted of the first part, feasting and the 
enthronement, only, since a number of princes did not support Möngke yet and had not come, 
so he could not effectively start his reign.209 Other quriltais did not include an enthronement 
and were convened for other purposes. Among these, some were convened specifically in 
order to conduct legal trials. 
 
For example, after the embarrassing defeat of the Mongols at hands of the Egyptians Ghazan 
judged and punished some amirs at a quriltai in June 1303 at Ujan; at least, Vassaf calls this a 
quriltai. It raises the question of how a “quriltai” is different from the Mongol legal institution 
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termed the “yarghu.” While the two terms do have different semantic connotations, it is 
nevertheless significant that either term could be used to describe the same series of events. If 
the distinction is not always very clear in the sources, perhaps it was not so clear in practice 
either. Regarding the trial at Ujan mentioned above, according to Vassaf, a quriltai was held 
and the amirs were tried:   
 
 ار789: و ا7(ا و/;ر! د/(7=210     …      ر/0123! +>  ?ار@(  
 Qūrīltāy mubārāk sākht… va amrā va luskar-ra yārghū farmūd. 
[Ghazan] held a blessed quriltai… and ordered an inquiry (yarghu) of the amirs and army. 
 
According to Rashid al-Din however, the quriltai, by which he seems to mean the feasting 
and not meeting together as such, took place after the yarghu: 
 
 ز;5/;ر!  7BنD, ذ F7; 7(Gا '@0H ... D)د7J1  'KL:ا/;7! )5 ... DM مOP ه ذ مود '@ORKSB زور رد FT1  'KL:ا
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Aghāz yārghū pursīdan kardand… ʻāqibat al-āmr ghurehʼi Zu al-Hijjah y[ā]rghū-hā tamām 
shud… angāh dar ruz panjshanbeh duvum Zu al-Hijjah aghāz ṭūy qūrīltāy kardand. 
First they held interrogations… Finally in Zu al-Hijjah the yarghus were over… Then on 
Thursday the second of Zu al-Hijjah they began the feast of the quriltai.  
 
Finally, although Khvāndamīr was writing much later, his terminology is also interesting. 
Like Vassaf, he speaks of a quriltai first and seems to regard the questioning as part of the 
quriltai. He writes that after Ghazan arrived in Ujan,  
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ر/0 زور ود زا DV%123! /) FR020 و +> W,! % نB/X وY,   و7!  Z0/( رد ار ناراد7 /;7!  7ه و +Mاد ز%Y! 
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Baʻd az dū rūz qūrīltāy sākht va Qutluqshāh Nūʼīn va Chūpān Bīk va sāyīr sardārān-rā dar 
mauqef y[ā]rghū bāz dāsht va har yak-rā ʻalā ikhtilāf be-chūb yāsaq tādīb namūdeh.  
After two days he held a quriltai and restrained Qutlughshah Noyin and Chupan Beg and 
other generals at the site of the yarghu and every one of them was subjected to beating 
according to the degree [of their offence]. 
 
Similarly, Khvāndamīr describes the trial of Arigh Boke, the brother whom Qubilai 
vanquished, as a quriltai, but then speaks of yarghuchis and interrogation “in the manner of a 
yarghu.”213 This overlap in the way these terms are used confirms not only the similarity of 
these institutions, but shows that the collegial decision-making practices which characterized 
them both shows were characteristic of Mongol law. While the terms were not 
interchangeable, it is significant that in meaning they are so similar. 
 
 
The principle of collegiality 
 
Since the quriltais were legal institutions, the principles underlying them were central 
features of Mongol legal culture. The most important of these principles is what can be 
termed the “principle of collegiality”214 or also “consultative tradition,” 215 which means in 
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essence taking others and their views into account when making decisions. This, after all was 
the purpose of coming together in order to make decisions, rather than a leader making 
decisions by himself. How deeply this principle was rooted in Mongol culture can be seen 
from the way in which it is emphasized and praised in the Secret History of the Mongols, 
which was written for Mongols from a Mongol viewpoint. For example, Chinggis Khan, after 
having defeated the rival Tatar tribe, held a council to decide what to do with Tatar tribesmen 
rather than simply deciding himself.216 Another example is the episode in which companions 
of Chinggis Khan dared to remonstrate with his decision about the fate of Daritai, an uncle of 
Chinggis Khan who had not remained loyal but gone over to another tribe.217 
 
The Secret History also contains an example of a secret trial that Chinggis Khan held which 
was interrupted by his mother. After hearing from the shaman Teb Tenggeri that his brother 
Qasar might be a threat to him,  
 
“On these words, Činggis Qa’an that very night rode off to seize Qasar. When he left, 
Güčü and Kököčü informed the mother that he had gone to seize Qasar. When the 
mother heard this, straightaway – it was still night – she harnessed a white camel and 
set out in a black covered cart, traveling all night.  
On her arrival at sunrise, Činggis Qa’an had tied up the opening of Qasar’s sleeves, 
removed his hat and belt, and was interrogating him. Činggis Qa’an, surprised by the 
mother descending upon him, became afraid of her.”218 
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The mother then vehemently defended Qasar as her son whom she had breast-fed and 
Chinggis Khan “felt shame.”219 Although motherly sentiments were obviously important here, 
perhaps it is indicative that such a secret trial is portrayed as having this outcome. The text 
implies that Chinggis Khan should have taken his mother’s sentiments into account, since it 
also says that his disfavour of Qasar was one of the reasons why Chinggis’ mother’s health 
declined.220 
 
Therefore, the principle of collegiality underlying the quriltais was deeply rooted in Mongol 
culture. It was partly a result of their nomadic way of life, where the difficulty in enforcing 
decisions meant that it was often better to seek consensus, but it was strengthened by the 
cultural value attached to it, as seen in the Secret History. As Ratchnevsky remarks, the 
collegial nature of legal trials was one element that worked to prevent gross injustice in 
Mongol legal trials.221 Such an important principle could hardly have remained without 
effects, and did not remain without effects, as Chinggis Khan set about conquering his empire 
and as the Toluids ruled over Persia and China.  
 
In fact, the principle of collegiality had great influence both within and outside the legal 
sphere, influence which continued to be felt even though the institution of quriltai itself 
became more ceremonial and less vital as a legal institution. Due to influence from the 
sedentary Persian and Chinese cultures, primogeniture became more important222 in the late 
Ilkhanate and the Yuan dynasty and the administration became more regularized and 
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bureaucratized. Therefore, quriltais were less and less needed as a venue in which to take 
important decisions.223  
 
While originally the principle of collegiality was about Mongols meeting to make decisions, 
it was a small step to extend it to situations where Mongols and non-Mongols were involved. 
This is what happened in the Ilkhanate and in Yuan China, where despite the increased power 
of the khans and the greater hierarchical nature of the polities, the principle of collegiality 
was influential. It was reflected when Mongol khans appointed two different people to the 
same post, or when they ordered Mongols to meet with non-Mongols to work out solutions to 
legal cases. Thus, the principle of collegiality was not limited to Mongols but was extended 
to others in the Toluid empire.     
 
 
The influence of the principle of collegiality outside of the legal sphere 
 
The theory that the principle of collegiality influenced legal practices in the Toluid empire is 
strengthened by the amount of influence this principle had in other areas. In the 
administrative realm, the influence of the principle of collegiality can be seen in the 
phenomenon of dual appointees in the Ilkhanate. Such appointments of two people for the 
same task were much more frequent in the Ilkhanate than under previous dynasties. David 
Morgan raises the possibility that the motivation for this unprecedented use of dual 
appointments might have come from Chinese practice;224 the Chinese routinely appointed 
‘left’ and ‘right’ ministers, for example. If it was a result of Chinese influence, then this was 
an instance of influence between the Toluid polities. However, the influence may well have 
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come more directly from the Mongol principle of collegiality – from the quriltai.225 The idea 
may well have played a role that effective decisions are best taken by more than one person 
through confronting and resolving possible opposition at the stage of decision-making, rather 
than later. 
 
In particular, it was standard practice for much of the Ilkhanate to have two joint viziers 
rather than a single vizier.226 For example Rashid al-Din was vizier alongside Sa’d al-Din 
Savaji, and then alongside Taj al-Din ‘Alishah.227 Ghiyath al-Din, Rashid al-Din’s son, 
shared the vizierate with Khwajah ‘Ala al-Din Mohammad.228 The relations between such 
dual appointees were not necessarily cordial, as seen from the example of Rashid al-Din and 
Taj al-Din ‘Alishah. When Rashid al-Din requested some clear division of responsibilities 
between them, Öljeitü denied his request. The reason Öljeitü gave was that “the peace of the 
empire lies in the fact that both order the matters in agreement with each other.”229    
 
The principle of collegiality was also extremely influential in China. According to Endicott-
West’s detailed research, the principle of collegiality influenced the organization of both 
central and local government during the Yuan dynasty.230 Local government under the Yuan 
involved daily conferences which the Mongol representative the darughachi,231 his Chinese 
counterpart and his subordinates were all expected to attend.232 Government business had to 
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be transacted in the presence of all these officials, and it was not easy to gain exemption from 
attendance.233 The Yuan administration as a whole was characterized by frequently 
overlapping responsibilities which may have made government slightly more cumbersome234 
but ultimately more in tune with Mongol values, in particular the principle of collegiality.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The great influence of the principle of collegiality in various aspects of Toluid governance 
shows how collegial decision-making was a principle which was dear to Mongols and which 
was influential in the empire. Of course, it was not always manifested and competed with 
various ideologies. The role of collegial decision-making within the quriltai shows that this 
was no new way of doing things imported from more ‘civilized’ cultures. Rather, collegial 
decision-making procedures were integral to Mongol culture, as seen by the importance given 
to this principle in the Secret History of the Mongols.  
 
Therefore, the way in which we view Mongol law needs to be revised. Though the institution 
which scholars most often associate with legal issues in the Mongol empire is the yarghu, in 
fact the quriltai was also an extremely important legal institution, and one moreover with 
deep roots in Mongol culture. In particular in the absence of any firm evidence about the 
existence of a Great Yasa, the quriltai and the collegial decision-making underpinning it are 
valuable evidence of the Mongol approach to law.  
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The following chapters will show how collegiality as an aspect of the Mongol legal tradition 
had considerable impact on legal practices in the Toluid empire. The Toluids were in fact 
quite flexible in matters of law, working together with non-Mongol legal specialists and 
including them in decision-making processes. While individual Mongol laws had variable 
impact in the lands conquered by the Mongols, the principle of collegiality was one aspect 
that had long-term and noticeable impact within the Toluid empire and is a major feature of 
the Toluid approach to legal matters.  Given that the principle of collegiality was rooted in 
Mongol culture, whereas the imposition of Mongol law on others was a novel reaction to a 
situation never before encountered amongst representatives of the Mongol elite, it is 
collegiality that should be considered most characteristic.  
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Chapter 3 - The ‘legal specialists’ – yarghuchis 
 
 
Introduction       
 
The previous two chapters have sketched how Mongol law was not necessarily inflexible as 
the concept of the ‘Great Yasa’ implies, but that cooperation and flexibility, as seen in the 
quriltai, are key characteristics of the Mongol legal tradition. This chapter will show how this 
flexibility was manifested in practice through examining the role of yarghuchis (from 
Mongolian jarghuchi, zhaluhuchi 扎魯忽赤 or duanshiguan 斷事官 in Chinese),235 who 
were the only Mongol-appointed officials in the Toluid empire known specifically as legal 
specialists. Although it would be misleading to say that legal responsibilities were the 
yarghuchis’ sole responsibilities,236 they are nevertheless the officials most readily and most 
often associated with legal matters in the Toluid empire.  
 
This analysis shows that yarghuchis operated mostly at the centres of Mongol power, the 
royal ordos and central government offices, and that when operating outside of these centres, 
it was not unusual for them to be required to work together with local legal personnel. In fact, 
such requests and arrangements were frequent enough that they can be seen as continuation 
of the principle of collegiality. Therefore, while Mongol customary law went largely 
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unchallenged at the ordo itself, cooperation with local personnel was a practice which was 
valued in the Toluids’ relationships with the peoples they had conquered. Attachment to 
Mongol practices at the court did not preclude a flexible attitude to law where the local 
population was involved. It will be argued that this was not merely a matter of convenience, 
but that the influence of the principle of collegiality exerted real effects.  
 
This chapter will moreover examine the nature of the institution of yarghuchi, arguing that it 
was primarily characterized not by the requirement for legal knowledge but by a 
preoccupation with status. Since the legitimacy of a trial was based in large part on the 
respective ranks of the participants, this may have made it easier for yarghuchis to be flexible 
in other aspects of a trial such as which punishments were imposed or how the outcome was 
communicated, and would thus have aided Mongol efforts to work together with Persian and 
Chinese legal specialists.       
 
 
The institution of yarghuchi and qualifications required for holding the post 
 
The institution of yarghuchi was fundamentally different from many legal institutions of 
sedentary societies, and certainly from the legal institutions of Persia and China at the time of 
Mongol rule. While the functions of these institutions – broadly, resolving legal disputes 
among members of society – were similar, the qualifications of those appointed as judges 
were radically different. The question of who could be appointed as yarghuchi needs to be 
analyzed within the framework of the Mongols as a nomadic, and initially illiterate, culture.  
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When examining the people who became yarghuchis, it becomes apparent that, like those 
appointed to other government positions in the Mongol empire, most of them were people 
who were very close to Chinggis Khan, or who were part of the keshig (guard).237 Shigi 
Qutuqu, who was appointed in 1206 or Belgütai, appointed a few years earlier, are variously 
held up as the first to be appointed as yarghuchi by Chinggis Khan.238 Both were very close 
to Chinggis Khan – Belgütai was his half-brother while Shigi Qutuqu was Chinggis Khan’s 
adopted son.239 Menggeser and Bulghai, the two most powerful yarghuchis under Mongke, 
had both been in Tolui’s keshig. The issue of trust is well illustrated by the case of Zhaolietai 
Chawu’er 召烈台抄兀兒 who, according to the Yuan Shi, initially served Chinggis Khan, 
and warned him about a rebellion: for this act of loyalty he was given the title of darkhan.240 
His son Nachin served Qubilai as yeke yarghuchi, and Nachin’s son Bansal and Bansal’s son 
Goroghutai also served as yarghuchis in Yuan China.241 This shows that the main 
requirement for appointment to the position of yarghuchi was Chinggis Khan’s trust in that 
person, and that personal trust and a close connection with Chinggis Khan, even over 
generations, remained important. 
 
The significance of this is that who was appointed to be a yarghuchi was, overall, more 
important than the methods by which they set about their task. While the Mongols did have a 
legal tradition with their own principles about how trials could be conducted, no special legal 
skills or knowledge were required in order to be appointed as yarghuchi; this contrasts 
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sharply with the Persian and Chinese societies where judges were required to have detailed 
legal knowledge acquired through years of study. The absence of a requirement for legal 
education was not due to ‘backwardness’ on the part of the Mongols but simply to a very 
different conception of what guarantees the legitimacy of a legal process. While for Persians 
and Chinese legitimacy was found mostly in specific procedures, laws and punishments, for 
the Mongols the punishments imposed and the exact order of events during the trial could be 
very variable, while status was of particular importance.242  
 
The idea of trial by one’s peers is very different from for example the Islamic attitude, where 
a qadi should in theory be able to judge even powerful government ministers. Mawardi 
explains that the mazalim court “was charged with the enforcement of decisions made by 
qadis not sufficiently strong to see that their judgments were carried out against defendants 
holding high rank or occupying powerful positions, and also with the suppression of evil-
doing and the enforcement of regulations within the jurisdiction of the muhtasib but beyond 
his power to apply.”243  
 
This principle of trial by one’s peers can be seen in the Secret History, when Chinggis 
commanded the elders of the companies not to judge dayguards who were equal to them in 
rank: “Further, elders of the companies without permission from Us shall not, merely on the 
ground of seniority, reprimand my guards who have been enrolled as guards equal to 
them.”244 It is also seen clearly in the trials following the Toluid coup. Allsen in his PhD 
thesis245 drew attention to the fact that Menggeser judged many of the accused, but imperial 
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princes were judged by Möngke himself.246 Oghul Qaimish was tried in the ger of her peer, 
Sorghaghtani.247 
 
There are examples from the Ilkhanate where the question of status is seen clearly. For 
example, Ghazan chose the vizier Rashid al-Din and a co-judge to try the cases of several 
amirs who had been unsuccessful in their military assignments. This may have been a fairly 
novel situation, since traditionally nearly all Mongols had been military men, and many 
bureaucrats in the emerging Mongol empire had been military men as well. In any case 
Ghazan assigned a “man of the pen” to judge “men of the sword.” It seems that Rashid al-Din 
was aware of the delicate nature of the situation and of the question of whether he could 
actually be seen to have higher status than the military leaders, for Mustawfī relates how he 
practically apologized to the defendants that he did not have the status that would normally 
be needed in order to try military men like them. After Ghazan had chosen Rashid and a co-
judge to lead the interrogations, and the amirs who were to be tried had been brought, Rashid 
said:  
 
“O famous and wise elders, before you I am less than your fief-holders. I am not even 
the door of this kind of court, but when the shah gives an order, it is not fitting to do 
anything otherwise, and it would be fitting if you would not be angry at this enquiry. 
An elder must be an example to the Mongols, and it is proper that a general should be 
admonished before the world. When before the elders, lesser people than he must gird 
their loins in the shah's business. I have with me famous, chosen elders, who will 
determine the admonition of this enquiry.” He received the reply, “When the shah so 
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ordered it, you became an elder in the court. You are no less than we are before the 
shah, and you are his guide in the world. We are not in peril from you, since we know 
the customs of the shah.”248 
 
The great amir Nauruz, after he had fallen out with Ghazan and was about to be judged, said 
to Qutlughshah, “Only the shah has the right to question me. It is not for you to try me, for 
only the shah is greater than I.”249 Regardless of the estimation of Qutlughshah’s status, 
Nauruz’s reasoning is the same as that of Chinggis when he commanded that the guards 
could judge people of lower status than themselves, but not those of equal status. In this case, 
the principle of judgment by one’s peers was not respected and Qutlughshah executed the 
sentence, probably because Nauruz’s conduct was considered treachery and he had already 
received permission to carry out capital punishment. In several other cases of treachery and 
rebellion, the rebels were put to death without a trial.250  
 
In China, the idea of trial by one’s peers also persisted. Qubilai tried Arigh Boke himself, and 
even feigned to ask Hülegü and Berke for their opinions, because Arigh Boke, being his 
younger brother, had nearly the same status as himself.251 Up to the end of the Ilkhanate, a 
large number of those known to be yarghuchis also had experience in the military, or even 
had concurrent military responsibilities, which gave them the needed status.252 Moreover, the 
dazong zhengfu 大宗正府, the central government organ set up for yarghuchis to try cases 
primarily involving Mongols, was staffed and led mostly by imperial princes and their 
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representatives;253 which meant that they would have a status high enough to judge almost 
any Mongol.    
 
This does not mean that legal knowledge was not respected among Mongols. On the contrary, 
knowledge of the yasa, yosun (customs) and biligs (sayings) was valued and is said to have 
been a factor in the election of khans, although there is no firm evidence for this. Möngke is 
said to have been “the one prince who has seen with his own eyes and heard with his own 
ears Genghis Khan’s yasaq and yarligh.”254 Ghazan was said to have known the yosun and 
yasaq well as a boy,255 and this is obviously meant to be seen as a positive characteristic in 
Rashid al-Din’s lengthy account of his virtues. However, this would seem to be post facto 
praise by the chronicler rather than a genuine consideration in the selection of khan.  
 
If the status of the respective participants of a trial was, for the Mongols, a consideration 
more important than almost anything else, it follows that other aspects of trials, such as the 
precise procedures used, the types of evidence used and the manner of recording the final 
decision (whether orally or in written form), and even the very laws applied, though 
important, were ultimately of secondary concern. Thus the procedures and laws used could be 
subject to change more easily than the practice of appointing judges who had high status. 
This was the case in particular whenever yarghuchis worked together with local legal 
officials, as was often the case due to the principle of collegiality which was also highly 
valued by the Mongols.   
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Yarghuchis’ cooperation with local legal personnel 
 
Accounts of the trials conducted in a ‘Mongol’ manner have led some to believe that the 
Toluids were uniformly inflexible, not to mention cruel and dismissive of Persian and 
Chinese sensibilities.256 However, trials which took place at the imperial ordo, the centre of 
Mongol power, should not be taken as respresentative of trials that took place elsewhere. 
When the whole spectrum of Toluid involvement in the societies they ruled is considered, it 
becomes apparent that what happened at the ordo was only one part of the Toluid 
involvement in legal matters. Outside of the ordo, as can be seen from the following cases, 
trials were often, though by no means always, conducted in a manner more congruent with 
local practices, often with the involvement of local officials or local legal personnel. 
Moreover, it is most likely trials which took place away from the centres of power which are 
underrepresented in the accounts that the sources give. The following sections aim to show 
that the principle of collegiality was important in many trials in the Ilkhanate and in Yuan 
China.257 
 
 
i) Persia 
 
Legal cases in Persia can be divided into several categories. Cases regarding traitors were 
often not considered worthy of a trial (yarghu) at all. This was the case for example with 
Malik Kamel, who was put to death by Hülegü.258 Others, such as Malek Salih were put to 
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death “in anger” without a yarghu.259 Nauruz’s relations were also to be put death without 
questioning.260 This contrasts with the majority of cases where the sources often contain the 
phrase: “after his guilt was proven …”261 Among the cases which did require yarghus, there 
was a marked difference between those that took place at the ordo and those that took place 
elsewhere, though the principle of collegiality often played a role both at the ordo and in the 
provinces.  
 
Firstly, there were cases which took place at a centre of Mongol power, where ‘Mongol’ 
methods were used in the procedure of the interrogation itself. These cases were mostly cases 
regarding officials of the Ilkhanate or other very prominent people. Among them are trials of 
Ilkhans themselves; of the successive viziers of the Ilkhanate; trials of local rulers, of tax 
collectors or military personnel. Many of these cases were politically sensitive. 
 
One such trial was that of the Ilkhan Ahmad Tegüder, which took place after Arghun had 
vanquished him; he was put to death a day before Arghun was enthroned.262 After the “ladies 
and amirs” had pledged fealty to Arghun,  
 
“Ahmad was summoned and tried by Tägänä, Nüregäi Yarghuchi,263 and Qonqurtai’s 
liege men, who asked, “For what reason did you kill Qonqurtai and Kuchuk, who had 
performed valiantly for Abaqa Khan and who had helped to make you king? When 
Arghun accepted you as king, although his father’s place should have gone to him, 
and was content with only Khurasan, why did you send Alinaq to raid his artisans and 
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people and take them captive?” “I did wrong,” he said. “I won’t do it again.” Arghun 
and the amirs wanted to placate his mother, Qutui Khatun, who held such an exalted 
position, by overlooking his crime, but Qonqurtai’s mother and his sons and people 
shouted out. Just then Yesu Buqa Guragan arrived and said, “What is this talk of 
pardon when Princes Hulachu and Jushkab have gathered a large contingent in the 
vicinity of Hamadan and are thinking of rebelling?” An edict was therefore issued for 
Ahmad to be executed in retaliation for Qonqurtai’s blood. On the eve of Thursday 
the 26th of Jumada I 683 [August 10, 1284], corresponding to the 28th of Altinch Ay 
of Daqiqu Yil, they put him to death in the same manner in which he had killed 
Qonqurtai. “As you judge so you shall be judged.” Pacem.”264 
 
This trial shows several aspects of Mongol legal practice. Taking place in the presence of 
Arghun, the questioning was carried out by Tägänä, an amir, by Nüregäi Yarghuchi, who is 
also described as an amir and courtier (noyan) in Rashid al-Din,265 and by the liege men of 
Qonqurtai, who had a claim for vengeance on Ahmad Tegüder. The choice of interrogators 
therefore was based on their status and their personal relationships with Ahmad, not on legal 
knowledge.266 In the case of Qonqurtai’s liege men, Arghun was in fact recognizing the 
validity of, or at least the necessity to take into account, their personal quest for vengeance. 
This more personalized approach to justice was a continuation of the steppe vengeance 
system, and the demonstration that steppe legal practices could find a niche in the ordo of the 
Ilkhan.  
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Not only that, but this trial vividly shows the participation of different actors and the way in 
which differing opinions were expressed. The vocal participation of Qonqurtai’s mother, and 
that of Qutui Khatun which, though not explicitly mentioned, may well have been vocal as 
well, is in line with the relatively high status of women among the Mongols and in the 
Golden Family. The open discussions in a very public setting – presumably, all those who 
were present at Arghun’s enthronement were also present at the trial – show how the trial was 
used as a forum to vent opinions, clarify strength of feeling, and cement Arghun’s legitimacy. 
The influence of the principle of collegiality on this trial is evident.  
 
Other trials which took place at the ordo also reflect the principle of collegiality. The yarghu 
of alleged Mazdakites took place in the “presence of the amirs and the courtiers.”267 In 
addition, when Ahmad Tegüder was being pursued by Arghun’s forces and the command had 
been given for him to be seized, Shiktür Noyan sent a message to Qutui Khatun, saying: 
 
“We are servants of the throne. Just now envoys have arrived to say that all the 
princes have commanded that Ahmad be seized. What fault is it of us servants? The 
prudent thing to do is for us to seat Ahmad alone in a tent until the aqas and inis 
arrive and confront whatever accusations there are to be made.”268 
 
Any of these people could intervene to try to change the outcome of the yarghu. For example, 
Buqa who was vizier to Arghun Khan and had plotted against him was executed but at a 
separate trial of his co-conspirators, some were pardoned for various reasons, including one 
because the amirs interceded for him.269 On another occasion, during the time that Rashid al-
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Din and Sa’d al-Din Savaji were joint viziers, some people who had conspired to slander 
them drank too much at a feast and their plan became known. Although some were 
condemned to death, one of them, Shaykh Mahmud, was released through the intercession of 
Bulughan Khatun.270  
 
Witnesses were also confronted with other witnesses, or those who had already confessed 
with those who had not. This technique, known as tapishmishi, was used in the case of the 
idiqut of the Uighurs, accused of having planned a massacre of Muslims.271 
 
Other trials during the Ilkhanate followed a similar pattern, for example the trial of the 
Mongol generals who had been defeated in Syria took place in 1303 in Ujan, where Ghazan 
and his amirs and officials, including Rashid al-Din and Bolad Chingsang, had encamped. 
The trial took place at the ordo “before the court,” though some of the interrogations took 
place in the absence of Ghazan himself. There is no indication that the trial itself had any 
non-Mongol characteristics, except for the unusual fact that a civilian (the vizier Rashid al-
Din) was called on to judge amirs.272  
 
Of the cases which were judged away from the ordo and from the centre of Mongol power, 
some were not influenced by the principle of collegiality and made no apparent concessions 
to Persian legal practices. These are cases where it could be argued that Toluid rulers were 
imposing their way of judging cases and not cooperating with local judges or elites. However, 
there are few examples of such cases and they dealt with rebellions against Mongol authority 
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(or against the authority of regional rulers under the Ilkhanate), not ordinary civil or criminal 
cases. They include the yarghus held by Yasavur Buqa, who was sent with only twenty 
Mongols to Shabankare to deal with the leaders of Shabankare who had defied Geikhatu by 
putting Naser al-Din to death and appointing a new ruler without Geikhatu’s consent.  
 
“Yasavur Buqa was a sly man. He knew that he could take this province easily. He 
came towards it from Fars and he was near Fasa. In the city of Fasa he came out and 
wrote an order saying that he is the hakem of Fasa and that I give the kingship of 
Shabankare to Ghiyath al-Din and in order to cement a partnership, it is necessary for 
him to come to Fasa together with all the maleks and amirs and chamberlains and hear 
the orders. When they read this letter, (they reasoned that) if they did not come they 
would be guilty, and if they came they would not know what was behind this. In the 
end all of the nobles and maleks went to Fasa. Yasavur Buqa took them all out on the 
first day and left them in the pillory, fetters and chains and imprisoned them in the 
prison of Fasa. Together with twenty Mongol horsemen he went to Ig. And he put 
Rokn al-Din Hossein, who was ten years old, on the throne and he took this measure 
with the approval of Naser al-Din. […] Yasavur was in Ig for four months and every 
day there was a yarghu so that the proud and cut-throat nobles and the people who had 
knowledge of this affair could all be punished. Some they roasted on the fire, some 
were made an example of, and some were put to the sword. In short, every person saw 
appropriate retribution. When the yasamishi was finished, and much property had 
come into his hands, after four months he returned to Fasa and he took the bound 
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maleks and returned to the ordo. They were imprisoned for a while, [then] there was a 
yarghu; all were held guilty. It was ordered that all should be put to death”273  
 
Though there is no detail on how the yarghus themselves were carried out, there is no 
mention of cooperation with local legal personnel and, given the circumstances, it is rather 
unlikely that such cooperation happened in this case. Therefore, in these yarghus led by a 
military man on a punitive campaign, there is no indication that there was any deviation from 
Mongol legal methods.   
 
Another yarghu which possibly falls into the same category is that of the Atabeg Tekle of 
Lurestan, who joined Hulagu Khan’s attack on Baghdad but later withdrew, apparently 
disgusted at the atrocities committed by the Mongols. He was condemned in a yarghu and 
executed in the main square of Tabriz, and while it is not entirely clear where the yarghu took 
place, it is possible that it was held in the public square prior to the execution.274 Although 
this execution (and possibly the trial) took place within the Persian sphere of the city of 
Tabriz as opposed to the Mongol sphere of the ordo, again there is no mention of any 
cooperation with local judges, nor is such cooperation recorded in the sources which mention 
the qadis of Tabriz during the Mongol period.275 
 
But in other cases, local officials were involved. Although the interrogation of some people 
who had complained against Terkan Khatun, the ruler of Kerman, took place without the 
involvement of qadis, it should be noted that even in the Islamic context this trial would have 
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been perceived as part of siyasa rather than one in which qadis would necessarily have been 
involved. The yarghu involved both the deputies of Terkan Khatun as well as local 
darughachis and yarghuchis and can therefore be seen as reflecting the collegial nature of 
decision-making valued by the Mongols.276 The representatives of Ilkhanid power and the 
representatives of Terkan Khatun together held the trial, thus implementing justice (as they 
saw it) at the same time as strenghthening their mutual ties. The trial, as George Lane has 
pointed out,277 shows the great amount of trust and cooperation between the Ilkhans and the 
rulers of Kerman, specifically between the Mongol amir Arghun Aqa, and the ruler of 
Kerman Terkan Khatun. After some opponents of Terkan Khatun had written a document 
opposing her rule, and this had been passed to Arghun Aqa, he gave her authority to deal with 
the situation. She in turn took worked together with the darughachis for her purposes, but 
finally delivered the accused from their hands, probably in order to be able to claim credit for 
being merciful.   
 
“In this situation he sent a letter to Terkan and sent their story in the middle of his 
letter to Terkan and said the naibs of Terkan and the basqaqs [editor’s note: iasaqchis, 
i.e. perhaps yarghuchis]278 of the province should get ready and hold a yarghu.” 
 
They were handed over to the basqaqs and yarghuchis to interrogate: 
 
“They brought them to the sand and conducted difficult yarghus [interrogations] and 
tied them up naked for several days and questioned them according to Mongol custom 
so that they would all confess their crime and would testify to their guilt. Some of 
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them were executed and some were told that in order to be an example to the people 
they would be brought to the ordo and executed [there], but Khodavand Terkan 
ordered mercy and forgiveness and took them back from the hands of the yarghuchis 
and said, I am going to the ordo myself and I will take them with me, and I am 
responsible for their fate, and she did not allow them to molest them. Such was her 
munificence.”279 
 
While this trial shows collegiality involving darughachis, yarghuchis and the local ruler, other 
trials involved qadis as well. In fact yarghuchis were sometimes expected to work together 
with qadis in resolving a case. This is seen very clearly in the case of the ‘land yarghus’ 
concerning ownership of the castle of Sirjan and its surrounding lands, which the Ilkhan 
Abaqa attempted to resolve after Terkan Khatun, the ruler of Kerman, and leaders from 
Shabankare both found themselves at the ordo at the same time, and disputed this matter. 
Terkan Khatun presented the case that Sirjan belonged to Kerman and that the local rulers of 
Shabankare had “fraudulently and aggressively” occupied it. 280 She requested a yarligh that 
Sirjan should be given back to Kerman and this was approved. The inhabitants of Shabankare 
replied that Sirjan and the castle had been destroyed, that they had built the buildings 
themselves, and that they therefore had rights to the castle. Thereupon,  
 
“[Abaqa] nominated the great amir Iyaji Aqa, who was the shahna of Isfahan, and the 
khwaja Shams al-Din Khurasani from among the sahib-divans, and who was the 
nawkar (nöker) of Iyaji Aqa, to go to Sirjan and turn Sirjan and the castle and its 
belongings over to Khodavand Terkan, and to hold a land yarghu [ 1/;ر! ?a(ا  ] and 
see arguments and deeds from both parties. Whatever had been purchased by the 
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people of Shabankare should be recognized as their own property and that the land to 
which water had been brought should [be decided according to] the decrees of former 
kings – that 4 and a half dangs be taken from them and the other [one and a] half 
should remain the property of the current owners.281 
 
The people of Shabankare tried to protest this judgment, complaining that the furnishings of 
the castle were so many that they could not possibly be removed. Therefore Terkan Khatun 
had pack animals requisitioned for them, and the people were brought before the castle by the 
army and made to salvage what they could and leave. 
 
“When they surrendered the castle and Terkan’s secretaries took charge of it, the qadi 
Imam al-Din Sirjan and his son Taj al-Sin Soleiman and Izz al-Din and Hamad and 
his brother the qadi ‘Imad al-Din Maqbul were ordered to put the issues of the land 
yarghu up for discussion and they considered the reasons and title-deeds of every 
party. After arguing about and perusing the title-deeds, some of these properties […] 
were given to the inhabitants of Shabankare, and the rest to Kermanis. And the 
jurisdiction over Sirjan was given to Khodavand Terkan. Because of various reasons, 
the people of Shabankare said that this had not been mentioned in the yarligh and they 
would not hand it over. The amirs of the yarghu said that this would be delayed until 
an order for its confiscation had been requested [from the court] and received. [Until 
then] it should remain in the hands of the people of Shabankare.”282  
 
What is noteworthy in this case is both the involvement of qadis alongside representatives of 
Abaqa and of the quarrelling parties, as well as the instruction to convene a ‘land yarghu’ on 
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the spot and to decide the matter with everyone present, exactly as the Mongol tradition of 
collegiality would require. Also noteworthy are the instructions to decide the case “according 
to the decrees of former kings.” Evidently the inclusion of Islamic legal specialists and even 
the use of some non-Mongol legal practices (such as the division of property into sixths or 
dangs) was unproblematic. 
 
Another case which involved cooperation and which can be explained by the principle of 
collegiality is the trial of Sayyid Taj al-Din Avaji.283 At this trial, since the accusation was 
that he was not a real sayyid, the qadi al-qudat was present. Perhaps the Ilkhan reasoned that, 
since the matter concerned religious law, as well as the standing of a senior state minister, the 
qadi al-qudat should be present. Unfortunately it is not mentioned whether he was to be 
merely an observer or whether, like other ‘interested parties’ present at other yarghus, this 
was to give him the opportunity to speak up, or intercede, if he felt that the proceedings were 
not fair. The latter is more likely, given the importance of collegial decision-making for the 
Mongols. 
 
Therefore, the principle of collegiality influenced the manner in which trials were conducted 
in Ilkhanid Persia, both at the ordo, and in the actions of yarghuchis at the local level. The 
principle of collegiality is the only factor that can adequately explain an event such as the 
‘land yarghu’ concerning the possession of the castle of Sirjan. The instances of trials with 
both yarghuchis and local officials or qadis present would seem to point back to the quriltai, 
where decisions were deliberately taken in such a way as to involve the maximum number of 
influential people in order to ensure their acceptance and effectiveness. In other words, the 
collegial nature of decision-making which was also a feature of Mongol legal culture was 
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making its influence felt in the Ilkhanate. Although cases in which cooperation occurred are 
not numerically in the majority among those recorded in the historical sources, this was likely 
due to the tendency of the sources to report politically important trials, rather than to a 
general failure on the part of yarghuchis to work together with local officials and take local 
practices into account. Rather, it would seem that for some legal cases, and especially those 
which took place away from the ordo and the Mongol centre of power, the involvement of 
local personnel or even of local qadis, and even the use of local norms (as can be seen from 
the use of sixths of a property, dangs) was a development of which Mongol rulers and 
officials approved.  
 
The reason for the involvement of local legal personnel together with yarghuchis in these 
cases would seem to be the Ilkhans’ recognition of qadis’ authority for most civil and penal 
matters on the local level, as will be fully discussed in chapter 5. From the legislation 
promulgated by the Ilkhans one can see that in areas such as weights and measures and land 
contracts, the Ilkhans expected the qadis’ cooperation,284 so it should perhaps not be 
surprising that their cooperation in trials on the local level was also expected or welcomed.  
 
These instances of cooperation foreshadowed some examples of trials jointly undertaken 
under the Timurids, in that Persian and Central Asian realm where Islamic, Mongol and 
Turkish ideas continued to meet. Under the Timurids, in order to decide certain cases, 
yarghuchis and qadis would sit opposite each other and decide jointly.285 This shows that 
though the influence of the collegiality principle in Persia was perhaps somewhat weaker 
than in China, it was certainly not completely absent, nor was it temporary.  
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ii) China     
 
Just as in Persia, in China the cases which can be called yarghus or which were investigated 
by yarghuchis can be classified into various categories, from the trials of important political 
figures at the ordo, to trials in which yarghuchis and Chinese personnel worked together. The 
exact configuration of who judged which trials was somewhat different from that in Persia, 
because of the high degree of bureaucratization in China, which led to the position of 
yarghuchi being institutionalized under the Yuan dynasty.286 Therefore, the types of cases 
which yarghuchis judged on their own, and those which they judged in cooperation with 
Chinese, also varied somewhat from the situation in Persia. But as in Persia, the principle of 
collegiality was influential. The integration of yarghuchis into a bureaucracy where they 
often worked in conjuction with Chinese in judging cases, and the involvement of yarghuchis 
in the compilation of some of the collections of imperial edicts, shows how the principle of 
collegiality was still very much at the forefront of how many trials were conducted.  
 
The principle of collegiality can be seen both in trials taking place at the ordo, and other trials 
in which yarghuchis were involved. That Qubilai valued the principle of collegiality can be 
seen from the trial of Arigh Boke, which manifests several typical Mongol practices. At his 
yarghu, called a quriltai in some sources,287 Arigh Boke was interrogated at the ordo by a 
number of high-ranking Mongol princes and military commanders.288 He was confronted 
with his generals in Qubilai’s absence in a method known as tapishmishi, to ascertain how he 
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and his generals would react to each other’s statements, and thereby whether they had spoken 
truthfully. Then, before delivering the judgment, Qubilai made a token gesture of wanting to 
ask the heads of other Mongol uluses289 for their input.290  
 
“The qa’an wanted to try Ariq Bökä, and he would have waited for the arrival of Hülägü 
Khan, Bärkä, and Alghu, but since they were very far away and it would have taken too long, 
the princes who were in the area, Taghachar, Yesünggä, Yäkä Qada’an, Hulaqur, Jibik Temür, 
Ja’utu, and other princes and commanders of Mongolia and Cathay assembled to put Ariq 
Bökä and Asutai on trial. […] The monarch issued an edict for all parts of the realm. All the 
commanders took counsel and said, “How shall we look upon Ariq Bökä’s and Asutai’s 
crime? For the qa’an’s sake, let us spare their lives.” They sent envoys to Hülägü, Bärkä, and 
Alghu, saying, “Since it is not possible for you to attend because you are too far away and too 
occupied with matters, and since there was a possibility, had we waited longer, for breaches 
to have been made in the fabric of the empire that could not have been repaired, we have 
therefore executed their officers, tried them, and are consulting with you. We brothers are all 
agreed that Ariq Bökä’s blood should be spared and Asutai should be released. What say 
you?”291 
 
Qubilai took this step because he recognized that, in theory, a decision as important as 
judging his own brother needed the support and advice of other members of the family. 
According to Rashid, Hülegü and Berke agreed to come for a quriltai, but war broke out with 
Berke and Alghu fell ill, so the quriltai did not take place.292 
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The principle of collegiality had deep influence in Qubilai’s ulus and the Yuan empire. 
Unlike in Persia, the position of yarghuchi was institutionalized as part of the Chinese-style 
bureaucracy set up by Qubilai. This meant that yarghuchis became a permanent presence 
within the central government and they could, and did, contribute to the widespread 
application of certain Mongol practices within China. Since the main government office 
incorporating them, the dazong zhengfu, was made up largely by representatives of various 
princes,293 and moreover the dazong zhengfu unlike other central government agencies 
primarily used the Mongolian language until 1295,294 the office could and to some extent did 
operate as a bastion of Mongol legal principles,295 supporting the punishment of livestock 
thieves by requiring them to return nine times the amount of stolen animals (a long-standing 
steppe practice) and advocating the use of military exile as a punishment method.296 However, 
at the same time another Mongol legal principle, the principle of collegiality, led to the 
dazong zhengfu often working together with other central government offices. Therefore, in 
the role of yarghuchis in Yuan China one can see traces of the principle of collegiality.  
 
The bureaucratization of yarghuchis happened over several stages. Initially, in 1265, ten 
yarghuchis were appointed; in 1272 Qubilai specified that they should “deal with Mongolian 
public cases,” in other words to deal with legal cases involving Mongols. Around 1281297 
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these yarghuchis were incorporated into the office known as the dazong zhengfu,298 which 
became a final court of appeal for Mongols involved in legal cases. Made up of, and often 
headed by, imperial princes or their representatives, the office dealt with cases such as that of 
the Mongol prince Bolanxi. In 1309 “in the eleventh month […] the prince Bolanxi killed a 
man because he was privately angry [with him]; [therefore] he should be put to death. The 
dazong zhengfu’s yeke yarghuchi [was] consulted [and decided that] “Boralki comes from a 
precious imperial ancestry; [I] request that he be beaten (with the heavy stick) and then be 
moved to the north to serve with the army as a low person.”299 In this case, a yarghuchi of the 
dazong zhengfu revised a judgment by Chinese officials and in doing so imposed a 
distinctively Mongol punishment, military exile. It should be noted that the favouritism 
shown in this example again shows the value ascribed to closeness to Chinggis Khan, and not 
necessarily to racial group per se. In 1310, when two yarghuchis, Huaidu 懷都 from the 
Secretariat for State Affairs and Duo’erzhi 朶兒只 from the Office of Surveillance went to 
Zhending fu 真定府 to deal with a case of people spreading rumours that the Mongol 
presence was only temporary, the Chinese were found innocent while two Huihui 回回
people were found guilty.300  
 
Yarghuchis of the dazong zhengfu also had authority at the local level in the capital Dadu. 
For example, when Yueluge was yarghuchi, he  
 
“had about a hundred bodyguards who stayed at his residence and were close to him, 
and who took orders from him…. If any common people who were passing by had an 
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accusation about a fight or a verbal dispute, he would immediately (go to) investigate 
until he found out whether it was true or not. Even if it was raining or muddy he 
would absolutely (go and) decide the case, without being affected by the lobbying of 
any party. So (the legal officials) in the capital respected his attitude and said of him 
that he was as clever as a god.”301 
 
However, the principle of collegiality is seen in the often overlapping competencies of 
various central government organs, and the resultant frequent cooperation of yarghuchis with 
non-Mongol officials. The overlapping competencies were not simply a result of the greater 
bureaucratization in Yuan China compared with the other offshoots of the great Mongol 
empire, but have been recognized as a characteristic that was particularly pronounced in the 
Yuan dynasty.302 In comparison with earlier Chinese dynasties, it seems the Yuan emperors 
sacrificed some efficiency for greater control from the centre, and a significant part of their 
strategy for providing checks and balances was the appointment of multiple agencies or 
officials to the same or similar tasks.303 This was manifested in the judicial realm by the 
cooperation (and sometimes competition) between the dazong zhengfu, the Ministry of 
Punishments and the Censorate, as well as by the obligation of yarghuchis investigating cases 
on the local level to work together with local authorities.  
 
The dazong zhengfu and the Ministry of Punishments had essentially similar remits as highest 
judicial appeal courts for the realm.304 While the dazong zhengfu dealt primarily with cases 
involving Mongols, the tendency for its remit to expand brought it into conflict with the 
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Ministry of Punishments.305 In 1286, the dazong zhengfu was made responsible also for 
criminal cases involving Chinese. In 1312, these cases were returned to the Ministry of 
Punishments. In 1328, cases from Dadu and Shangdu and those involving Mongols and 
members of the keshig and postal system were given to the dazong zhengfu and local cases, 
even those involving Mongols, were given to local agencies (yousi) and the Ministry of 
Punishments. In 1336, all cases of adultery, robbery, cheating and fraud were given to the 
dazong zhengfu.306 Although the Censorate’s remit was to supervise other officials and 
remonstrate with the emperor about policy,307 they were also occasionally involved in 
judging cases.    
 
In practise, as will be seen from the following examples, yarghuchis of the dazong zhengfu 
often worked together with those from other government bodies in deciding cases. This 
brought Mongols and Chinese together, since most, but not all, of the staff of the dazong 
zhengfu were Mongols,308 while the staff of the Ministry of Punishments was primarily 
Chinese.309 This shows that the principle of collegiality had real effects in Yuan China.  
 
For example, in the year 1294, Qubilai ordered the regional censorate and yarghuchis to 
question the pacification commissioner of Huaixi route Angji’er, who had embezzled from 
the army 600 ding, 450 liang of silver, and two horses.310 In the same year, censors and a 
minister from the Central Secretariat memorialized that Jiao Hua from the Jiangnan Branch 
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Censorate and other officials were not following the law and were falsely accusing officials 
of the Branch Secretariat of wrongdoing. As a result, “The emperor ordered the [Central] 
Secretariat, the Censorate and a yeke yarghuchi to investigate this case together.”311 When 
Wu Chang’s wife Liu Shi 劉氏 accused the Minister San Baonu 三寶奴 of having robbed an 
imperial signet of the recently deceased Song emperor and other items, Wuzong ordered 
officials of the Secretariat for State Affairs, of the Censorate, the yeke yarghuchi Beg Temur, 
and a representative from the Bureau for the Empress’ Administration to investigate the 
case.312 Also, 1319, “the people under the Prince of Jin Yesun Tiemu’er experienced raids 
and natural disasters, and many people became robbers. [The emperor] ordered the yarghuchi 
Nangjiatai to go there and interrogate and record [the cases] of the criminal prisoners together 
with the Prince of Jin’s councillor, and ask the prince of Jin to execute those guilty of serious 
[crimes] and have those being sent into exile given a beating in addition.”313 
 
In addition, the cases of prisoners in the capital Dadu were to be jointly reviewed by 
yarghuchis and other officials. The emperor ordered that: 
 
“The Ministry of Justice of the Central Secretariat, the Censorate, and the yarghuchis 
each [should] choose an official and authorize him to decide cases, [so as] to discuss 
cases of injustice until they become clear, to investigate cases that have been delayed, 
and to judge cases that are not so serious and then dispatch [the accused back to where 
he came from].”314     
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Instead of waning over time, the influence of the principle of collegiality only grew and led to 
further collaborative efforts. After 1335, a body called the wufuguan 五府官 (five-offices-
officials) was set up: 
 
“When important cases are to be decided, important prisoners to be interrogated, 
[representatives from] the Central Secretariat, Bureau of Military Affairs, Censorate, 
[da]zong zhengfu, Ministry of Punishments, these five must hear the case together. 
This will be known as the wufu[guan], and the representative from the Central 
Secretariat will be the duanshiguan [yarghuchi].”315 
 
Obstacles in the way of collaboration, such as the dazong zhengfu’s yarghuchis’ use of 
Mongolian, were eliminated. In 1295, Chengzong ordered yarghuchis to use Chinese and not 
Mongolian to promote cooperation and supervision between yarghuchis and Chinese officials. 
“Yarghuchis since olden times have used the national language (i. e. Mongolian). They must 
change and use Chinese characters.”316 The Yuan history elsewhere reports that: “All 
(officials of the) dazong zhengfu now decide important cases on which depend the fate (of the 
accused), (so) they must use Chinese characters to record the case in writing, so that the 
public texts can be given to the Censorate to be reviewed and sent by the censors to the 
emperor.”317 The Yuan Dian Zhang dates this decision to 1301.318 The change completed 
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their integration with other officials in the Yuan officialdom.319 Greater integration between 
the different branches of government became the norm.  
 
Yarghuchis and Chinese officials in the Yuan dynasty worked together not only in judging 
legal cases but also in writing legislation. In 1303, officials from the dazong zhengfu, Central 
Secretariat, and Censorate worked together on developing consistent laws.320  
 
“In 1323, [the emperor] ordered the shumi[yuan] fushi 樞密副使 [Assistant Director 
of the Bureau of Military Affairs] Wanyan Nadan, the shiyushi 侍御史 [Associate 
Censor] Cao Boqi, the yeke yarghuchi Buyan, the Jixian Academician Qincha, the 
Hanlin Auxiliary Academician Cao Yuanyong, to hear and read the imperial ge 格
and li 例 [statutes and precedents] which were compiled and gathered together in 
Renzong’s time […]. In the second month […], the ge 格 and li 例 were fixed, 
altogether 2539 tiao 條 [items], among which were 717 duanli 斷例 [precedents], and 
1151 tiaoge 條格. The emperor ordered that 94 of them be expunged, and he ordered 
them to be classified under 577 [headings]. This was called the Dayuan tongzhi 大元
通制. It was promulgated in all-under-heaven.”321  
 
In addition, members of the dazong zhengfu were also involved in putting together the later 
compilation known as Zhizheng tiaoge.322 
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Conclusion     
 
This chapter has shown that even those officials who could most be expected to promote 
Mongol legal practices within the Toluid empire worked together with local legal officials, 
and local authorities generally, on a number of occasions. While many of them (and it should 
be remembered that not all yarghuchis were Mongols) did represent Mongol views as can be 
seen from the use of military exile, the overriding concern seems to have been working 
together with local officials and finding solutions acceptable to all parties.   
 
It is essential to recognize that this was not simply a case of ‘administrative’ or ‘customary’ 
practices influencing the law, but of Mongol legal culture directly influencing legal 
procedures in the Ilkhanate and the Yuan dynasty. Contrary to Jagchid Sechin’s surmise that 
joint trials in China were due to pressure by Han officials who feared that Mongol or semu323 
yarghuchis would not judge cases fairly,324 the impetus to judge cases jointly came mostly 
from the Mongols. It was because the principle of collegiality was so important in Mongol 
legal culture itself that it influenced how yarghuchis dealt with legal cases both in the 
Ilkhanate and in the Yuan dynasty.       
 
Moreover, the influence of the principle of collegiality on the conduct of trials both in the 
Ilkhanate and in Yuan China was not short-lived. It can be seen as a precursor of more 
systematized joint trial methods in the Timurid realm. In Yuan China, the joint trial system 
was an important impetus for the incorporation of several Mongol practices into the Chinese 
legal system, even influencing the Ming dynasty, as will be argued in chapter six.   
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Chapter 4 – Darughachis and other local officials 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While the previous chapter focussed on yarghuchis, the present chapter will review other 
Mongol-appointed officials at the local level and their involvement in law, with a particular 
emphasis on darughachis (also described in the sources with the Turkish term basqaq or the 
Arabo-Persian term shahna; transliterated in Chinese as daluhuachi 達魯花赤). The chapter 
will not be a comprehensive examination of legal issues at the local level, but will examine 
whether there are further traces of the principle of collegiality in the way in which Mongol-
appointed officials conducted legal matters.  
 
While darughachis and other officials were not primarily involved in legal matters, 
nevertheless this was an inescapable component of their roles for many local officials.325 This 
chapter will show that officials that the Mongols appointed to local areas quickly became 
integrated into the local fabric and that their involvement in law shows a neutral or even 
positive attitude towards Islamic or Chinese practices respectively.  
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Darughachis 
 
This chapter will put a particular emphasis on darughachis, since they were often the earliest 
Mongol-appointed officials in any newly conquered area. The imposition of officials known 
as darughachis was one of the conditions of submission for almost any region that accepted 
Mongol overlordship.326 They were appointed from an early period in the wake of Mongol 
conquests, and usually assigned to cities.327  
 
The function of darughachis was to ensure the permanent submission of recently conquered 
cities and territories. To this end they were involved in suppressing rebellion, keeping order 
where necessary, and sometimes they were specifically tasked with organizing the rebuilding 
of destroyed cities.328 Thus, as a kind of overseer, they were not necessarily involved in day-
to-day administration, though with time they came to be closely involved in day to day 
administration especially in Yuan China, where they were integrated into the local 
administration at its various levels. Although they were not primarily legal specialists either 
in theory or in practice, as representatives of the central Toluid administrations in conquered 
areas, they were at times involved in legal cases.  
 
Their occasional involvement in legal matters came about not least because they had 
moderate military forces with them which could help them to keep order and enforce their 
decisions. An accurate estimate of the strengh of their forces is difficult, but Vassaf indicates 
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that at one point the shahna in Shiraz, Bulughan, fled with 300 soldiers, so it seems that he 
had at least 300 who were under his command and felt loyal enough to flee together with 
him.329 It would also have been impossible for the shahna of Baghdad, unless he had a group 
of soldiers under him, to arrest a “company” of soldiers which had turned back from 
accompanying Najm al-Din to Egypt, and put them to death,330 or for the “shahna of Iraq” to 
capture and execute a group of Bedouins who had stolen garments from the Friday mosque in 
Baghdad331 and had plundered the area around it.332 However, the detachments of shahnas 
were not of overwhelming strength. When Barmas, the shahna of Merv, went with the Emir 
Ziya al-Din to put down a rebellion in Sarakhs, the inhabitants of Merv took the opportunity 
to rebel, and when Barmas returned from putting down the rebellion, he found the city gates 
shut and was unable to enter the city. He had to content himself with killing some people 
whom he found near the gates and leaving for the ordo to seek redress; but he died en 
route.333  
 
Connected with the availability of detachments of soldiers under their command was the 
tendency to call on shahnas to help in military campaigns. For example, Chin Temur was 
stationed as shahna of Khwarazm when that province was conquered, and during Ögödei’s 
reign when Chormaqan was sent to Iran, Ögödei “ordered the leaders and basqaqs of 
provinces to go on campaign themselves and assist Chormaqan. Chin Temur set out from 
Khwarazm as ordered.”334 Likewise, when in 1278 two thousand Negudaris attacked Fars, 
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Balaghan the shahna was among those who went with an army to repel them.335 In Yuan 
China, darughachis are often mentioned in the sources as going on military campaigns.336  
 
Another factor which justifies particular attention on darughachis is that they were meant to 
be non-local. The vast majority of people chosen to be darughachis were from a different 
place, and even from a different culture, than the people they were assigned to ‘guard.’ This 
requirement was even written into legislation in Yuan China, though it was likely not strictly 
adhered to.337 The one exception were generals and others who were instrumental in the 
submission of the cities or areas they had formerly commanded or been officials in.338 Such 
people could also be appointed as darughachis, as a reward for the services rendered. 
Therefore, the darughachis would be the most likely to transmit inter-cultural influence, 
either Mongol influence in legal matters, or even influence deriving from the culture of their 
place of origin.  
 
It is for these reasons that this chapter will focus in particular, but not exclusively, on 
darughachis. While in Yuan China there were many officials at the local level who had 
regular connections with the central government, in Ilkhanid Persia darughachis were, apart 
from local governors or sultans, often the only directly Mongol-appointed or -approved 
officials in a particular local area.  
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Local personnel in China 
 
The principle of collegiality is very evident in the legal system at the local level. In fact, the 
dispersal of authority is recognized as one of the major features characterizing the legal 
system during the Yuan dynasty, and setting it apart from previous dynasties such as the 
Song.339 The influence of the principle of collegiality on Chinese local administration in 
general has been previously examined by Endicott-West. While many have noted its 
influence on the legal administration in the Yuan dynasty, this has been seen in terms of a 
convenient way of dealing with people of many different nationalities, or as due to Mongol 
administrative traditions. Collegiality in the legal system of the Yuan dynasty has not been 
seen as a result of the influence of Mongol legal tradition itself, as embodied in the quriltai.340  
 
The yuehui 約會 or joint trials system was the most prominent manifestation of the principle 
of collegiality at the local level. It was a central element of the Yuan legal system.341 The 
yuehui system rested on the idea that cases involving people from different groups (in China, 
household registration groups) should be decided jointly. If a dispute involved two people 
from different groups, a meeting of the heads of the two groups, sometimes with a 
government representative in addition, was convened to find a suitable solution. Such a 
meeting was called a yuehui or ‘joint meeting.’342  
 
From the beginning of Qubilai’s rule, the solutions proposed to resolve legal conflicts could 
include joint trials. In response to the complaint of the darughachi and the local general 
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administrator (director-general) of Huaimeng route (lu 路) not long after Qubilai had 
ascended the throne, Qubilai ordered joint trials to be held:  
 
“On the 28th day, ting-ch’ou [of the 6th moon of the 2nd year of the Chung-t’ung reign 
period: 26 July 1261], the Central Secretariat (Tu-t’ang) memorialized and 
respectfully received an imperial decree (sheng-chih) [which said]:  
To the Pacification Bureau (Hsuan-fu-ssu) of Chen-ting route: According to the 
memorial of Mi-li-chi, the Ta-lu-hua-ch’ih of Huai-Meng, and T’an Ch’eng, the 
General Administrator, they reported [saying that]:  
As for the territory under our jurisdiction, much of it has Mongolian military officials 
(t’ou-mu) who have been stationed on it. If it happens that there is official business 
concerning a legal case, they are unwilling to come forward to give testimony. Often 
they do not submit to being summoned and questioned (kou-chui), and this results in 
the delay and obstruction of business. 
Approved the memorial (chun-tsou).  
Let the pacification bureaus in all the sundry routes in all places be instructed: from 
this time onward, the civilian population overseers (kuan-min-kuan) of the various 
subprefectures (chou) and cities, whenever there is official business concerning 
Mongolian military personnel (chün-jen), when they conduct an investigation, should 
together with one military overseer (kuan-chün-kuan) conduct a hearing and decide 
the case (t’ing-tuan). Let this be put into effect (shih-hsing). Let there be no partiality. 
Approve this.”343 
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Darughachis were involved in regular conferences at lower levels of the administration down 
to the district level, so that any legal cases they dealt with were also discussed in conference. 
Conferences at the route level were held daily and were attended by the darughachi 達魯花赤, 
the general administrator (zongguan 總管), the associate administrator (tongzhi 同知) and the 
commissioner of records (panguan 判官), joined, if the conference was taking place at upper-
route level, by an assistant administrator (zhizhong 治中).344 The conferences dealt with 
diverse affairs, including sometimes legal cases, and were also held at lower levels of local 
government. An edict from 1264 stated that:  
 
“The officials of the capital [jing 京], prefectures [fu 府], subprefectures [zhou 州], 
and counties [districts - xian 縣] every day sit in conference (yuan-tso), [where] they 
deliberate upon legal cases, and examine into official affairs.”345  
 
Another edict from 1277 stated:  
 
“The officials of the capital, prefectures, subprefectures, and counties [districts] 
gather together every morning. They sit in conference (lit. sit in the round: yuan-tso), 
[where] they deliberate upon legal cases, and delve into official business. Except for 
those to whom it is appropriate to grant leave, [the others] must not be remiss in their 
duties [that is, in attending the conference]. As before, every day they must sign in in 
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the official conference register (kung-tso wen-pu). Those who are absent on official 
business will be marked down above.”346  
 
Joint trials were mandated in more and more situations, leading to a situation where joint 
trials were an integral component of the Yuan dynasty legal system. In most cases, yuehui 
dealt with civil matters. In 1266 Qubilai ordered that: 
 
“In the case of households belonging to the touxia [appanage-holders] or se[mu], if 
there are any criminal cases, the darughachi from the local area, the civil officials 
should meet with the official from the [zong]guan[fu] to decide and dismiss the case. 
If they are unable to convene a meeting, they can judge and close the case and 
implement the punishment [themselves].”347  
 
An edict from 1294 mandated joint trials for civil matters involving Buddhist and Daoist 
monks or Confucian scholars. Qubilai ordered that: 
 
“If Buddhist or Daoist monks or Confucian scholars have a verbal dispute, the civil 
officials should come together in one place to interrogate [them]. The head of the 
Buddhist monks, the head of Daoist monks and the head of the Confucian scholars 
should conduct the interrogation together.”348  
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In the case of religious personnel, even some criminal matters could be decided by joint trial. 
The section on criminal law of the Yuan Shi says that:  
 
“All Buddhist monks, Daoist monks, and Confucian scholars who have a dispute will 
not have [their cases] decided by the yousi [the local government agencies], rather the 
heads of the three houses [Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian] should come together to 
interrogate [the litigants].”349  
 
Similar regulations were put in place regarding various other household groups. In 1295, 
emperor Chengzong ordered that: “If a dispute occurs between doctors and ordinary civilians, 
the civil officials and the head of the doctors should come together in one place to interrogate 
[the litigants], and make a judgment. Respect this.”350 In 1300, “The Central Secretariat 
memorialized and received the edict: […] If there is a matter that needs to be investigated, the 
head of the entertainers and the guanminguan [civil officials] should interrogate [the litigants] 
together. Respect this.”351  
 
In the year 1301, a complaint reached the court from Henan province about cases between 
civilians and military personnel, or those under the jurisdiction of princes (touxia). The 
military leaders were failing to show up for the arranged joint meetings, and the officials 
argued that ordinary people were suffering because their cases were not being decided. The 
officials of the Central Secretariat referred to an edict from 1267 in which Qubilai had 
mandated joint conferences and given the civil officials authority to decide a case if meetings 
had thrice been called but had not been attended by the relevant representatives. The officials 
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from the Central Secretariat said that this system had been in place for a long time and to 
implement Qubilai’s edict.352 In 1312, there was a renewed complaint regarding cases 
between civilians and military personnel or those under princes’ jurisdiction. The obligation 
to hold joint trials was re-emphasized, although if three attempts at meeting were 
unsuccessful, the yousi would have authority to deal with the case and then report it to the 
censorate for checking.353  
 
In 1302, Chengzong ordered that for all cases involving Uighurs, no matter in which area of 
China or under which administration or in which appanage they were living, for those matters 
that should be decided by conference, officials of the duhufu [the office charged with Uighur 
matters] and other government offices “should come together, and comparing the evidence in 
one place should interrogate [the litigants] and decide the case. If this has been commanded, 
those who judge based on their own ideas [and not together with others], are they not 
afraid?”354 In 1314, Renzong repeated that in cases involving Uighurs, even if they were 
living in far-away cities, their appointed head should hold a meeting together with the city 
officials to decide the case.355  
 
In 1308, Wuzong gave an edict that less serious cases involving both military personnel and 
civilians should be judged by conference, as had been the practice since the time of Qubilai. 
The refusal of some to cooperate in the joint investigation and trial process was apparently 
leading to untold misery: 
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“Their leaders know there is no proper system, they delay and make excuses, they 
don’t turn up for meetings.  They delay for days and months, they delay the cases, and 
create big obstacles. One asks, “Why?” because, no matter in which part of the land, 
if someone has been murdered or seriously injured, or if a robber has taken someone’s 
money, and if he has left the owner dead or injured, the body should be examined 
immediately.  If a meeting is arranged, but they don’t arrive quickly, if the weather is 
hot, the body will start rotting.”356   
 
In response, Wuzong ordered that officials who didn’t turn up should be reported and 
prosecuted, and also investigated by the lianfangsi 廉訪司, the regional censorial office. The 
edict reconfirmed decisions should be taken by joint conference, although the civil officials 
could decide if three attempted meetings had been unsuccessful. The edict stated about the 
policy of making decisions by conference that “this has been the practice for a long time; it is 
not up for discussion.”357 
 
Crucially, interrogations were undertaken in conference for the specific purpose of avoiding 
injustice. In 1298, Chengzong issued an edict in which he emphasized that acting on one’s 
own leads to injustice, giving an example of a local official and a darughachi who 
interrogated people on their own, thus breaking the law: 
 
“In Binzhou lu (route), the Director-General investigated [the cases of] Zhang Xianjun and 
other people who died [because of the torture he applied.] Also, the darughachi of Yongzhou 
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lu (route) Mila investigated the criminals in a way that was illegal. Such behaviour only leads 
to oppression and cruelty for the people.”358 
 
Wang Yun, a prominent and influential official serving the Yuan dynasty, also gave examples 
of the violation of the principle of collegiality leading to injustices: an archer (policeman) 
who tortured a suspected thief without informing his superiors, and a police commissioner 
who tortured a suspected thief to death.359 
 
Zhang Yanghao 張養浩, a district magistrate (xianyin 縣尹), in his handbook entitled Frank 
Advice for the Magistrate expressed similar sentiments:  
 
“When there are legal cases, [officials] should convene together at a set time and hold 
an inquiry. One should not take advantage of a time when one is angry to act without 
proper authorization in administering a beating while interrogating.”360 
 
Therefore, on all levels, from the route to the district level, the sentiment prevailed that 
conducting interrogations in conference was necessary to avoid injustice, reflecting the 
sentiments expressed in the Secret History of the Mongols about the trial of his brother Qasar 
which Chinggis Khan attempted to hold by himself. This shows that the principle of 
collegiality penetrated very deep in Yuan China, and did not quickly disappear.  The 
darughachi became a part of this system and examined legal offenses together with other 
officials. The rationale underlying the yuehui and other joint conferences was the same as that 
underlying quriltais, of bringing leaders together to decide issues which affected all of them. 
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 Ko ̄teibon Gentenshō keibu, ch. 40, pp. 48-49 枉勘枉禁論罪 
359
 Endicott-West, Mongolian Rule in China, p. 53 
360
 Zhang Yanghao, Mumin zhonggao, p. 285; translation taken from Endicott-West, 1989, p. 53 
119 
 
Although the later Yuan did try to limit the use of the yuehui and bring more cases under state 
control, the system, and the principle, persisted.361  
 
 
Local personnel in Persia 
 
It is extremely significant that there exists evidence for the Ilkhanate of a direct parallel to the 
joint trials in Yuan China; or at least, of the intention of Ghazan Khan to implement similar 
joint trials within the Ilkhanate. This fact has remained unremarked on except in the work of 
Hu Xingdong, the specialist on the civil trial system in the Yuan dynasty. The similarity 
strongly suggests that the roots of this approach lie in Mongol pre-imperial legal practices, 
and leaves no practical doubt that collegial decision-making practices had some influence in 
the legal administration in both Yuan China and the Ilkhanate. 
 
Rashid al-Din states, in the middle of his edict on the delegation of judicial authority, that: 
 
“If a case is between two Mongols or between a Mongol and a Muslim, or if there are 
other cases that are difficult to decide, we order the shahnas, maliks, bitigchis, cadis 
[qadis], and learned Alids [and danishmands362] to meet twice a month in the 
congregational mosque [ د '%نا/! D)/M kOl 'V:mO:ا  ] to investigate. Let them hear the 
cases together, get to the bottom of them, make decisions in accordance with the law 
[ 7M ^8n bl/( '%+V! =op, DS) ر  ], write and record their decisions, and give their 
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signatures in witness thereto so that afterward no one can raise any objection or 
invalidate the decision.”363 
  
Ann Lambton has interpreted these words as an attempt to revive the mazalim trials which 
had been in use by Islamic sultans, with the purpose of deciding important cases using 
slightly more lax rules of evidence, providing a forum where even powerful people could be 
taken to task for any kind of oppression or injustice.364 The order to meet on a regular basis 
(twice a month) would perhaps support this view. However, it is equally if not more likely 
that this initiative in fact stems from the principle of collegiality which was such a strong 
tradition among the Chinggisids. Legal cases at the ordo had not suddenly come to be 
decided differently after Ghazan’s conversion to Islam, rather the principle of collegiality was 
and remained very important for the Ilkhans. Moreover, the edict which this provision was 
embedded in was to be sent out to “basqaqs, maliks, and persons who govern on our behalf” 
and was part of Ghazan’s attempts to introduce reforms in the whole Ilkhanate; therefore this 
was an initiative aimed at influencing the local level, and not merely providing a forum for 
the sultan or perhaps his governor to display their exemplary justice, as was most often the 
case for the mazalim. Therefore, it is important to recognize the similarity with joint trials in 
China, which has been not been highlighted so far.  
 
Whether or not the joint local trials that Ghazan wanted were actually carried out, his 
instructions show his intentions and attachment to the principle of collegiality. Moreover, the 
evidence indicates that in the Ilkhanate as well as in Yuan China, Mongol-appointed officials 
at the local level quickly became integrated into the local fabric, and that their actions were 
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often in tune with local practices when they were involved in legal cases. Darughachis in 
particular seem to have deeply integrated. For example, when faced with a ‘rebellion’ in 
Bukhara led by a sieve-maker from Tarab, the darughachis did not act alone; rather, “the 
emirs and basqaqs that were present in Bokhara” consulted together and decided to attack the 
leader of the rebellion.365 Similarly, riots in Baghdad because of a prohibition of lion hunting 
in 1287 were quelled by the shahna Ali Bahadur in conjunction with the sahib-divan and the 
chief religious dignitaries.366 Rashid al-Din points out that there may have been additional 
reasons for integrating locally: he alleges that shahnas and bitigchis would collude with 
governors against the central government to cream taxes from the population.367 
 
In dealing with legal matters likewise, darughachis can be seen as integrated into the local 
environment. In some cases, Mongol and Islamic legal principles coincided. It is not 
surprising that shahnas insisted on putting to death both of those accused of adultery, since 
Carpini reports that: 
 
“They [the Mongols] also have a law or custom of putting to death any man and 
woman they find openly committing adultery; similarly if a virgin commit fornication 
with anyone, they kill both the man and the woman.”368 
 
One might suspect that Ibn al-Fuwat.ī has here emphasized the Islamic element of the decision 
perhaps too much; in any case, if he knew about it, he has not written about the Mongol 
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practice of putting to death both adulterers. In the year 1267-8, a darughachi was involved in 
punishing an adulterous couple:  
 
“And in [this year] a woman by name of Orus Khatun was killed in Baghdad. She had 
been the wife of one of the companions of Tukal Bakshi the shahna of Baghdad, who 
was called Hossein Aqa. The reason for that was that she was the lover of a beardless 
and beautiful ghulam. When her husband came to know this, he wanted [that young 
man] to be killed, but the shahna refused [this] and said: [one must] kill both of them 
or they should remain [alive] until I implement the hadd. So [the husband] took the 
ghulam to the outside of the walls, pounded a stake into the ground, and seated him on 
it and he died. Then he brought the woman and killed her with his hands, crying out 
of sorrow for her.369  
 
Another case of adultery in Shiraz a few years later shows a father, feeling in need of 
defending the honour of the family, killing his daughter’s lover on his own initiative, and the 
darughachi of Shiraz giving the order for his daughter to be publicly put to death in a locally 
customary manner by being thrown from a mountain near Shiraz: 
 
“And also in this year [1290], the daughter of one of the nobles of Shiraz agreed on a 
detestable thing with a ghulam of her father. When the daughter saw that he 
deflowered her, she became scared and fled away. When her father became aware of 
it, he killed the ghulam and searched for his daughter until she was found after several 
days.  The shahna of Shiraz gave an order that day for her to be put to death. They 
brought her to the top of a mountain outside of Shiraz, in which there was a big and 
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deep pit into which they used to throw the women that they wanted to put to death. 
They also threw the girl into that pit but not only did she not die but none of her limbs 
was hurt. Those present were amazed and asked for her to be set free. The shahna 
gave a commentary the meaning of which was that of a saying of a poet: “If one does 
not die today, does one not die tomorrow, and if one does not die tomorrow, does one 
not die the day after?” They sent to him Shams al-Daula ibn Montajab who was 
knowledgeable about her case. They brought her out of the pit and married her off. 
This happened in Dhul Hijja of this year.370  
 
The issue of importance, apart from the penalties imposed, is how the darughachis were 
involved in punishing these cases together with the community. Other Mongol appointees, 
such as governors and viziers, likewise dealt with legal matters in a way often congruent with 
local practices or sensibilities. One exception is the following case which is closer to Mongol 
practices, through the confrontation of the accuser with the accused (similar to the Mongol 
practice of tapishmishi) and the burning of corpses, which has echoes of the Mongol 
shamanist belief system where to destroy someone’s bones is tantamout to utterly ending 
their existence even in the afterlife:  
 
“In this year [1278-9], in Baghdad, there appeared two cunning men, one was called 
Ibn al-Hammas and the other Taj al-Kafni. A group of foolish people had joined them. 
They grew in power and were mentioned by many people. The Sahib-Divan [Shams 
al-Din Juvaynī] used a trick in order for Ibn al-Hammas to be brought before him, and 
he put him under the watch of a policeman [shurta]; he remained there for some days 
and he asked for his pardon. So [the Sahib-Divan] pardoned him and confined him at 
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the gate [of his house?]. Then he commanded him to bring Taj al-Kafni and he 
brought him and he confined him and made him be a comrade for him [i. e. Ala al-
Din tied him to the gate as well]. A group of people from Hilla attacked the Sahib’s 
door one night [to get these two men] but they could not get possession of them and it 
was not possible to get these people. Then Qatada, a police officer, told Sahib-Divan 
about Ibn al-Hammas and al-Kafni [that they were involved in] corrupt things and that 
they ventured against and commissioned people and secretly made them fear so that 
they refused to help them [the police?]. So the Sahib-Divan brought them [the 
policeman and the two imprisoned men] together and he [the policeman] testified 
about them. The Sahib-Divan ordered them to be killed and their heads were taken to 
be shown around. And one day one of their associates attacked Qatada while he was 
sitting on the bank of the Tigris river and killed him and some of his companions. 
And Sahib-Divan ordered the exhumation of the corpses of Ibn al-Hammas and al-
Kafni and their burning.371  
 
Other decisions, however, were very much in line with local practices, showing in particular 
the influence of Islamic law. What is significant is that there is no evidence that the Ilkhans 
objected to this. In the many cases of darughachis and other local officials being impeached 
or reported to the Ilkhanid court, in no case is adaptation to local practices cited as a reason 
for condemnation. Rather, accusations of embezzlement or of secret contact with Mamluk 
Egypt were much more frequent because they reflected matters which the Ilkhans thought to 
be threatening to their income or their identity and legitimacy. Ala al-Din Juvaynī was 
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accused of both of these things.372 If accusations of following local legal practices had carried 
any weight with the Ilkhans, it can be supposed that they would have been used.  
 
A poet who had said things deemed to be against the Shari’a was put to death on the orders of 
Ata Malik Juvaynī, governor of Baghdad, though details on the case are lacking.373 Also, in 
the year 1276 in a hammam of Baghdad a man and a woman were arrested for adultery. It is 
recorded that Ala al-Din gave the order that they be stoned,374 which is the Islamic penalty 
for adultery committed by married people. This shows the imposition of strict Islamic law by 
officials appointed by non-Muslim Ilkhans, from which it is clear that the Toluids gave their 
governors considerable latitude to handle legal issues. 
 
Another case which again reflects the involvement of local legal officials, though in this case 
there is little indication that their active involvement was sought, is the following: 
 
“In the year 1295, the vizier Jamal al-Din Dastajirdani gave an order to his own aide 
Nur al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman to take and put to death Fakhr al-Din Mozaffar bin Tarah, 
the sadr of Wasit and Basra. He went to Wasit and took Fakhr al-Din and his 
companions. Then he […] put a collar around [his] neck and reproached him and got a 
document from him that he had [wrongly] taken many possessions. And he called 
upon the qadi and trustworthy men to witness this. Then he brought him to Baghdad 
and appointed a jailor over him for a few days and beat and punished and killed him. 
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They brought his head to Wasit and hung it on the bridge after walking with it around 
the streets and the market of Wasit.”375  
 
While such involvement of local officials, even if only in the role of witnesses shows some 
engagement with local legal specialists, and adaptation to local legal practices, as seen above, 
was not unusual, a further aspect of the legal system in the Ilkhanate which shows the 
influence of the principle of collegiality was the appointment of joint qadis. While not 
particularly frequent, and while there were occasional instances of joint qadis before Mongol 
rule in Persia,376  the appointments of joint qadis have nevertheless be noted as a specific 
feature of the legal system of Persia under the Mongols. While these appointments could 
potentially be due to Chinese influence, it is just as probable that the Mongol principle of 
collegiality was the inspiration. In 1274-5, Terkan Khatun, who ruled Fars under the Mongols, 
appointed joint qadis. Fasihi remarks that one of those appointed, Muhammad Shah-sultan, 
avoided taking bribes, perhaps implying that other qadis did.377 The second joint appointment 
took place in 1279-80 when Rokn al-Din Yahya Fali-Sirafi and Naser al-Din ‘Abdullah 
Baydawi were both appointed qadis. According to Vassaf, the governor of Fars, Suqunchaq 
Noyan, had planned to appoint Naser al-Din Abdullah Beiza’i / Baydawi, but a group among 
the qadis, seyyeds, sheikhs and other local notables he consulted supported Rokn al-Din 
Yahya of the Fali-Sirafi family of qadis. So instead of either alienating the powerful locals 
(whose goodwill he needed in order to have a chance at governing), or giving in to their 
demands, two qadis were appointed. Vassaf says that in spite of the arrangement, Rokn al-
Din took precedence in practice. According to Subki however, Naser al-Din Baydawi was 
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restored to office after travelling to Tabriz and impressing the vizier who happened to be 
present in one of the religious schools.378 The presence of joint qadis is consistent with the 
presence of joint viziers in Persia and points to a common influence behind these phenomena, 
namely the principle of collegiality.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The principle of collegiality is the most reasonable explanation for these features of the 
Ilkhanid and Yuan legal systems. It can be seen how cooperation had greater influence than 
any desire to impose Mongol ways. The darughachis and other Mongol-appointed officials 
integrated on the local level and partly used local legal practices.  
 
The integration of the darughachis is due mainly to their precarious position at the 
intersection of the Mongol elite and the local non-Mongols. In order to remain in their 
position and avoid facing punishment or execution or murder, darughachis needed to keep all 
sides happy. Equally important though was the willingness of the Toluid khans to allow 
adaptation to local practices to happen.  
 
Moreover, the integration of darughachis into the local fabric was mediated at least partially 
by conferences inspired by the principle of collegiality. This principle is the only factor that 
can adequately explain the daily joint conferences of local officials in Yuan China, as well as 
Ghazan’s attempt to start similar conferences in the Ilkhanate. The examples of adaptation of 
the darughachis to local practices and the Ilkhans’ willingness to allow this shows flexibility 
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in legal matters, while working together with local officials in conferences was an 
opportunity for the influence of Mongol legal practices to be absorbed more deeply, as will 
be argued in chapters six and seven.  
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Chapter 5 – The khans’ attitude to law 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Having concluded that both yarghuchis and darughachis in the Ilkhanate and the Yuan empire 
had an often flexible approach to local law, especially when they were dealing with the local 
population, and were influenced by the principle of collegiality, it remains to examine the 
attitude of the khans themselves. By examining their approach to legal matters one can show 
that they, too, had a flexible attitude. Their flexible, non-ideological approach to law enabled 
their officials in turn to be flexible and to achieve positive results and agreements through 
their meetings and discussions with local legal officials.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the sources are not such as to give a complete impression 
of the Ilkhans’ and Qa’ans’ attitudes towards the law. In particular, while there are numerous 
formal legal documents from the Yuan dynasty, there are few from the Ilkhanate. Even if the 
documents were sufficient, though, it is in the spirit of this research that one should not rely 
only on what the khans may have said; one should rely perhaps more so on what they did.    
 
This chapter will seek to deduce the khans’ attitudes about law through their relationships 
with various actors: firstly, local legal personnel; secondly, other Toluids, and thirdly, 
through their relationships with minorities in their own territories.  
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Local legal personnel 
 
i) Persia 
   
In the Ilkhanate, the most powerful and prominent representatives of the existing Islamic 
legal system were the qadis, who were in charge of conducting legal cases. The Mongol 
encounter with the qadis is therefore key to understanding how they approached the Islamic 
legal system.  
 
While the very first contact with qadis took place during the Mongol invasion of Persia in the 
1220s, it was the foundation of the Ilkhanate which first brought about close contact between 
them and the Mongol leadership. With Hülegü Khan came the need, and the reality, of an 
accommodation with the qadis, which amounted in effect to a recognition of their place and 
role within Ilkhanid society, even though, considering the ideological aims of the Ilkhans, this 
was not widely proclaimed. 
 
Prior to the coming of Hülegü Khan,379 qadis enjoyed a certain amount of respect among the 
Mongols, though their status was not as high as it had been under Islamic rulers. While some 
perished in the Mongol attacks,380 the Mongol policy was to spare them out of respect for 
their religious credentials.381 They were also exempted from taxes.382 There was however no 
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recognition of their role, with the military administration exercising more of a hands-off 
policy than a hands-on management of Persian affairs. 
 
It was when Hülegü Khan came to Persia that the relationships with qadis were deepened and, 
to an extent, formalized. That Hülegü understood the role that ulama played in legitimizing 
rulers is shown by his demand for a ruling from the ulama of Baghdad. According to Ibn 
Tiqtaqa, when Hülegü conquered Baghdad, he ordered the ‘ulama to issue a fatwa stating 
whether a just infidel sultan or an unjust Muslim sultan was preferable. They hesitated, but 
after the respected Radi al-Din ibn ‘Ali ibn Ta’us agreed that the just infidel is preferable, 
they all signed it.383  
 
Ibn Tiqtaqa’s story shows that Hülegü was interested in political domination, not in legal 
affairs per se. He was concerned about his legitimacy, about whether the Muslim clergy, with 
their great influence within society, could try to undermine his rule. Like the demands he had 
made on the caliph earlier, the demand for the fatwa was a political demand similar to those 
the Mongols made of every place they wanted to conquer.384 Having accepted his demand for 
the fatwa, the qadis were then allowed to continue functioning as qadis within Persian society. 
 
However, Hülegü also showed a more personal concern for the qadis, by appointing qadis 
where needed. While little information has come down to us about the appointment of qadis, 
the available evidence indicates that Hülegü did not appoint qadis systematically, but only 
where needed. Hülegü appointed Nizamuddin Abdul-Mu’min Bandaniji (d. 1268-9), who had 
been appointed qadi of west Baghdad by the Caliph in 1254, and chief qadi from 1257,385 as 
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chief qadi of Baghdad within a year after the Mongols took the city.386 Thereafter, the 
qadiship was passed on through the naming of a successor by the qadi himself or through the 
intervention of the governors of Iraq under the Mongols.387 Hülegü also appointed Abu l Fath 
‘Umar b. Bundar al-Tiflisi (d. 672/1273-4) qadi in Damascus after taking that city; like his 
predecessor, al-Tiflisi was a Shafi‘i (Rashid al-Din mentions instead a “Qazi Shamsuddin 
Qummi”).388 These appointments show that Hülegü was aiming for stability, appointing qadis 
where existing structures had been destroyed; the chronicles do not report any systematic 
effort of his to appoint (or re-appoint) qadis. Therefore, despite the fact that qadis practised a 
form of law very foreign to the Mongols, and that some of their laws conflicted with Mongol 
customary laws, Hülegü chose to be flexible in legal matters, and required from them only 
political allegiance.  
 
The value given to stability in preference to control over the qadis’ activities is also shown by 
an edict issued through Amir Baytmish389 on 4th September 1288, in the time of Arghun. The 
edict simply urges two qadis of Ardabil, Sadr al-Din and Baha al-Din, to quickly resolve a 
dispute about possession of a village, according to Shari’a.390 Such an edict could not have 
been issued without the knowledge of Arghun.  
 
Therefore, both Hülegü and Arghun were flexible and allowed qadis freedom to use their 
own laws. The recognition of the role of qadis did not of course preclude Hülegü or Arghun 
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from using Mongol laws and forms of trial at the ordo as discussed in chapter 3. However the 
co-existence of Mongol law at the ordo and Islamic law in the cities and provinces was a 
situation which the early Ilkhans, even the staunch Buddhist Arghun, were comfortable with. 
This shows that an open attitude towards Islamic law did not come about only in the late 
Ilkhanate, but characterized Ilkhanid rule from the beginning.  
 
The later Ilkhans continued this attitude and even showed a more marked preference for 
Islamic law, after Ghazan converted to Islam. However, most change at this juncture was 
theoretical391 and in practice Islamic law continued to be honoured mostly at the local level. 
Qadis did however start to be employed by the Ilkhans themselves in order to write legal 
documents, as for example a certain Qadi Fakhr al-Din of Herat who composed the ‘pledge’ 
for the qadis that they would obey Ghazan’s command and not accept land title documents 
more than thirty years old.392 The later Ilkhans also appointed qadi al-qudats, supporting and 
acknowledging the Islamic legal system in this way: 
 
“Regarding the office of judge: the custom of the land requires that the qadi al-qudat 
of the whole of Persia remain in the retinue of the Sultan. Regardless of the far-flung 
provinces, he appoints [the legal personnel] everywhere. Only Iraq is an exception, 
since Baghdad has its own qadi al-qudat, who is responsible for Baghdad as well as 
all of Iraq. The qadi al-qudat Abu Mohammad al-Hasan al-Guri said to me, that the 
maximum salary of the qadi al-qudat is [the income from] six villages, and in 
addition 1 tuman, which is equivalent to 10000 dinar ra’ij.”393 
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“In the ordo and also while he is travelling, the Sultan is accustomed to having 
renowned scholars and professors around him, who draw regular salaries from him. 
Each of them has their own fuqahā’ and students as well. [All together] they are the 
so-called ‘company of travelling scholars.’”394 
 
Whether the qadi al-qudat fully exercised the claimed power to appoint qadis in every 
province is doubtful, since the qadiship continued to be passed on mainly in hereditary 
fashion throughout the period of Mongol rule.395 There was also an attempt by Ghazan to 
forge closer ties between the ordo and the local level qadis,396 and between the qadis and 
local Mongol officials,397 but considering the failure of other reforms of Ghazan to have any 
impact at the local level, it is doubtful whether this was successful.398 
 
 
ii) China 
 
With the conquest of the Jin empire of north China ruled by sinified Jurchens, and the Song 
empire of southern China, the Mongols also encountered the Chinese legal system. This was 
a system in which cases were decided on the district level by magistrates, assisted by clerks, 
the magistrates basing their judgments on a legal code of the dynasty and governmental edicts 
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which supplemented it.399 It was also a feature of the system that particularly complex cases 
or those involving the death penalty were routinely sent to the central government for review. 
 
The reaction of Qubilai, the founder of the Yuan dynasty, to this situation was that he, like 
Hülegü regarding Islamic law, recognized the Chinese officials and the Jin law code known 
as Taihelü. 400 In 1261 he acknowledged the ‘five-punishments system’ as used by the Jin - 
the Chinese had traditionally divided punishments into five main degrees of seriousness, and 
the Jurchen Jin had also adopted this classification. Since Qubilai wanted to introduce some 
changes to the punishment of exile within the ‘five-punishments-system,’ it is evident that he 
recognized it as valid, at least for the Chinese.401 Moreover, in 1270, shortly after the 
Secretariat for State Affairs (Shangshusheng) had been set up, the Central Secretariat in 
support of one of its decisions quoted the Taihelü: “According to the old regulations: when 
people of the same group commit crimes against each other, they should follow their own 
customary law. Chinese and others may not apply other laws by analogy to settle cases.”402 
As Birge points out, this statement was quoted several times by different government offices, 
showing unanimity in the central government on this point.403 
 
It is true that the principle of ius sanguinis was occasionally reversed or not fully respected 
during the Yuan dynasty; however, it should be stressed that the principle that each ethnicity 
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should follow their own laws was that initially followed by Qubilai. This is important to note 
because it disproves any notion that the ‘Great Yasa’ was so important ideologically to the 
Mongols that they would not tolerate any deviation from it.404 
 
It was in early 1272, immediately after adopting the reign name Yuan, that Qubilai officially 
abolished the Taihelü.405 Several explanations have been proposed as to the reasons for this; 
the official explanation being that the Taihelü was too harsh.406 Other scholars have proposed 
that the Taihelü was not considered suitable for the new dynasty.407 Bettine Birge proposed 
that perhaps because of intermarriage and cross-cultural influences, Qubilai decided that the 
time was ripe to impose one set of laws valid for everybody.408 A further possible explanation 
will be discussed in the next chapter. In any case, by the late 1270s the attempt to impose 
Mongol laws had been mostly abandoned, and the separation of laws again became the 
norm.409  
 
The recognition of Chinese laws and practices is also seen in the yuehui (joint trials) system, 
which determined how trials concerning litigants from different ethnicities should be decided, 
and which was not seriously challenged during the Yuan dynasty. The principles of this 
system have been explained in chapter 4. In 1311 there was an attempt to tighten government 
control over legal trials, and qadis in China were told not to judge legal cases anymore, 
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although the effect of this decree was probably only in the short term.410 The yuehui system 
was deeply entrenched and continued until the end of the dynasty. Therefore the Yuan 
dynasty, like the Ilkhanate, both started and ended with those who judged legal cases locally 
being respected. 
 
 
Inter-Toluid ties: weaker than local ties     
 
An indication of the priorities of the Ilkhans and the Qa’ans in matters of law can also be 
deduced from their relationship with each other. This is because despite the physical distance 
between them, they consulted representatives of each other’s khanates on matters of concern. 
Consultation in matters of law between the Toluid khanates would show an intention to 
develop more efficient legal methods, which would be connected with the desire of the khans 
to have more control. It could indicate also a desire to find the best ways of imposing Mongol 
laws. On the other hand, if the possibility for consultation on matters of law existed, yet the 
Toluid khans did not take advantage of it, this would indicate that there was no political will 
at the highest level to tightly control local legal matters or even to influence them in a 
particular direction apart from upholding the role of the local legal specialists. If the Toluid 
khans considered that they had little to learn from each other on legal matters, then it can be 
concluded that they were satisfied with their own arrangements and considered themselves, 
their high officials, and the local legal specialists as the stakeholders in determining the shape 
of the legal system of their khanate.  
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There were numerous matters in which the khans did take advantage of knowledge passed 
from the other Toluid khanate. For example, the short-lived adoption of paper money, or the 
chao, in the Ilkhanate is merely one of the best-known instances of such influence. The 
possibility of issuing paper money was first discussed by the vizier Sadr al-Din and his 
colleagues, and when they mentioned it to Geikhatu, he asked Bolad Aqa, the representative 
of the qa’an at his court, for more details.411 Although Muslim and Christian authors of 
Western Asia were aware of the use of paper money in China, the practical implementation of 
this Chinese custom, short-lived though it was, would almost certainly not have taken place 
had there not been the close ties with Yuan China which the Toluid empire afforded. Bolad 
Aqa also assisted Ghazan when he became concerned about the number of Mongols who had 
been “compelled by poverty to sell their children,” and also those Mongols who were taken 
prisoners during warfare and subsequently sold as slaves.412 He drew on Bolad’s experience 
with the social welfare measures of the Yuan court and as one who had trained new recruits 
in the imperial guard, to work out a solution to this problem which was duly implemented, 
involving the creation of a new guard unit under Bolad’s command.413 In addition, the khans 
and their officials took advantage of geographical, historical, agricultural and other types of 
knowledge coming from the other khanate. This was transmitted sometimes through books or 
other documents, and sometimes through the forced or voluntary movement of personnel 
from Persia to China and vice versa.414    
 
Given the openness of the khans to availing themselves of information from the other Toluid 
khanate, it next needs to be asked whether they had the opportunity of doing so in regards to 
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legal matters. As Allsen has noted in his analysis of influence between the Ilkhanate and the 
Yuan dynasty, information could be transmitted through documents or people.415 In terms of 
documents, the Chinese law code of the Jin dynasty known as Taihelü 泰和律 was translated 
into Persian, possibly by Rashid with the assistance of Bolad Aqa.416 In terms of people, one 
should consider both judicial personnel and those who, while not yarghuchis in name, 
nevertheless had experience of legal matters. It is noteworthy that Bala Yarghuchi417 (also 
known as Bala Noyan),418 who was among those judging the alleged conspirators following 
the enthronement of Möngke,419 had descendants in both China and Persia,420 who may have 
been in contact with each other. There were a number of yarghuchis in China with Persian or 
Central Asian backgrounds, among them Hesimaili (Isma‘il),421 Saiyyid Ajall, Halahasun 
(Harqasun), Temur Buqa, and others. As for people from the East in the Ilkhanate, Shi 
Tianlin was a Chinese yarghuchi who accompanied the Mongol armies in the conquest of 
Persia; he probably acted as a yarghuchi within the army.422 In addition there was Bolad Aqa. 
While a Mongol, he spent years serving Qubilai. He was one of those entrusted with the 
politically delicate interrogation of Arigh Boke and his officers in 1264,423 and held a post in 
the Censorate, where he became Censor-in-Chief, between 1271 and 1277. In 1278 Qubilai 
also ordered him together with an official from the Censorate, Xiang Wei, to investigate the 
activities of the financial minister Ahmad; an investigation which was aborted because 
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Ahmad claimed to be ill.424 Bolad was later sent to the Ilkhanate, where he remained as envoy 
of the Qa’ans in China. Therefore, it is clear that there were people both in the Ilkhanate and 
in Yuan China who would have been able to give information about the policies of Qubilai or 
the practices of the Ilkhans, had such knowledge been requested.  
 
However, it appears that there were no attempts to ask these officials who had experience in 
the other Toluid khanate about legal matters. Bolad Aqa was asked about many things while 
in the Ilkhanate, but there is no record of his advice being sought in legal matters. Nor is there 
any evidence that the translated Taihelü had any effect on policy in the Ilkhanate. Though 
there are Chinese seals on several Ilkhanid edicts, this was for purposes of legitimacy and 
does not reflect any effort to seek or apply knowledge about the legal policies of Qubilai or 
his successors.425 In China, it is a possibility that the accession of the Muslim convert Ahmad 
Tegüder in Persia may have influenced policies adopted by Qubilai towards the Muslims for 
several years, but this only shows Qubilai’s determination to maintain the Mongol-Chinese 
character of his realm.426 In short, any evidence that the khans of the Yuan dynasty or the 
Ilkhanate sought to learn about legal policies in the other khanate in order to possibly adopt 
them, is lacking.      
 
There is a single legal case involving Bolad Aqa in the Ilkhanate; however, his contribution 
was not advising on legal strategies, but rather giving legitimacy to the proceedings. It was 
his presence and not the information he could convey which was sought.  
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“When Ghazan heard about the battle [in Syria in which the Mongol army had been 
defeated], his heart was filled with pain and anger. He left Mosul for Ujan, and when 
he arrived there, the amirs came at the same time. Exhausted and broken hearted, one 
by one, they came to Ujan. In his anger, the high born shah showed his generals no 
mercy. Those amirs who had been weak in battle would lift their heads from their 
disgrace. The shah spoke to Bolad Ching-Sang and ordered an enquiry according to 
Mongol custom.”427 
 
The text seems to imply that Bolad Chingsang was somehow involved in the decision 
whether or not to try the defeated amirs. However, it seems unlikely that Ghazan would 
genuinely have relied on him for such an important decision, and more likely that he tried to 
show that he had Bolad’s, and thereby the great Qa’an’s, approval for these trials. He was 
using Bolad to bolster the legitimacy a politically sensitive trial. 
 
The appointment of yarghuchis also does not support the idea that the khans were keen on 
information on legal matters from the other Toluid khanate. Yarghuchis were appointed 
across geographical regions only in the time of the unified Mongol empire, as seen from the 
example of Hesimaili 曷思麦里 [Isma‘il], who came from “Guze wo’erduo” [Ghuz-ordo, the 
Qara-Khitay capital, at or near Balasaghun].428 He was an official for the Qara-Khitai before 
surrendering to the Mongols and participating in their further conquests in a military capacity, 
achieving a good reputation. He was appointed as bitigchi (secretary) and in 1232, he was 
appointed darughachi in Huaimeng. In 1239 Ögödei appointed Hesimaili to be yarghuchi in 
the ‘Western regions’, and Hesimaili only failed to take up the appointment because the great 
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commander Chahan429 and an official of the Branch Secretariat, Tiemudie’er (Temuder),430 
memorialized that he should remain in China. The case of Hesimaili is remarkable for several 
reasons. If his name, Isma‘il, can be taken as an indication of his ethnicity (which is not 
necessarily the case), he would have been a Central Asia Muslim in the employ of the Qara-
Khitai,431 who were the refugees from the Liao Chinese empire who had fled and established 
a new empire in Central Asia. Therefore, it seems he was comfortable mediating between 
cultures even before surrendering to the Mongols. His subsequent employment as darughachi 
in China and the prospect of sending him back to the ‘Western regions’ (not necessarily to his 
birthplace but quite possibly, to the future Ilkhanate) as yarghuchi shows that the Mongol 
rulers were willing to send people as yarghuchis anywhere in the Mongol empire, without 
regard to their nationality.432   
 
However, there was no systematic attempt either in the Ilkhanate or in the Yuan dynasty to 
appoint yarghuchis who would contribute experience from the other Toluid khanate; on the 
contrary, most yarghuchis were Mongols with no experience of the other khanate. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that legal matters were not of sufficient concern to the khans for them to 
use the connection between the two Toluid khanates to get better ideas. Only the case of 
Bolad Aqa suggests turning to a representative of the other khanate for advice, but the case 
regarded the punishment of Mongol amirs, not ways of dealing with the local population. The 
Ilkhans and Qa’ans therefore considered the legal system as a matter to be worked out locally, 
and this shows their identification with the territories that they ruled.  
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Minorities: not allowed to derail cooperation with local legal officials 
 
A further mirror through which we can see the khans’ priorities is that of their relationship 
with minorities in their territories. These, like the intra-Toluid relationship, could have 
threatened relationships with Persian qadis and with Chinese local officials. However, as will 
be shown below, despite tolerance of diverse religions and groups within society, the 
relationships with Islamic qadis and Chinese judicial officials remained paramount. 
 
The place and influence of minorities will be examined through two cases studies: Muslims 
in China and Buddhists in Persia. It is significant that, however powerful and numerous a 
minority was, the khans did not allow that minority to influence the laws which would apply 
to the whole of the population.    
 
 
i) Muslims in China 
 
Among the minorities in the Toluid empire, one stands out because its members were both 
close to the khans and economically powerful. Many Muslims from Central Asia and from 
Persia settled in China during the Yuan dynasty. Crucially, many were also financial partners 
of the Toluid khans in the partnerships known as ortogh, whereby the khans would provide 
capital with which merchants would trade and make profits.433  
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Muslims were of course the majority in the Ilkhanate, which contributed to their financial and 
political strength in the entire Toluid empire. Nor was their presence in China new. Muslim 
communities had become established during the Tang and Song dynasties, when their 
community leaders were sometimes known as fanzhang 蕃长 “foreign elders”.434 There is 
evidence for Muslim communities in Hangzhou and other cities, which had their own 
mosques and religious leaders.435  
 
The Muslims were commonly granted some legal autonomy, though under the Tang and 
Song, all except “non-acculturated foreigners” were theoretically under Chinese law.436 The 
Song writer Zhu Yu wrote that  
 
“If a foreigner (fanren) commits a crime, he goes to Guangzhou to bring up the true 
[matters], they send him to the office for foreigners who dispatch him to be bound to a 
wooden ladder and beaten with a cane. From the heel to the crown of the head, every 
three strokes with the cane are equal to one stroke with the big cane. … If the [penalty 
for the crime should be] exile or above, the matter is decided in Guangzhou [by 
Chinese officials].”437  
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This is confirmed by “Suleiman’s” account of Guangzhou.438 In two Song documents qadis 
are mentioned, though without using the word ‘qadi’, which is first found in documents from 
the Yuan dynasty.439 
 
However, during the Yuan period the number of Muslims in China increased dramatically. 
Apart from the number of Muslims in important government posts, and those involved in the 
ortagh, the power of Muslims in Yuan China can be seen in the following anecdote: 
 
“I have humbly observed that those Chung-tu [officials] who are personally in charge 
of overseeing civilian households each year supply the harmonious purchase, corvée 
obligations, and a host of other items [that are] truly more numerous and burdensome 
than in other routes. At present I have investigated and found that this route’s (that is, 
Chung-tu’s) Muslim civilian households from the 1252 original register together with 
the 1263 supplementary record add up to 2,953 households. Among them, many are 
wealthy merchants and influential, monopolistic families. Their “entrusted funds” 
with which they do business are multifarious. They snatch away from people the 
interest [from loans made by the merchants]. Moreover, they pay not one iota of tax 
or corvée (ch’ai-i).”440 
 
Their legal situation was also more advantageous. The qadis were officially recognized, since 
they were sent official imperial instructions, as shown by the following edict when their 
fortunes suffered what was presumably a temporary reversal and an attempt was made to 
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restrict their activities, in the context of tightening state control over the legal sphere as a 
whole.441 The edict stated: 
 
“On the 29th of March, in the 1st Year of Huang-Ching [1308], Hsuan-i 宣慰 of Fu-
chien Province received the order of Chung-shu-sheng 中书省 through Cha-fu 札付 
of Chiang-che Hsing-sheng 江浙行省: Ha-ti Ta-shih [qadis] who were given the 
special imperial instructions on the 25th of November of a certain year of Chih-ta […], 
shall be exclusively engaged in their religious business and reciting canons from now 
on. Any Muslim who has to do with punishment, marriage, lawsuit on property and 
others, and public affairs, great or small, shall not complain to any Ha-ti [qadi], but 
directly to the government according to the regulations.”442  
 
If the qadis had been given special imperial instructions, then that means the Yuan 
government recognized them and their role. A dramatic example of the use of Islamic law is 
found in one of the cases in the Yuan Dian Zhang, a private collection of cases reviewed by 
the central government and sent to the provinces to be used as guidance for future 
decisions.443 The case entitled, “If the husband dies before [the bride] has passed through the 
gate, half of the bride-price should be returned” details a dispute in 1265 between two 
families because the groom had died after the bride price had been paid, but before the 
marriage ceremony. The authorities in Dadu [Beijing] asked Huihui dashi 回回大師 [Muslim 
learned man, quite probably a qadi is meant] about Islamic law, and he said that half the bride 
price should be returned. The decision was nevertheless considered difficult and the case was 
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passed up to the Central Secretariat, which commented: “Looking at the interrogations there 
are no mistakes. Half of the wealth should be returned, according to the li [customary 
law].”444 Therefore even the highest government organ confirmed that Islamic law should be 
used, at least in a dispute between Muslims in Dadu.  
 
Thus, the practice of Islamic law was well established in Yuan China. Up to the end of the 
Yuan dynasty, the emperors never promulgated a law code (lü) which would have signified 
the superiority of one kind of laws, whether Chinese or Mongol laws, over all the other laws; 
thus ensuring a degree of legal independence to recognized minorities including the Muslims.  
 
However, when it came to laws that would affect not just the Muslims but the Chinese 
population, the attitude of the Qa’ans was entirely different. This can be seen from a request 
of Shabuding, a Muslim from a locally well-connected merchant family in Jiangzhe province 
who had entered office through the recommendation of the finance minister Sengge.445 The 
Yuan Shi says that: 
 
“In 1290 in the autumn in the seventh month, the pingzhang[zhengshi] (privy 
councillor446) of Jiangzhe Shabuding proposed that, because officials were cheating 
and stealing money and grain from the storehouses, criminals’ faces should be 
tattooed as in Song law and hands should be cut off [lit. their wrists should be cut]. 
The emperor answered: ‘That is Huihui [Islamic] law. It will not be allowed.’”447 
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Qubilai Khan immediately recognized cutting off the hands of thieves as Islamic law and 
rejected it. Therefore, despite their power and privileges, it can be concluded that Qubilai did 
not wish Islamic law to influence the law of the Yuan empire as a whole; nor is there any 
indication that the Muslims were allowed to exercise such influence later in the dynasty.  
 
 
ii) Buddhists in the Ilkhanate  
 
Though Buddhism had had some influence in Khorasan up to the tenth century,448 its 
appearance in Persia during the 13th century was largely due to the Mongols’ appreciation of 
this form of religion. Buddhists were summoned, according to Rashid al-Din, from “India, 
Kashmir, Cathay, and Uighur lands,” and the Ilkhans’ continuing involvement in Tibet 
facilitated this process.449  
 
That the presence and influence of Buddhists was due to Ilkhanid ties with Yuan China is 
reflected in the fact that many Buddhists who came to Persia were connected with the 
Ilkhanid court in some way. For example, at Arghun’s court debates between followers of 
various faiths (including Buddhism) took place.450 The monk Kamalashri provided the 
minister and historian Rashid al-Din with information on Buddhism, based on authentic 
Hinayana texts.451 How much influence Buddhism had outside the court, and how many 
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Buddhist temples were actually built remains questionable. Ghazan himself, while he was 
still a prince in Khorasan and had not yet become Muslim, built a Buddhist temple in 
Khabushan.452 Caves beneath the observatory at Maragha might originally have been 
Buddhist in purpose,453 and a temple at Khoi was built in Hülegü’s time.454 However, when 
Rashid al-Din writes that there were Buddhist temples “in every place”, he was exaggerating 
to make the point that Buddhist influence had vastly increased from the time the Mongols 
entered Persia.455 In fact the actual number of Buddhists in the Ilkhanate was most probably 
extremely low. 
 
Yet despite their small numbers, Buddhists had wider influence on law in the Ilkhanate than 
the powerful and numerous Muslims did in China. This was because they motivated the 
Ilkhans to promulgate several amnesties for criminals, which affected prisoners of all faiths; 
whereas Islamic law in China, as argued above, applied to Muslims only. Though it is 
impossible to ascertain how many people altogether were affected by the amnesties, it is not 
the number of people affected, but rather the fact that the Buddhists were able to have such an 
influence at all, that is significant.  
 
What did the Buddhists in the Ilkhanate have that the Muslims in China, with their superior 
numbers and wealth did not? The Buddhists, like the Muslims, had personal connections with 
some of the highest-ranking Mongols in the Toluid empire and with the khans themselves, 
but the Buddhists also had a faith which coincided in some points with the Mongol belief 
system. In particular, the two belief systems coincided in viewing sickness as potentially a 
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sign of spiritual attack by other people, and thus susceptible to being influenced by ritual 
human action.456 While Mongol belief already included the idea that through doing a ‘good 
deed’ one could heal sickness, either one’s own or someone else’s,457 the Buddhists 
introduced to the Ilkhans the concept that freeing condemned criminals was exactly the kind 
of good deed that could heal sickness. The commutation of death penalties through amnesties 
had not been a Mongol practice as such, not only because there weren’t large numbers of 
criminals imprisoned at any one time on the Mongol steppe, but also because the Mongol 
legal system , which accorded the concept of vengeance extremely high importance, sits 
uneasily with the idea of commuting penalties. 
 
The eminent official and advisor Yelü Chucai, a syncretist with Buddhist and Confucian 
leanings,458 was instrumental in getting Ögödei to issue amnesties, the first of which was 
issued in 1229 when he obtained “an edict to the effect that crimes committed before the first 
month of 1229 should not be punished.” This was the first time that an amnesty had been 
granted by the Mongols.459 Later in 1241 Yelu Chucai recommended another amnesty which 
was accepted, as Ögödei’s health was not that good.460   
 
An “almsgiving” amnesty was issued by Sorqaqtani Beki while she was ill: 461 “But Beki 
being ill and her illness having grown worse, as an almsgiving for her long life those who had 
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that day been condemned to death all received their pardon.”462 Since Sorqaqtani was a 
Christian, she may have been influenced by Christian practices of charity, as seen for 
example in the recommendation of Christians in Hülegü’s entourage to “be merciful and 
lighten the taxes” following Hülegü’s death.463 However, the main factor seems to have been 
the perceived benefit that giving an amnesty or lightening taxes could have for an ill person. 
This was something that could speak directly to Mongols still clinging to shamanist beliefs. It 
is not surprising that both Ögödei and Sorqaqtani adopted the new measure of the amnesty in 
the time of their need.     
 
A few amnesties were issued during the Ilkhanate, and it is not an accident that two of them 
are associated with the staunchly Buddhist Arghun. Even the exaggerated claims by some of 
the chroniclers, such as his alleged desire to attack the Ka’ba,464 only reinforce the general 
impression that he had great trust in the bakhshis (the term indicates Buddhist priests or 
shamans)465 and their teachings. According to Rashid al-Dīn, “Arghun Khan was highly 
devoted to the bakhshis and followed their path,”466 indicating that he did not merely respect 
them as representing one of many faiths,467 but that he was personally committed to 
following their teachings. He had monks come from India, and built temples and granted 
estates to followers of Buddhism. He even trusted them to provide medicine which would 
lead to long life. He retreated and allowed few people other than the bakhshis to attend him, 
again showing that he valued Buddhism above other faiths. “He made a forty-day retreat in 
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the fortress at Tabriz, and during that time, other than Ordu Qaya, Quchan and Sa’duddawla, 
no one was allowed near him – save of course the bakhshis who attended him day and night 
to discuss their beliefs.”468 He even died as a result of the ‘medicine’ given him by the 
bakhshis and which, according to Rashid, contained sulphur and quicksilver.469  
 
Arghun declared an amnesty when he ascended the throne: “Since God the eternal has shown 
me favor and awarded me my late father’s crown and throne, I hereby pardon all criminals’ 
crimes. If the Sahib-Divan comes to court, I will receive him with honour.”470 In this instance, 
the pardon of Shams al-Din Juvaynī helped him only temporarily;471 but it seems that other 
criminals were included in the pardon. Another amnesty was issued by Arghun shortly before 
his death in 1291. The reason for this later amnesty is given by Ricoldo di Monte Croce as 
follows:  
 
“Arghun, who had shed a lot of blood and put to death lots of innocent children and 
women, fell gravely ill. In a dream, a woman appeared to him who inspired respect 
and fear in him. She quivered and seized his chest and told him: “Come and answer to 
the Lord for the blood which you have shed.” He answered, “Which Lord? Am I not 
the Lord of the World?” (for this is the name by which all, including the Christians, 
call him – namely Lord of the World.) Terrified, he woke up and hurriedly called for 
his bakhshis (baxitas) and priests and asked them who this Lord, who had called him 
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with such authority, was, and how he could free himself from him. They responded 
that he was someone who concerned himself with avenging [shed] blood and and who 
had come to demand a reckoning from him for the blood he had shed. It would be 
impossible to escape him, except through charity. Thereupon Arghun wrote to all the 
cities of the Orient to liberate prisoners, and bring out great treasures and give 
generous alms. He died shortly after this.” 472  
 
It is significant that in this story it is the blood that has been shed, and not just any kind of 
killing or oppression, that cries out for vengeance, thus mirroring the Mongol belief that it is 
dangerous (for the person concerned and sometimes for the one performing the execution) to 
shed someone’s blood.473 This is further evidence for the interaction between shamanist and 
Buddhist belief systems which led to the use of amnesties in the Ilkhanate. Of the Ilkhans, 
Arghun was the one most influenced by Buddhism, and it is more than probable that it is 
either as a result of his own pious motives, or at the suggestion of the Buddhist personnel 
present at court, that these amnesties were issued.  
 
One of the first acts of the next Ilkhan, the newly enthroned Geikhatu, was to issue an 
amnesty; he “ordered prisoners freed” in the context of also ordering freedom from taxation 
for religious specialists.”474 Vassaf states that “by nature Gaikhatu abhorred bloodshed”475 – a 
stance that seems more reminiscent of Buddhism than the Mongols’ traditional animism, 
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which despite the sacred nature of blood476 allowed for a good deal of killing. Geikhatu had a 
Buddhist name, Irinjin Dorji, from the Tibetan Rin-ch’en rDo-rje,477 conferred on him at his 
enthronement ceremony, a ceremony in which Buddhist bakhshis took a visible part and 
which was held in “relative proximity” to where Hülegü Khan had founded a Buddhist 
temple at Labnasagut.478 
 
The amnesties issued in Persia reflect the use of this practice in China, where they were a 
longstanding tradition,479 and where Buddhist monks likewise had some influence on the 
Toluid rulers. For example, Tanba, a Tibetan bakhshi unlike others at the ordo was successful 
in influencing Temür Qa’an (Chengzong) to give an amnesty for 100 prisoners, on the pretext 
of a heavenly omen.480 There were so many amnesties that some Chinese officials, such as 
Chen Tianxiang,481 criticized the emperors for being lax.482 It is doubtful whether the 
amnesties in Persia would have been issued, had the Mongols not brought Buddhists, and 
Buddhist influence, with them as they came to rule Persia.  
 
This Buddhist influence on law in the Ilkhanate does not, however, equate to a deliberate 
intention of allowing minorities to influence the legal system of the Ilkhanate. It should be 
noted that the influence came about not through any formal channels but through influencing 
the beliefs of the Ilkhans. The amnesties were legal acts but they could also be considered 
religious acts, and they were issued on the occasion of an enthronement or in response to 
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personal crises such as illness rather than to any considered policy about how best to order 
legal matters. The use of amnesties in these circumstances does not negate the fact that for 
the Ilkhans, it was the relationship with local legal officials, namely qadis, that counted in 
terms of ordering legal matters in the way they thought would best fit the Ilkhanate.  
 
 
Conclusion   
 
In this chapter I have examined the attitude of the Toluid khans towards law in three ways: 
through their relationships with local legal officials, with the other Toluid khanate and with 
minorities in their own territory. Since it was the relationship with local legal officials which 
took precedence over the others, it can be concluded that tolerance of and accommodation to 
local practices was the prevailing attitude of the Toluid khans in legal matters.  
 
The attitudes of Hülegü and of Qubilai towards local legal officials were mostly tolerant, and 
subsequent khans likewise respected local legal officials and their role. Neither the Toluid 
relationship nor the influence of even very powerful minorities was allowed to derail the 
positive relationships with local legal officials.  
 
This is extremely significant in that it shows that flexible attitudes towards existing legal 
systems were not simply devised by officials working locally, but had backing at the highest 
levels. The willingness of many yarghuchis and darughachis to work together with local legal 
officials merely reflects the attitude of the khans themselves. Therefore, any theory that the 
khans were intent on imposing Mongol laws on the population, or wished to tightly control 
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legal matters without respecting local legal systems, does not correspond with the facts for 
the vast majority of the duration of the Toluid empire.    
 
The theory that ‘the Yasa’ was invariably conceived of as superior to local laws also needs to 
be modified. Events in the Toluid empire show that from the beginning of the Ilkhanate and 
the Yuan empire respectively, the khans saw local laws as complementary to, and not 
necessarily in competition with, Mongol law. While it is true that at the ordo itself Mongol 
law and practices prevailed, the khans themselves acknowledged complementarity, and 
showed through their actions, including their instructions to yarghuchis and darughachis, that 
they saw Mongol and local laws as appropriate for different realms and therefore 
complementary to each other. Therefore, the attitude of the khans can only be seen as flexible, 
not dogmatic.  
 
Since such an emphasis on complementarity is prevalent in both the Ilkhanate and the Yuan 
dynasty, it can hardly be attributed merely to chance. In the Yuan dynasty, the khans 
juxtaposed various legal traditions in the yuehui (joint trials) system, while in the Ilkhanate, 
qadis were seen as fulfilling a valuable function complementary to that of the Ilkhans. It is 
more likely that this tendency of the khans to be flexible has its roots in the political-
administrative and legal tradition of the Mongols, where disparate nomadic groups needed to 
work together towards common goals. The recognition of diverse legal systems and the 
expectation that the representatives work together towards a resolution whenever both are 
involved reflects the spirit and the practice of the quriltai. 
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Chapter 6 – Chinese officials’ dependence on the Yuan emperors 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the cooperation between Mongols and Chinese in the area of law. 
It will be argued that not only were the Qa’ans disposed to being flexible, Chinese officials 
and intellectuals were themselves determined to work together with the Mongol rulers in 
matters of law. This produced a unique situation in the Mongol empire where the desire on all 
sides to work together led to significant and enduring Mongol influence in legal matters.  
 
The reason why Chinese intellectuals and officials wanted to work together with the Qa’ans 
was that in Chinese and Confucian culture, the legitimate bearers of the Mandate of Heaven 
were regarded as the only legitimate source of law. From the point, therefore, that Chinese 
began to see the Mongols as legitimate rulers, they needed the Qa’ans in order to promulgate 
laws, believing that the empire could even collapse without appropriate and just laws.  
 
This fact needs to be recognized because it is the only explanation of what otherwise appears 
as a paradox. The Yuan empire is the khanate where Mongol influence in legal matters was 
most pronounced; it is also where officials and scholars put the most effort into trying to 
influence the rulers away from Mongol law, in this case towards Chinese law. Partly this can 
be explained because of the greater bureaucratization of Chinese society, but it also appears 
that Confucian influence was counterproductive, in the sense that it led to greater Mongol 
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influence in legal matters, rather than less Mongol influence. The very principle of 
Confucianism that led scholars to look to the khans as the source of law led to Mongol 
influence becoming more pronounced that it would have been otherwise. This effect of 
Confucianism on the legal history of China has not been noted elsewhere.483  
 
 
Uniqueness of Yuan China 
 
It was the willingness of officials and scholars to see the Qa’ans as legitimate bearers of the 
Mandate of Heaven and as the only people who could legitimately make the laws which led 
to significant long-term influence of Mongol law within China. The fact that both Chinese 
and Mongols were willing to work together and, most of the time, to make compromises, led 
to significant mutual influence. The influence of Mongol law in China was greater than in 
Persia, Central Asia or in the Golden Horde.   
 
The modes of cooperation which facilitated this influence were several. There were firstly 
discussions at the imperial ordo. These were not unique to the Yuan dynasty, but they played 
an important role in terms of acquainting the Qa’ans with the expectations of the Chinese and 
vice versa. Memorials and complaints from the Chinese acquainted the Qa’ans with their 
viewpoints and proposed changes.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the institutionalization of yarghuchis in the dazong zhengfu was 
unique to Yuan China, and meant that there was a long-term presence of yarghuchis within 
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the government, some of whom actively promoted Mongol practices. The subsequent 
opportunities for Mongol and non-Mongol officials to meet together and judge cases together 
was one of the mechanisms which led to sometimes long-term influence of Mongol practices 
within the Chinese punishments system.   
 
Another unique factor in Yuan China was the amount of written legislation that the central 
government worked on. Only the Chinese attempted to create, and involve the Qa’ans in 
creating, a law code and compilations of edicts. As a result, teams of Mongols and Chinese 
were tasked with working together to develop legislation acceptable for all groups. Although 
most legislation which was developed in this way was not finally promulgated, there were 
still real effects in terms of the Mongols’ and the Chinese knowledge of each other’s legal 
practices and sometimes also in the development of legislation which showed a compromise 
or even amalgam of Chinese and Mongol practices. 
 
Moreover, the Yuan empire was unique in terms of the dependence of local officials on the 
Qa’ans. As seen in chapter 4, a variety of local officials at the district, prefecture and route 
levels dealt with legal cases, often in conference. The crucial point is that they were able and 
willing to communicate regularly with the central government. While legislation sometimes 
took some years to filter down,484 communication was more frequent and effective than in 
any of the other khanates.  
 
Therefore, Yuan China was unique in many respects. The greater level of bureaucratization in 
China does not in itself account for the greater Mongol influence in law. Rather, it is the 
willingness of the Chinese to work together with their Mongol rulers, and the determination 
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of the bureaucracy to implement the laws made by the Qa’ans, which led to the deep and 
long-term nature of Mongol influence in Chinese law. In no other khanate were local officials 
implementing originally Mongol punishment methods so regularly. For example, most 
beatings were given with the number of strokes ending in 7 as was customary for the 
Mongols; and military exile not only became one of the recognized grades of punishment, it 
remained so into the Qing dynasty.485 
 
 
Confucianism as a powerful motive for cooperation 
 
From the beginnings of imperial Chinese history, the emperors made laws for the people and 
tried to claim that they alone had the right to do so. This was connected with the claim that 
the emperors were the ‘Sons of Heaven,’ having the most direct and most authoritative 
connection with Heaven. The emperors alone knew the will of Heaven and communicated it 
to the people. They intended to leave no space for other claims, whether religious or 
otherwise, to be able to make valid laws.486 
 
While it is true that cases which were not considered very serious were often dealt with 
locally without the involvement of government authorities, and the heads of families and 
village leaders had considerable authority in legal matters,487 the most significant matters 
were determined from above by the emperors. This was despite the fact that early Confucians, 
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as opposed to legalists, viewed the law in itself with suspicion as a measure of last resort in 
the governing of society.488 By the time of the Song and Jin dynasties which preceded the 
Yuan, Confucians viewed the emperor’s laws as essential to the ordering of society. In 
particular, a legal code organized on the model of the Tang code was seen as an indispensable 
tool of rule and necessary for the legitimation of each subsequent dynasty.489 While in 
practice edicts could modify or even reverse rulings in the law codes,490 the fact of having a 
law code with a fixed text had enormous symbolic importance, supposedly lending clarity to 
the legal system and stability to society.491     
 
It is also of immense importance for the case of the Yuan dynasty that while Confucians were 
committed to remaking society according to traditional Chinese principles, at the same time 
they believed that the law should not remain static. On the contrary, change was expected, 
especially on the change of dynasties, and during dynasties as well, because the law was 
meant to be suitable for the times and the particular situations and challenges being lived.492  
 
These convictions were the motivation for Confucians and Chinese scholars to serve the 
Mongols and urge them to produce laws for the empire. While they were interested in 
Chinese culture being protected, they were convinced that any laws needed to come from the 
legitimate ruler, and that some changes might be needed to adapt the laws for the current 
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times. This is why they approached the Qa’ans and asked them to issue laws. This would only 
be the case, however, if they considered the Mongols to be the legitimate rulers of China.  
 
The opinions of southern Song loyalists, scholar-officials who refused to serve the new 
dynasty due to their attachment to the Confucian idea of loyalty, have long coloured the 
historiography.493 However, in fact the Mongols were accepted relatively quickly as 
legitimate, particularly in northern China, thereby enabling many who were educated in the 
Chinese tradition to work for and with the Mongols. Many of the inhabitants, officials and 
scholars of the former Jin empire were favourably disposed towards the Mongols; the Khitans 
in particular, who could look back with nostalgia to the Khitan Liao empire and many of 
whom resented Jin rule, welcomed the Mongols.   
 
Yelü Ahai and Yelü Tuhua were two Khitans who were involved in the Mongol enterprise as 
early as 1203.494 Other Khitans, Jurchens and Chinese soon joined them, and were given 
appropriate titles and offices in return for their loyalty.495 Some of the warlords (shihou 世侯) 
involved in the ‘Red Coat’ rebellion in Shandong also turned to the Mongols even before the 
Mongol conquest could be seen as inevitable. They considered the Mongols as just another 
alternative to the Song or the Jin, perhaps because the Mongols understood the importance of 
titles in Chinese political ideology. In submitting to the Mongols, they usually were able to 
obtain a higher title than the one they held already.496 Nor did supporting Confucians scholars 
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and rituals prevent these warlords from turning to the Mongols.497 This shows that the 
Mongols could indeed be perceived as legitimate rulers by many.  
 
In the former southern Song empire, loyalism and the refusal to serve the new dynasty played 
a greater role. Since a non-Han dynasty had never conquered the whole of China, to the 
feelings of loyalty were added, for some, racial or ethnic prejudices.498 Some scholars 
withdrew from government service, though there were different degrees of withdrawal. Some 
refused to take up any government positions, others initially refused to serve but accepted 
positions later, while still others served in schools but refused to be part of the ranked 
bureaucracy.499   
 
As Jennifer Jay has shown in her comprehensive study however, the phenomenon of Song 
loyalism was both less uncompromising and less long-lasting than has been supposed. 
Loyalists were not the majority, but the minority of scholar-officials in southern China. In 
addition, the feelings and actions of even the most ardent loyalists changed over time. Many 
felt intense loyalism in the first years of Mongol rule, but relaxed their attitude as they met 
with northerners committed to Confucianism and saw some benefits in the reunification of 
northern and southern China.500 In the 1280s and 90s, many started using Yuan reign titles 
which they had refused to use previously; some took up posts as officials; and others 
permitted their sons to serve the Mongols.501  
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Overall, Confucian scholars continued to stress the value of serving the government; some 
actively encouraged their students to serve the Mongols.502 Many saw a law code and 
appropriate laws as essential for the empire. The connection between Confucianism and the 
desire to obey laws made by the Emperor is shown by the Mumin zhonggao 牧民忠告 “Frank 
Advice for Magistrates,” written by Zhang Yanghao 張養浩 (1270-1329). Although the work 
is suffused with Confucian principles, he still states: “Now the law is [the law of] the Son of 
Heaven. If the people should violate it, they violate the law of the Son of Heaven.”503 
 
Thus, rather than being a discouragement from working together with the Mongols, 
Confucianism was on the contrary a strong motivating factor for working together with them, 
including in regards to legal matters. While Confucian ideals may have prevented a minority 
of former officials from serving the Yuan, many others had as their aim to ‘civilize’ or 
sinicize the Mongols.504 In particular, some were motivated to work for and with the Mongols 
precisely because they wanted to persuade the Qa’ans to issue new laws or a legal code. 
 
 
Chinese officials’ requests for a law code    
 
Requests for the Mongols to issue laws or a legal code were very frequent in the Yuan 
dynasty, demonstrating that the traditional Chinese belief that legitimate laws come from the 
emperor was strong, and that the Qa’ans were considered to be legitimate rulers. The view 
that the Mongol ‘barbarians’ were totally without any kind of law, as the Ming dynasty 
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compilers of the Yuan history implied,505 may also have played a role in motivating 
Confucians to try to help them ‘acquire’ law. But only the view that the emperor is the only 
legitimate source of law can explain why Confucians turned to the Mongol Qa’ans, and not to 
some other groups or specialists, to provide what they considered to be appropriate laws.   
 
Chinese scholars wanted the Yuan rulers to promulgate a law code in the style of the Tang 
and Song law codes, since such a code was considered essential for an effective legal system 
and in preventing disorder.506 In the absence of such a law code, some scholars looked to 
earlier codes such as the Taihelü or even the Spring and Autumn Annals to provide the 
necessary legal basis, and others viewed the compilations of edicts promulgated during the 
Yuan as law codes.507 However, most recognized that in practical terms, up-to-date laws from 
the Yuan rulers were essential, and were therefore willing to work together with the Mongols. 
The fact that these Chinese officials and intellectuals wanted not simply a few laws but an 
entire law code and comprehensive collections of edicts means that the resulting cooperation 
with Mongols in legal matters was very deep and quite fruitful, in terms of producing laws 
which reflected a combination of Mongol and Chinese influences.  
 
One of the earliest attempts to get the Mongol rulers’ cooperation in lawmaking is seen in the 
Yuan Shi biography of Guo Baoyu 郭寶玉, who submitted to the Mongols in 1211 and 
accompanied the generals Sübedei and Jebe on their reconnaissance around the Caspian. For 
him, a new dynasty meant that new laws were required: 
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“He [Guo Baoyu] also said: “When a dynasty is just being established it is appropriate 
to issue new regulations.” The emperor followed the proposal. Thereupon he issued 
five regulations divided into articles. For example: “When the armies are marched out 
they cannot wildly kill. When cases at law are tried the punishment is to be death only 
in the case of major offenses. Other miscellaneous offences are to be punished 
according to the circumstances through beating with the bamboo. In the case of 
military households one soldier is to be provided for each able-bodied (ting 丁) 
Mongol and Se-mu 色目 and in the case of Han people those with four ch’ing of land 
and three able-bodied will all provide one soldier. Persons aged 15 and above will be 
considered able-bodied. Those aged 60 are overage. Jam households will be the same 
as military households. Artisans will be limited to one ch’ing of land. Buddhists and 
Taoists have no benefit for the state. They are harmful to the people. They must be 
generally prohibited and limited.” Things like this were all set forth by Pao-yu.”508  
 
Although Guo Baoyu’s biography presents this proposal of his as having been made soon 
after he met Chinggis Khan, Buell thinks that the request most likely dates from after Guo 
Baoyu was appointed as yarghuchi, and had assumed some legal responsibilities. However 
this may be, his words show his desire for Chinggis to be involved in issuing laws for the 
new dynasty.  
 
Guo Baoyu was only the first of a long list of Chinese who petitioned the Mongols to produce 
laws for the empire. Moreover, the frequent calls for the Yuan rulers to harmonize Mongol 
and Chinese views show how strong was the motivation of many Chinese to work together 
with the Mongols to produce laws acceptable to all parties. Wang Yun 王惲 (1227-1304) 
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came from an important legal family that had served the Jin dynasty for many years, while 
his father spent much time in studying the Confucian classics. Wang Yun himself was 
successful in gaining office under the Yuan and served in the Central Secretariat and the 
Censorate, among other posts. In 1268, he proposed that a new code should be adopted.509 
Since this proposal was made before the Jin code had been officially abrogated by Qubilai, 
his motivation in calling for a new code was not simply the absence of a code but the 
conviction that a new dynasty should have a new code appropriate for the times. He wrote: 
 
“If within [this code] there are [items] which cannot effectively function, let us extract 
[supplements from] the dynastic cha-sa (jasaγ) and, by following the practice of 
[issuing decrees] of the Chin dynasty, establish [these supplements] separately [under] 
decree authorization.”510  
 
From this proposal it can be seen that Wang Yun’s belief in the importance of having a new 
code trumped any desire of keeping Chinese laws ‘pure’ or free from Mongol influence. He 
considered having up-to-date laws, even if they contained Mongol influences, to be 
preferable to having outdated ‘Chinese’ laws. This shows that he considered the Yuan a 
legitimate dynasty and cooperation with the Qa’ans in matters of law as a duty of the highest 
importance.  
 
Hao Jing 郝經 came from a family of distinguished Confucian sholars, and became an 
advisor to Qubilai Khan. When Qubilai, discussing government matters with him, asked him 
to produce a memorandum on the proper conduct of government, Hao submitted a 
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memorandum entitled Liguo guimo 立國規模  (Plan to Manage the State). 511 Later, after 
learning that Möngke’s eastern army had not had success for some time, he submitted a 
second memorandum entitled Dong Shiyi 東師議  (Discussion on the Eastern Army). In these 
memorandums, Hao Jing urged Qubilai to establish a complete system of laws, “a civil 
government based on impartial and universal laws.”512 
 
In 1262, Qubilai ordered his senior official Shi Tianze 史天澤 and his advisor and Confucian 
scholar 姚樞 to prepare a Chinese code.513 However, the delay in actually promulgating the 
code514 led to a memorial from Wei Qu 魏初 in 1271, who drew attention to the need to 
update the laws in each dynasty. In 1273 Qubilai read a draft of the code and submitted it to 
“his Mongolian advisors” for revisions,515 but the matter did not go further. Wei Qu had 
memorialized: 
 
“I hear [the rumor] that Shih T’ien-tse and other elders have discussed and compiled 
the Ta Yuan Hsin-lü [New Code of the Great Yuan], and not years and months have 
passed but [I] have not seen a proposal to promulgate a code. Now [I] thoroughly 
deliberate [and find that] the Chou dynasty followed [the foundation] of the Yin 
dynasty, and the latter came after the Hsia dynasty. There were things unchangeable. 
As to li (rites), yüeh (music), hsing (punishment), and cheng (government) they are 
transitional and are to be modified or expanded according to circumstances nor can 
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they be fixed by a [permanent] code. The T’ai-ho lü is not a mere Chin code. It 
adopted supplements from the Five Classics and institutions of the Three Dynasties [i. 
e., Hsia, Shang, and Chou – P. C.], Han and T’ang dynasties. If [we] expunge [from 
the T’ai-ho lu] items esteemed by Chin customs as well as laws established by Chin 
decrees, and then add decrees and rules issued since the beginning of [our] dynasty as 
well as the established precedents, then a text can be completed and it will become the 
Chih-yuan Hsin-lü [Chih-Yuan New Statutes]. Furthermore, since law is a tool for the 
maintenance of a nation, the Censorate especially cannot but regard the establishment 
of laws as essential.”516   
 
Wei Qu 魏初, like Wang Yun, thought that Mongol and Chinese laws should be combined, 
and that Mongol influence on the law was either a good thing or the necessary price to pay in 
order to have an up-to-date law code. Once again this shows the eagerness of Chinese to 
work together with the Mongols on law, even in the creation of a law code which would be 
followed by local officials in China.  
 
Around 1274, Zhao Liangbi 趙良弼 made a similar request to Qubilai that it would be 
advisable to establish unified laws so as to suppress evil bureaucrats.517 In 1283, Cui Yu 崔彧, 
a minister in the Board of Punishments, urged the establishment of unified laws.518 The 
efforts of another official, He Rongzu 何榮祖, who had started his career as a clerk and had 
held various positions in the government, were blocked by powerful minister Sengge until his 
downfall. Subsequently, however, He Rongzu 何榮祖 was appointed Senior Chief Councillor 
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of the Central Secretariat, and was able to work with the Mongols on the Zhiyuan xinge 至元
新格 which was promulgated in 1291, and also on a second compilation called Dade lüling 
大元律令.  
 
In 1292 and 1294, seeing that his earlier request had not been heeded, Wang Yun 
memorialized again on this issue. In the 1292 memorial, Wang Yun wrote:  
 
“I humbly suggest that [it is] proper for the established statutes and ordinances to be 
promulgated as the Hsin-fa [New Code]. If there are [items] which cannot effectively 
function [or] thoroughly fit [the situation], let the holy decrees of previous reigns as 
well as the t’iao-ko (articles and codes) from the Chung-t’ung reign to the present be 
generally deliberated and be used as supplements.”519  
 
After Chengzong came to the throne, in 1294, Wang Yun, who was now Hanlin xueshi 
(Hanlin academician) submitted a further proposal for a Yuannian xinfa 元年新法 [First Year 
New Code], in which he did not mention the yasa.520 Paul Heng-chao Ch’en takes this as 
clear evidence that the Yasa, and by implication Mongol law itself, quickly declined in 
importance in China;521 however, as I have argued earlier in this thesis, a single word does 
not summarize Mongol law, and the influence of Mongol law is much greater than what can 
be assumed on the basis of the narrative of the Great Yasa.522 The prestige of Mongol 
customary laws may have waned somewhat, but the collaborative projects which these 
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memoranda resulted in nevertheless led to Mongol influence on the law which lasted even 
into the Ming dynasty.   
 
The desire to see the Yuan emperors involved in producing laws – preferably clear laws 
organized for easy consultation – persisted. Soon after, another official, Zheng Jiefu 鄭介夫, 
held that the Dade lüling needed more revision. He submitted a memorial to the throne saying 
that one needs to look at both ancient Chinese laws as well as more recent laws including 
decisions of the current dynasty. Both the Chinese and the Mongol elements should be 
harmonized into a single document.523 After Wuzong succeeded to the throne in 1307, the 
Central Secretariat submitted a memorial in December 1307 or January 1308:524  
 
“Statutes and ordinances are urgent matters for governing the state and are to be 
modified or expanded in accordance with circumstances. […] Shih-tsu [Qubilai] once 
again issued an edict ordering that the T-ai-ho lü of the Chin be not applied and that 
elder ministers, who thoroughly understand the laws, consult [laws of] the ancient and 
present times so as to establish new [legal] institutions. So far it has not been carried 
out. We, your subjects, think that statutes and ordinances are serious matters and 
should not be lightly discussed. [We therefore] request that the t’iao-ko put into 
practice since the succession of Shih-tsu [Qubilai] to the throne be examined and 
unified [into one code] so that [it] may be observed and put into practice.”525  
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Permission was granted for this request to be implemented and it resulted in the compilation 
of the Dade dianzhang 大德典章, of which some fragments are extant.526 
 
A further request was made in 1309 by ministers of the Secretariat for State Affairs. This 
request was successful but remained without effect since Emperor Wuzong died in 1311 
before action could be taken:  
 
“In our country the lands are vast and the people are many, beyond that of former 
dynasties. The statutes (ko) and precedents (li) of previous reigns are inconsistent. 
Officials who enforce the laws issue light and heavy punishments as they like. We 
request that the more than 9,000 statutes (ling) implemented from the reign of T’ai-tsu 
[Chinggis Khan, i. e. 1206 on] be edited to eliminate the superfluous and render them 
consistent, and be made into fixed regulations (ting-chih).”527  
 
Renzong, who took action on the request first approved by Wuzong, was urged on by Xie 
Rang 謝讓 (1246-1311), a minister of the Board of Punishments: “From ancient times to the 
present day, those who had the country have all had statutes to support their rulings. How 
could a conscientious holy dynasty like ours have no laws to follow and thus let bureaucrats 
indulge themselves and people suffer evilness?”528 The result was a text completed in 1316 
with decrees (zhaozhi), statutes (tiaoge) and precedents (duanli), with documents covering 
the years 1234 to 1316. It was expanded and promulgated in 1321 as Dayuan tongzhi 大元通
制.  
                                                 
526
 Ch’en, Chinese legal tradition, p. 22 
527
 Yuan Shi, ch. 23, p. 516, translation by Birge in: Women, property, and Confucian reaction, p. 212; Ch’en, 
Chinese legal tradition, p. 23 gives a slightly different translation. 
528
 Yuan Shi, ch. 176, p. 4111, translation by Ch’en, Chinese legal tradition, p. 24 
173 
 
 
However, even when a document similar to a code529 had been issued, Chinese officials 
continued to request more up-to-date compilations of governmental edicts. In 1322 Li Duan 
李端, a censor, suggested to the throne that ordinances should be codified to prevent 
bureaucrats from committing evil acts and to give the authorities proper guidance, a proposal 
which was accepted by Yingzong.530 In 1323 Baiju stated in a memorial that the “former 
code” should be edited and published as the tongzhi “Comprehensive Institutions.”531  
 
An additional reason for Chinese to work together with the Yuan rulers on legal matters was 
their desire that the laws for South and North China, which had differed under the Song and 
Jin dynasties, could again be unified. It is significant that they looked to the emperor and not 
to an ideology, a religion or to a common allegiance to past Chinese practices to bring about 
this unification. Zheng Jiefu in his memorial advocated “selecting from the proper customs of 
the South and North” in order to produce a code that would be appropriate for all.532 Hu 
Zhiyu 胡祗遹 (1227-1295), a scholar-official, poet, and advisor to Qubilai, likewise looked 
to the government to achieve the elusive unification of the laws of the south and north:  
 
“The reason law has not been established [i.e., a Chinese-style law code has not been 
promulgated] is because the south cannot follow (the laws of the) north, and the north 
cannot follow the (laws of the) south. So how can one establish (law) appropriate for 
the times? One cannot have the south following the laws of the south and the north 
following the laws of the north, law cannot be established from this. The south cannot 
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follow the north and the north cannot follow the south. The matters of the south are 
complicated, therefore the law is complicated; the matters in the north are simple, and 
therefore the law is simple. For the complicated to follow the simple cannot constitute 
a system; if the simple were to follow the complicated, people would detest this. But 
to establish (something) connecting the two systems, one could (order that) in each 
case they follow the stricter (penalty).”533 
 
It is important to emphasize what these Chinese scholars and officials were asking for and 
why. They were asking firstly for the Yuan rulers to make laws, even if these laws were 
influenced by Mongol legal practices. Secondly they asked for these laws to be compiled into 
a law code, preferring such a code (or the compilations of edicts which were in fact produced) 
to relying on Chinese codes from the previous dynasties. The historical and ideological 
reasons for these requests lie in the practices of previous Chinese dynasties, each of which 
had a law code, and in the conviction that the proper and legitimate source of laws is always 
the emperor. 
 
It is these requests by Chinese officials and intellectuals, and the attitude underlying them, 
which led to attempts to produce codes reconciling Mongol and Chinese laws. The resulting 
interaction between Mongols and Chinese contributed towards the embedding of certain 
Mongol customs into Yuan law in such a way that they influenced the whole Yuan dynasty or 
even the Ming and Qing dynasties. But before explaining about these Mongol influences I 
will seek to show that not only did Chinese officials and scholars working in the central 
government wish for the Qa’ans to be personally involved in proclaiming law, officials at the 
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local level also looked to the Qa’ans for final rulings regarding the laws which they 
administered.   
 
 
The attitude of local officials  
 
A very important question is whether these requests for the Mongols to be involved in 
lawmaking mirrored the attitudes of those Chinese officials who dealt with legal cases on the 
ground. The sources show that this was the case and during the Yuan dynasty. The central 
government had the same role in the eyes of local officials which it had had during previous 
dynasties: firstly to make and circulate appropriate legislation, and secondly to act as ‘court 
of appeal’ for any difficult cases which could not be decided locally. 
 
That local officials under Mongol rule expected the government to fulfill both these roles is 
shown both by the contents and by the very existence of the legal compilation known as Yuan 
Dian Zhang. As Birge has shown,534 it is a compilation which was commercially produced in 
southern China. Although, unlike the government legal compilations, it is not devoid of some 
contradictory rulings from different time periods, it is nonetheless organized by topic and its 
purpose was to collect and bring together in one volume Yuan government edicts and 
precedents, which could be consulted by local officials.535 It was compiled from central 
government rulings and precedents which were sent to a local route (lu) of Jiangxi or local 
government in Fujian, thus showing that central government rulings did reach the provinces, 
presumably not just this province, but many or all provinces.  
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A preface to Yuan Dian Zhang 元典章 cites a request from Jiangxi officials in 1303 that 
statutes and precedents (ge li 格例) be collected and made into a book, to be distributed to 
local governments.536 While mentioning this request was probably intended to give some 
legitimacy to the Yuan Dian Zhang, the existence of the Yuan Dian Zhang, since it is a 
commercial publication, shows that there was demand for a compilation of precedents, and 
such demand would have come mainly from those officials dealing with legal matters at 
various levels of the government. This shows a deep level of interest in and engagement with 
the laws made by the Yuan rulers, unlike anything that happened in Persia during the Mongol 
period.  
 
Moreover, that local officials looked to the central government to rule on cases which were 
difficult to solve is shown by the contents of the Yuan Dian Zhang. The Yuan Dian Zhang 
contains cases from many provinces around China, from both north and south China. These 
were cases which, despite the distances involved, were communicated to the central 
government, decided, and then communicated back to the provinces in the form of edicts, 
which reached Jiangnan where they were compiled to become part of the Yuan Dian Zhang. 
The Yuan Dian Zhang contains hundreds of such edicts.  
 
More evidence that cases were indeed being forwarded up to the central government and 
were receiving answers come from documents excavated in Qara-khoto, the ‘black city’ 
(known in Chinese as ‘Hei cheng’ 黑城). These documents are one more piece of evidence 
showing that at least some cases did in fact go up to the central government for review. 
Because the collection contains some documents from the Qara-Khoto region and some 
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produced in Dadu, one can see how communication regarding such legal matters was very 
quick. From the Emperor at Dadu, documents could reach Qara-khoto in less than 20 days.537  
 
This is not to suggest that the system of sending cases up for review was entirely free of 
problems or faultlessly efficient. It is quite possible for example that corrupt officials could 
have kept some cases from being forwarded up for review; however this may be, the fact that 
a significant number nevertheless reached the central government shows that there was not 
only theoretical but also practical reliance on the central government at the local level, which 
was one of the ways in which Mongol influence could reach the local level and have concrete 
effects. This means that edicts of the Qa’ans were usually heeded, unlike in the Ilkhanate 
where firstly less legislation was produced, and secondly, that which was produced was not 
necessarily respected at the local level. Even Farquhar, who argues that the Yuan dynasty, as 
imperial China in general, was much more decentralized than is often held to be the case, 
admits that the reviewing of legal cases is one instance where the central government and the 
provinces did have an effective connection.538 
 
These observations should lead to a re-evaluation of Qubilai’s short-lived attempt to impose 
some Mongol practices, including the levirate, on the Chinese.539 As previously discussed,540 
this was not Qubilai’s first reaction to the Chinese legal system after coming into contact with 
it; rather, this came at the moment when he adopted the dynastic name Yuan. Moreover, 
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Qubilai had worked with Chinese local officials for some years, issuing edicts which they 
received but not requiring from them major changes in terms of adoption of Mongol legal 
practices. Is it not possible that he resolved to impose Mongol laws precisely because he had 
the connection with local officials that he needed in order to implement such a change? In 
other words, the local officials’ respect for the Emperor as the source of law may indirectly 
have led to greater Mongol involvement in legal matters, which then affected the local 
officials directly.  
 
Such a supposition becomes more plausible when one compares the Yuan dynasty with the 
other khanates. There are no examples from the Chaghatai khanate showing that the levirate 
was imposed, and there is a single example from the Golden Horde which was a levirate 
union accomplished literally by force at the ordo itself. It may have occurred in this way 
because the khans of the Golden Horde knew that they had no influence with Russian judges, 
so they took the opportunity of a visit to the ordo by the widow and the younger brother of 
Andrew of Chernigov to force such a union to take place. 
 
“Andrew, Duke of Cerneglone which is in Russia, was accused before Bati of taking 
Tartar horses out of the country and selling them elsewhere; and although the charge 
was not proved he was put to death. Hearing this, his younger brother came with the 
widow of the slain man to the chief Bati to petition him not to take away their 
territory from them. Bati told the boy to take the widow of the slain man, the boy’s 
own brother, as his wife; and bade the woman take him as her husband according to 
Tartar custom. She said that she would rather die than break the law. But none the less 
he gave her to him [as wife], although both of them refused as much as they could. 
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And they put them both to bed together and forced them to consummate the marriage 
in spite of their tears and cries.”541  
 
In the Ilkhanate, there is no indication that there was ever an attempt to impose the levirate. 
In China, the greater bureaucratization and the respect for the Emperor which suffused the 
officialdom, encouraged by Confucianism, led to a greater, though in this case temporary, 
influence of Mongol law on ordinary Chinese people.  
 
 
Changes in Chinese law as a result of Mongol influence 
 
The fact that local officials in China looked to the Yuan emperors as the source of legitimate 
law led to significant and enduring Mongol influence on the Chinese legal system. Here it 
will be shown how Mongol influence led to changes in the punishments imposed on ordinary 
criminals in China in beatings, military exile, the death penalty, and the confiscation of 
family members (after a criminal had been put to death).  
 
i. Beatings 
 
Beating was one of the ‘five punishments’ in China on which Mongol rule left its mark. This 
was because legislation specified fixed numbers of strokes to be used for different gradations 
of culpability. While Chinese traditionally used multiples of ten as the numbers of strokes, 
the Mongols, due to the symbolism they ascribed to numbers, preferred numbers of strokes 
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ending with the number 7. During the Yuan dynasty, stroke numbers conformed to the 
Mongol preference, but the change was reversed by the Ming dynasty.    
 
In China the numbers of strokes administered as punishments, which were graded according 
to the seriousness of the crime, were the subject of an imperial edict by Qubilai which 
reduced them from multiples of ten such as 50 and 110 to numbers ending in seven such as 
47, 107. The reason given was that heaven forgives one stroke, the earth forgives one stroke 
and the emperor forgives one stroke: 
 
“Qubilai established the punishments in all-under-heaven: beating with the light stick, 
beating with the heavy stick, penal servitude, exile, and strangling, these five 
punishments. For beating with the light and heavy sticks, he said: ‘Heaven forgives 
[the criminal] one stroke; earth forgives [the criminal] one stroke, and I forgive [the 
criminal] one stroke. If previously the punishment would have been 50 strokes, beat 
him only 47 times; if the punishment would have been 110 strokes, beat him 107 
times.’”542  
 
The explanation given for the change, that round numbers were reduced to numbers ending in 
seven for leniency’s sake, is not necessarily credible; rather, the special importance accorded 
to the number 7 by the Mongols seems much more probable. The number seven - as well as 
the number nine - was a very important number in ancient Turkish and Mongol history. They 
were sacred numbers.543  Heaven was believed to have either seven or nine levels, and the 
same for hell; in addition, the cosmic tree or axis mundi, which was sometimes depicted on 
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shaman’s drums, was usually shown as having seven or nine branches.544 Other numbers 
ending in seven, as well as 70 and 700 also played a very important role in ancient Turkish 
stelae and texts.545  
 
Although its significance is not entirely clear in all cases, it would seem that the number 7 
indicated inauspiciousness, since it was also connected with certain burial rituals, such as 
how many times one should circle a corpse.546 In addition there are Mongol stories that tell of 
7 demons, 7 robbers, or 7 suns coming out of heaven, which lead to disasters happening on 
earth.547 The number 7 is also associated with numbers of strokes of beatings in the Secret 
History. Although the Secret History gives only a few examples where the number of strokes 
is specified, the numbers given are 3, 7, and 37 strokes:548 
 
“If a member of the Guard when called on duty fails to take his turn, in accordance 
with the previous order he shall be disciplined with three strokes of the rod. If the 
same member of the Guard fails again – for the second time – to take his turn of duty, 
he shall be disciplined with seven strokes of the rod. If, once more, the same man, 
without sickness or other reason and without having first consulted the elder of the 
company, for the third time fails to take his turn, thsu regarding his service by Our 
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side as too difficult, he shall be disciplined with 37 strokes of the rod and shall be sent 
to a distant place out of Our sight.”549  
 
Thus, as has also been previously recognized,550 the use of numbers ending in seven is not 
coincidental and is a result of Mongol influence. That the emphasis on the number 7 was not 
just theory but affected beatings in practice can be seen from the cases recorded in the Yuan 
Dian Zhang. This document shows government decisions about difficult-to-decide cases that 
were sent up from the provinces. In many of these cases, where a beating is ordered the 
number of strokes ends in seven.551  
 
Thus, the modification of stroke numbers in Yuan China to numbers ending in seven is an 
adaptation to Mongol practices and was possible because officials dealing with these cases at 
the local level felt they had a reason to obey orders that came from the Yuan emperor. Using 
numbers of strokes ending in seven was the usual practice even on the local level during the 
Yuan dynasty. 
 
ii. Military exile 
 
Drafting into the army is another punishment where cooperation between Mongols and 
Chinese and its results are very apparent. This aspect of Mongol legal culture had much 
greater influence in Yuan China than in the Ilkhanate because of the greater reliance on 
legislation from the central government.  
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Military exile can be counted among the ‘typical’ Mongol punishments recorded in the Secret 
History. It is with this punishment that Ögödei allegedly threatened Güyük because he had 
insulted Batu. Despite the fact that this incident probably did not take place as described, 
since Güyük was on campaign and could not have been in Mongolia at that time,552 the 
incident does reflect a method of punishment which was familiar to Mongols and which 
reflected their nomadic lifestyle. As people for whom fixed prisons were not practical, 
military exile was a practical way of dealing with criminals and permitted an intermediate 
punishment between the death penalty and beating.  
 
“’Following whose counsel does this mean creature fill his mouth with talk against a 
person senior to him? May he and he alone rot like an egg! He has turned against the 
bosom of a person who is senior to him. Therefore,  
 
We shall place him in the vanguard: 
We shall make him climb the town walls  
Which are as high as mountains  
Until the nails of his ten fingers are worn away; 
We shall place him in the garrison army: 
We shall make him climb the town walls  
Which are made of hard-pounded earth 
Until the nails of his five fingers are ground down.”553 
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In China, military exile had been used occasionally under the Song but had not been included 
as part of the five-punishments system.554 During the Yuan dynasty, it was gradually 
expanded and integrated into the Chinese punishments system, where it came to be one 
degree below the death penalty and a degree above ‘forced labour.’555 Thus, although initially 
either military exile or forced labour could be used in the case of a death penalty which had 
been commuted, by Renzong’s time the differentiations between the punishments and their 
relative severity had been determined more precisely, and military exile was used exclusively 
in the case of a commuted death penalty.556 In addition, by Renzong’s time, military exile 
was combined with a beating.557   
 
Yarghuchis were heavily involved in promoting military exile as a punishment; they became 
at one point administrators for the system, keeping records and organizing the travel to the 
place of service.558 But the yarghuchis’ promotion of this punishment would not have 
succeeded without their connections with the court and with Chinese legal officials which 
enabled this punishment to eventually become part of the ‘five-punishments-system.’ It is 
precisely these connections that were fostered by the Qa’ans’ attachment to the principle of 
collegiality. The result of such intense cooperation was such that the use of military exile in 
China had long-term influence and it was “accepted as a major punishment” during the Ming 
dynasty.559 
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iii. The death penalty 
 
The execution methods used during the Yuan dynasty came to be a unique set of practices 
resulting from an amalgam of Chinese and Mongol principles. In China the two main 
execution methods in use when the Mongols came were decapitation and strangulation,560 
with beheading seen as the more severe of the two, since the dismemberment of the body was 
held to prevent the proper passage of the soul.561 The Mongols considered any form of 
execution which involved the shedding of blood as more serious, and therefore also saw 
beheading as the worse penalty. Although there was remarkable convergence in which death 
penalties were considered more serious, changes occurred during the Yuan which reflected a 
shift in who could be subjected to which death penalty.  
 
The Mongol principle that the blood of royal personages was not to touch the ground is 
illustrated by Nayan’s execution in 1287, when he was wrapped in a carpet and trampled to 
death: 
 
“And when the Great Kaan learned that Nayan was taken right glad was he, and 
commanded that he should be put to death straightway and in secret, lest endeavours 
should be made to obtain pity and pardon for him, because he was of the Kaan's own 
flesh and blood. And this was the way in which he was put to death: he was wrapt in a 
carpet, and tossed to and fro so mercilessly that he died. And the Kaan caused him to 
be put to death in this way because he would not have the blood of his Line Imperial 
spilt upon the ground or exposed in the eye of Heaven and before the Sun.”562 
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There is no report of a similar execution after 1287, and strangling itself seems not to have 
been regularly used, neither among the Mongol nobility nor in the punishments meted out to 
ordinary Chinese. After Qubilai decided to abolish the Jin code, the Taihelü, in 1271, 
strangulation was dropped from the list of official punishments. This was a remarkable 
change, especially since strangulation had been generally used in both the Mongol and the 
Chinese cultures as a more ‘lenient’ alternative to decapitation. Although there has been some 
debate about whether strangling was used again later in the Yuan dynasty, Xu Yuchun in his 
thesis on punishments during the Yuan dynasty comes to the conclusion that the evidence 
does not show that strangulation was used.563  
 
Although an official reason for dropping strangulation is not recorded, it may have been 
another opportunity for Qubilai to advertise his leniency.564 Another, deliberately cruel 
method of execution known as ‘slow slicing’ was used rarely and in cases of high treason, so 
beheading was supposedly the only ‘regular’ death penalty. This meant that if it was 
commuted, meant the offender would be exiled, rather than put to death by strangulation.565  
 
In practice however, as Zeng Daiwei has shown, the place that strangulation had held was 
taken by a new execution method, beating to death. It is not clear exactly how such a beating 
occurred, and whether it indeed meant that copious blood was shed, or whether it perhaps 
was similar to the Mongol method of ‘kicking in the pit of the stomach.’566 This penalty was 
separate from beating with the light stick (笞) and beating with the heavy stick (杖), and is 
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described using the word 敲 (“to beat”). While beating with the light and heavy stick, when 
given as a penalty, is always accompanied by the number of strokes to be administered, in 
many cases there is no reference to a number of strokes, but rather the expression “敲了.” 
This would seem to indicate that the person was beaten to death. Zeng Daiwei also believes 
that cases where the penalties in the section of the Yuan Shi on criminal law which are 
described merely as “处死” or “死” (“put to death”) also involve beating to death.567     
  
Beating to death was often used, like strangulation previously, in the case of commutation of 
the penalty of decapitation, or even commutation of slow slicing. Beating to death had not 
been unknown during the Song, being mentioned in several clauses in the Xu Zizhi tongjian 
zhang bian.568 During the Yuan it was applied, not according to the status of the offender as 
would have been the case among the Mongols, but according to the gravity of the crime 
committed, as in the Chinese system of graded punishments. For example, according to the 
Yuan history, killing one’s stepmother should be punished by slow cutting. “In the case of 
sons who murder their stepmother, they should be treated the same as sons who kill their 
mothers.”569 “Sons and grandsons who kill their paternal grandparents or mother or father are 
to be put to death by slow slicing.”570 However one source says that in 1294 a person found 
guilty of killing his stepmother was due to have his sentence commuted due to mitigating 
circumstances. A memorial was sent up to the Central Secretariat as to which punishment 
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should be imposed, and the Central Secretariat’s decision was that he should be beaten (to 
death), and that all further similar cases should be treated in the same way.571 
 
Although beating to death was not unknown during the Song,572 it is quite possible that its 
use reflects Mongol influence, since there are a few reports of beating to death in the 
Ilkhanate. One account of a public execution involving beating to death is from the year 1311 
when Sayyid Taj al-Din Avaji was put to death “with two of his sons on the bank of the 
Tigris by consecutive blows.”573 Perhaps this was similar to the executions by beating to 
death carried out in Yuan China. 
 
However, possibly the main reason why beating to death was used is that Qubilai did not 
want Chinese to be treated in a way that was traditionally reserved for Mongol nobles. Using 
beating to death meant that strangulation or other bloodless execution methods could be 
reserved for those whom Qubilai judged merited it, whereas there were still two main 
execution methods, beheading and beating to death, for more serious and less serious cases 
among the ‘common’ subjects of the empire. In addition, since it left the body whole, beating 
to death would presumably have been considered slightly less dishonourable than either slow 
cutting or beheading by the Chinese, and may even have satisfied the Chinese requirements 
for successful passage of the soul to the next life.574 In that sense, it may have been an 
acceptable substitute for strangulation in the Chinese system of punishments, while allowing 
strangulation to be reserved for those who, from the Mongol point of view, were worthy of it.  
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The restriction of the use of strangulation mirrored the fact that even for Mongol nobles and 
members of the royal family, it was not always used. Ananda, son of Manggala, son of 
Qubilai was beheaded in 1307.575 This shows how even princes of royal blood were treated 
more and more like common people with regards to execution methods. It seems that the 
Qa’ans were trying to communicate that princes should be no more privileged than any other 
subjects of the empire. 
 
If the restriction of strangulation more and more to the khans themselves was indeed the 
reason behind the use of beating to death, it would be a remarkable case of compromise 
between Mongol and Chinese values. In any case the changes – enforced throughout the 
Yuan empire, not through force, but through legislation and the respect local officials had for 
that legislation – were only possible as a result of the Mongols’ and Chinese desire to work 
together on these issues.     
 
 
iv. Confiscation and handing over of family members or property of the accused 
 
A further Mongol punishment method which is reflected in the Ilkhanate and in Yuan China 
is the ‘confiscation’ of the possessions or the family of condemned criminals. This practice 
had its roots in the Mongol vengeance system where the relatives and possessions of a 
perpetrator were considered legitimate targets for plunder. Given the amount of 
communication and discussion between Mongols and Chinese about legal matters, perhaps it 
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should be no surprise that this practice, too, ‘caught on’ in the Chinese environment and was 
also incorporated into legislation.      
 
The vengeance system itself was an integral part of Mongol legal tradition, as some scholars 
have recognized.576 For example, Chinggis’ wife Börte was taken by the Merkit as vengeance, 
though he later won her back. While in the vengeance system this principle was usually 
applied externally, i. e. it was considered legitimate to take or capture the relatives and 
possessions of an external enemy, in Chinggis Khan’s time the same principle could be 
applied to warriors within Chinggis Khan’s own following, should they prove unfaithful.   
This is reflected in the Secret History of the Mongols: 
 
In the days of war, 
If we disobey your commands, 
Deprive us of all our goods and belongings, and 
Our noble wives, and cast 
Our black heads on the ground! 
In the days of peace, 
If we violate your counsel, 
Cut us off from retainers and possessions, and 
Our wives, and cast us  
Out into the wilderness!’ 
Thus they pledged their word and in 
This way they swore the oath of loyalty,577 
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This passage shows three leading warriors pledging allegiance to Chinggis Khan and 
recognizing that, should they be unfaithful, Chinggis would be perfectly justified in taking 
away their families and possessions.  
 
From the time of Chinggis Khan, the principle that relatives and/or possessions of 
perpetrators could legitimately be taken was intentionally applied to non-Mongols. The 
practice seems to have been known as ‘anzhu’ 案主.578 In the 1223 edict which Chinggis 
Khan gave to Chang Chun, the master of the Daoist sect, and which has been preserved in the 
Chinese sources, Chinggis prohibited people from becoming monks merely to evade taxes, 
and the penalty if caught was to be ‘anzhu.’ In Aubin’s opinion this meant that the family 
members and / or possessions confiscated were to be awarded to the Daoists.579  
 
In a case that was decided by Möngke, Bala Bitigchi, who had originally been sentenced to 
the death penalty, was spared and sent on a difficult embassy, and “his wives and children, 
his servants and cattle, all his animate and inanimate possessions, were seized and 
distributed.”580 
 
In Yuan China, as a result of Mongol influence, the practice of confiscation became so 
widespread that even al-‘Umari, a historian in the Mamluk empire, heard about it. He writes:  
 
“One of the most amazing things that I saw in the realm of the Great Khan is that, 
although he (the qa’an) is an unbeliever, he respects the Muslim communities. If an 
infidel (i. e. a non-Muslim) kills a Muslim, the murderer is put to death together with 
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his family and his possessions are confiscated. In the contrary case [however], such a 
punishment is not carried out and only bloodmoney – a donkey – is demanded.”581 
 
Looking beyond the obvious pro-Muslim bias, al-‘Umari’s report is correct insofar as the 
punishment of a murderer extended to his family and possessions as well. His claim that the 
family of a murderer was put to death is not true, but family members and/or the possessions 
of criminals were often confiscated.  
 
Political personalities who fell into disgrace often had their possessions confiscated, and 
often their wives and children as well. For example, Sanggha’s property, wife and slaves 
were confiscated.582 Daulatshah’s household and his son’s household were confiscated and 
awarded to others.583 By a special edict November 24, 1328, the powerful minister El Temur 
got sole authority to redistribute confiscated property; under his direction about 125 
individual properties changed hands.584  
 
Not only that, but the practice of confiscating the wives and children of criminals was also 
introduced into legislation. For example, the Yuan Shi records that traitors who had already 
planned a crime should be put to death by slow slicing and their associates executed; while 
traitors without a plan should be exiled and their families confiscated. Likewise sorcerers 
who confused the masses and created a disturbance were to be executed and their families 
confiscated.585 However, attempts to stop the confiscation of wives gained some ground later 
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in the dynasty, because of increased Confucian influence.586 It would have been difficult for 
this practice of confiscation to become so widespread if Mongols and Chinese had not 
together made an effort to produce up-to-date legislation and if local officials had not been 
relatively diligent in following that legislation and allowing it to shape their jobs.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The uniqueness of Yuan history with regards to legal matters lies not so much in the 
extensive bureaucracy but in the willingness of that bureaucracy to look to the Mongol rulers 
as the legitimate source of law. This has not so far been recognized as a major factor 
underlying the extent of Mongol influence in law in China. Both Confucianism and legalism 
saw the emperor as the legitimate source of law and therefore indirectly led to Mongol 
influence. Local officials, just like many of the Chinese scholars and officials in the central 
government, looked to the Yuan emperors as the source of law. This was not only a 
theoretical opinion, rather they relied on the emperor’s edicts in practice to perform their jobs 
day to day.  
 
The effects of this can be seen in the changes in punishments which affected not only 
Mongols, but also Chinese, including ‘ordinary’ Chinese at the local level. Changes in the 
death penalty were possibly a result of the Qa’ans wanting to restrict ‘honourable’ execution 
methods to fewer people. Changes in the number of strokes in beatings were due to Mongol 
influence, and the introduction of military exile even affected the ‘five-punishments system’ 
in the long-term into the Ming and Qing dynasties.  
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These changes are considerable and can be explained through the willingness of the Toluid 
rulers and of Chinese officials and intellectuals to work together in creating and 
implementing appropriate laws. Only the flexibility of the Yuan dynasty rulers and elite 
together with the enthusiasm of the Chinese advisors and officials could have led to such a 
deep influence of Mongol law within China.   
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Chapter 7 – Self-reliance of Persian qadis 
 
Introduction 
 
Unlike Chinese officials, Persian qadis did not depend on interaction with the Toluid rulers in 
order to perform their legal duties locally. While qadis did have some connections with the 
Ilkhans and their officials, they did not need regular direct contact; qadis were content to 
work without input from the Ilkhans, since they considered the source of law to be in religion. 
The relationship between qadis and the Ilkhans was therefore much more distant than that 
between Chinese local officials and the Qa’ans.  
 
This self-reliance of the Persian qadis with regards to the Ilkhans had real consequences with 
regards to the depth of Mongol influence on legal matters in Persia, or rather, their self-
reliance led to a much reduced Mongol impact as compared with China. Together with the 
Ilkhans’ willingness to allow them to judge according to their own laws, this resulted in a 
fairly stable situation where specifically Mongol punishment methods, although implemented 
at the ordo, had little to no wider impact. The practice of military exile remained without 
effect on the local population, while there may have been some limited influence in terms of 
numbers of strokes used for beating, probably through imitation of Mongol ways. The 
principle that bloodless execution methods are more ‘honourable’ is the only aspect that had 
long-term influence, but this was through cultural influence rather than through the central 
government’s efforts or the creation of legislation. Overall, the influence of Mongol 
punishment methods was much less deep and affected less people than in China.  
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Positive aspects of the qadis’ attitudes towards the Ilkhans and Mongol authority 
 
Qadis’ attitudes towards the Mongols were generally less positive than those of local officials 
in China. A major reason for this was that they considered the ultimate source of law to be in 
religion. All the laws which society needed had already been revealed, they believed, and 
instead of taking orders from their ruler, they expected the ruler to conform to their image of 
a God-fearing sultan.  
 
However, initially their attitude was by no means entirely negative. On the contrary, it was a 
qadi al-qudat from Qazwin who was partially responsible for bringing Mongol khans to 
Persia. In a general sense, it could be said that qadis were unhappy with the military 
administration of the Mongol governors. More specifically, they may have been frustrated by 
their lack of influence on the Mongol khans.  
 
During the years of military rule, before the Ilkhanate was founded, the centre of Mongol 
power was remote from Persia not only geographically but also in terms of the influence that 
qadis could exert. The Qa’ans were surrounded by religious specialists from various faiths, 
which allowed them to resist influence from the qadis. While during the Mongol conquests, 
qadis and other Islamic leaders were often among those negotiating surrender for their cities, 
this would not have afforded them any platform from which to influence the Mongols. At 
other times, qadis travelled to the Mongol centre of power in order to make their influence 
felt. In 1246 the qadi al-qudat of Baghdad Fakhr al-Din came to the quriltai enthroning 
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Güyük.587 On 5th of December 1252 a “group of Muslims” led by Qadi Jalaluddin Mahmud 
Khujandi came to the gate of Möngke’s ordo; the qadi delivered the sermon and led the 
prayer, praying for Möngke, who ordered gifts to be given to them.588 Muslim clerics were 
also present in Qaraqorum, the capital of the Mongol empire, where imams rubbed shoulders 
with bakhshis and Christians.589 While the presence of qadis and imams at the centres of 
power shows their desire to make their influence felt, it would have been difficult to do so 
while so many faiths were jostling for influence. One can imagine the frustration of the local 
qadis, under Mongol rule, under a Qa’an who did not uphold Islamic law, and with few 
prospects that Islamic law would be honoured at the highest levels. This would seem to 
explain the extraordinary action by residents of Qazwin, including a qadi al-qudat, in inviting 
a Mongol khan to come and rule Persia. They considered it better to have an accessible, 
though still non-Muslim khan, rather than a distant khan whom there was little chance of 
influencing.  
 
The request from a Qazwini merchant emphasized the need for just and effective rule in 
Persia: 
 
The merchant from Qazwin said: “I have a request to ask, on behalf of the common 
people. … I have a wish that … the victorious qa’an could grant … that he would 
build a bridge across the Amu Darya … we do not speak of a bridge made of stone, or 
brick, nor a bridge of chains. I want a bridge of justice over that river, for where there 
is justice, the world is prosperous. He who comes over the Amu Darya finds the 
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Qa'an's justice, and on this side of the river there is justice and a path. On that side of 
the river, the world is evil, and some people become prosperous through injustice.”590 
 
This shows that a non-Muslim could be seen as qualified to provide justice. Such justice 
could include protection from threats such as that of the Ismailis, known as the Assassins, 
who were disrupting trade. The qadi al-qudat shared these sentiments, and according to 
Mustawfi, expressed himself as follows: 
 
“In the hope of seeing the victorious qa’an, I have travelled a long way to this country. 
Since the monarch has now stretched out his hand to us, it would be fitting if he gave 
us justice, as our cry for redress and justice against the oppressor has now reached the 
just qa’an. For we have seen much injury and a great deal of oppression in the world 
from that evil-doing brotherhood, who have imposed a heavy toll on us which has 
caused us much injury.”591  
 
This shows how qadis were among those who welcomed the arrival of Hülegü in Persia, and 
how their attitude towards the Mongols was by no means unremittingly negative. The qadis 
were willing to work together with the Mongols to an extent.  
 
Once Hülegü came to Persia, some remaining obstacles to good relations between the qadis 
and their Mongol rulers needed to be overcome, one of which was Hülegü’s demand that the 
qadis recognize him as the legitimate ruler. Although a qadi al-qudat was among those who 
had invited the Mongols to rule in Persia, it remains questionable whether according to 
Islamic law, a non-Muslim could even be a legitimate ruler. This topic had been discussed in 
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Islamic scholarship in the form of the question of whether an unjust Muslim or a just infidel 
ruler is better. Al-Busti had declared in 1010 AD that the “government (realm) may exist 
even along with unbelief, but not with injustice;”592 and al-Ghazali also quoted this maxim, 
mistakenly attributing it to Muhammad.593 However, Sadan writes that “most of the writers 
intended to stress, by hypothetical example, the importance of justice.”594 Only a few even 
mentioned the possibility of a contradiction with the principle that a ruler should be Muslim; 
but the few that did, like Mawardi, make clear that the saying should not be used to give 
legitimacy to a non-Muslim ruler.595 
 
Nevertheless, this obstacle was also overcome, probably through taqiyya, an Islamic principle 
which specifies that in time of need, a Muslim may dissimulate his true beliefs.596 When 
Hülegü Khan put the question to them as to whether an unjust Muslim or a just non-Muslim 
is preferable,  
 
“when they became aware of the proposed fatwā, they held back from giving an 
answer. Now Radi al-Din ibn ‘Ali ibn Ta’us was present at this meeting, and he was 
preeminent and respected. When he saw how they held back, he took the fatwā and 
wrote his reply on it, preferring the just infidel to the unjust Muslim, and the others 
wrote after him.”597 
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Hülegü’s request and the reaction to it by Ibn Tawus and other clerics shows that these 
‘ulama were willing to compromise. Another instance of taqiyya concerned Ghazan Khan’s 
desire to marry the wife of his late father Arghun, Bulughan Khatun. While such a marriage 
was typical for Mongols, under Islamic law it would be illegal.598 Al-Safadi tells how Ghazan 
was willing to abandon Islam if the marriage could not be performed, but that one scholar 
came up with a solution: since Ghazan’s father had not been a Muslim, the marriage between 
Arghun and Bulughan Khatun could be considered invalid, therefore Ghazan could marry 
Bulughan Khatun. Interestingly, “the unnamed scholar mentioned in this passage was subject 
to some criticism for his permissive interpretation of the law, but he replied that adopting an 
indulgent position and thus preventing Ghazan's apostasy and his subsequent antipathy to 
Islam was the best solution. This cogent explanation was accepted.”599 In addition, some 
qadis were willing to work for the Ilkhans directly, in particular after Ghazan converted to 
Islam, to draw up legal documents.600 
 
These anecdotes show that, despite some hesitation about working together with the Mongols, 
a lenient attitude overrode hardline dogmatism. What contributed to this attitude was the hope 
that the Mongol rulers would convert to Islam, and once converted that they would gradually 
support Islamic practices more and more. In this sense, the attitude of the qadis mirrors that 
of other scholars, whether Sunni or Shia, who were willing to serve the Mongols. Nasir al-
Din Tusi was one of the most famous scholars who joined Hülegü’s entourage after the 
Assassin stronghold of Alamut, where he had been staying, was destroyed. The Juvaynī 
brothers, Shams al-Din the vizier and the Ala al-Din the governor of Iraq and historian, also 
seem to have served the Ilkhans with the hope that they would convert to Islam. This is 
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shown by the construction of the Takht-e Suleiyman, which Ata Malik and Tusi were closely 
involved with, and the ceramic tiles of which proclaimed Shi’a and Sufi-inclined Islamic 
beliefs.601  
 
Like many Persian officials, qadis were often willing to regard the Ilkhans as legitimate rulers, 
and had personally positive relationships with the Ilkhans and the Mongol elite. One such 
qadi who had a positive relationship with the Ilkhans is Qadi Baydawi from Shiraz. One of 
his extant works is a short history of Persia, the Nizam al-tawarikh, which was perhaps 
“partly envisaged as an offering to the Mongol authorities to help secure his appointment to 
his father’s post [as qadi of Shiraz].”602 The Nizam al-tawarikh recounts the history of Persia 
from the beginning (including pre-Islamic rulers of Persia) to Baydawi’s time. In his history, 
Baydawi praises the Mongol Amir Suqunchaq highly.  
 
What is significant is that the Nizam al-tavarikh was extremely popular, at least based on the 
number of surviving manuscripts; it has several continuations, and was much quoted in later 
works, including Mustawfī’s chronicle.603 The motives for writing were not just literary and 
scholarly, but also political and nationalistic.604 Baydawi was the first historian after Juvaynī 
to present the Mongols as “merely another Iranian dynasty;”605 and he did it in a much more 
explicit fashion than Juvaynī, who had achieved his end mainly through poetry and literary 
allusions.606 Hülegü and Abaqa are mentioned in very positive terms, despite Abaqa’s 
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mocking of Juvaynī’s Islamic faith at one point; the Salghurids of Fars are included; and the 
Ismailis and Khwarazmshahs are included but criticized.607 In short, the Mongols are 
presented as the latest dynasty of Persia, and presented positively not least for being an 
enormous improvement on the immediately preceding dynasties. 
 
Therefore, Persian qadis were by no means completely opposed to working together with the 
Mongol rulers, even in the early Ilkhanate, and some had very positive relationships with the 
Ilkhans or with Mongol amirs. Nevertheless, as in general they felt no need on a professional 
level to engage with the legal practices of their rulers, there was less opportunity for Persian 
and Mongol legal practices to influence each other.  
 
 
The independence of the qadis from the Ilkhans 
 
In Persia unlike China, the source of law was not considered to be the ruler, but rather it was 
found in religion. The source of law was considered to be God, and the legislation as already 
revealed and fixed according to the detailed scholarship of the four Sunni law schools. The 
task of government was considered to be conforming to and upholding the already existing 
body of law. This meant that there was a fundamental difference with China, where local 
officials were so keen on having the Mongol rulers produce laws for them. Persian qadis had 
no need of the central government to provide the laws according to which they would judge. 
 
Therefore, communication between the central government and local qadis was less intense 
than in China. Communication did happen, of course: Rashid writes that qadis were 
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continually coming and going from the ordo.608 But it seems that apart from gaining 
appointment or having their appointment recognized, qadis did not consider communication 
with the central government essential to the way in which they performed their jobs. This is 
shown by the fact that most of the legal documents produced by qadis during the Mongol 
period were in Arabic, not Persian. There was indeed a trend towards greater use of Persian, 
but this had significant effects only after the Ilkhanid period.609 The documents show some 
influence from Islamic law as practised in Central Asia. There were some changes in the way 
in which a property’s size was reported in land contracts, for example the contracts could 
mention of the weight of seeds needed to plant the land, or occasionally the weight of the 
harvest, measurements which had previously only been used in Central Asia, and which 
found their way into these documents from Ardabil and northwestern Iran.610 Influence from 
Mongol practices, however, is not noticeable. Monika Gronke writes in her edition of legal 
documents from Ardabil dating up to the 1250s that “it is not necessary to go into the details 
of historical events because the legal documents do not reflect them.”611 
 
The data shows that throughout the Ilkhanid period, the qadis were an extremely stable 
influence in society - Hoffmann calls them “islands of continuity”612 in a sea of elite princes 
and bureaucrats whose heads rolled as soon as the wind changed. In the cities of Persia, the 
position of qadi was often held by the same family, or by the same few families, throughout 
the Ilkhanid period. This was not a departure from earlier practice, since the position of qadi 
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had already become strongly hereditary.613 The hereditary tendency contributed to the ability 
of the qadis to function nearly independently of the central government. 
 
In Tabriz, there were at least three families of qadis that spanned the Mongol period and 
beyond. The first of these is the Haddadi / Shaybani family, whose members had been qadis 
in Tabriz for generations who had the additional nisba al-Tabrizi. Rukn al-Din ‘Abd al-Malek 
is attested for Tabriz for 1218. In 1266 Ibn Fuwati met Izzuddin Abu’l Abbas Ahmad b. 
Qiwamuddin Muhammad b. Abdulmalik al-Haddadi, who had ‘inherited’ the office of qadi 
from his father (Qiwamuddin), in Tabriz at the home of a relative, the khatib Shihabuddin al-
Haddadi.614 According to Mashkur, he was born and grew up in Baghdad and died in Syria.615 
Ibn al-Fuwati also knew a Fakhruddin Abu al-Fazl Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Abd al-Malik al-
Haddadi who, if it can be true that two brothers with the same name were qadis in Tabriz, 
should be a brother of Izzuddin Abu al-Abbas.616 A certain Ibn Muhammad al-Shaybani 
made one of the oldest annotations on the Waqfname-ye Rashidi, which is dated 1310;617 and 
a legalisation in the Majmū‘a of Rashid al-Din is from Mahmud b. Abdullah al-Haddadi, who 
can be assumed to be a grandson of Qiwamuddin. Qiwamuddin Muhamamd al-Haddadi al-
Shaybani was qadi in 1383; other members of the al-Haddadi family are also attested at this 
time.618 
 
Other Tabrizi qadi families that spanned the Mongol period are the al-Sharif family and the 
Qazwini family. The al-Sharif family is significant in that there is evidence of links between 
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its members and the eminent vizier Rashid al-Din, which means that, though the qadis of 
Tabriz do not seem to have had direct personal relationships with the Mongol Ilkhans, they 
were nevertheless only one relationship removed. Ibn Fuwati met the Sharifi qadi Majd al-
Din ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar b. Muhammad at the house of Rashid al-Din, which would seem to 
indicate (although it cannot be proven) a friendship between the qadi and the vizier. Rashid 
al-Din also answered a theological question of the qadi, and although he wrote much to try to 
answer critics who branded his Islam as unorthodox, it still shows engagement with 
theological matters at the highest levels of the Ilkhanate, as well as among the elite of the city. 
Although it is possible that Rashid’s relations with Islamic scholars were polemical, it is also 
quite possible to imagine them inviting each other to their houses for friendly theological 
debate.  
 
Another family of qadis which is attested is the Khurasani family, but it seems to have 
established itself later than the other families: the earliest documents that could be connected 
with people from the Khurasani family are found in a waqf document from 1303; the family 
is also attested for 1382 and 1408.619 Its members were writers of legal documents, who 
called up witnesses, or legalized zawiyas, and also signed the waqfnamah of Rashid al-Din.620  
 
Although hardly any legal documents which these qadis handled have survived (the 
waqfnamah of Rashid al-Din is a significant exception), the legalisations from these 
documents, as well as the testimony of al-Fuwati, show that the Islamic legal system in 
Tabriz was functioning and apparently, not in any way abnormally. The qadis continued in 
their jobs, and due to the Islamic legal sources and to the qadiship being passed on through 
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inheritance as is clearly seen in the case of the Haddadi-Shaybani family and of the other qadi 
families, they operated largely independently from the Ilkhanid government.  
 
It is true that one qadi was executed by the Mongol in the main square of Tabriz, however 
this was Qutb al-Din, the brother of the vizier Sadr al-Din, who had engaged in power politics 
at the court.621  
 
In Ardabil likewise, a family of qadis, the Kakuli family, spanned the Mongol period, 
showing how the position of qadi remained largely hereditary and stable. The first qadi of this 
family who is known is Jamal al-Din Isma‘il b. Hamid b. Ahmad, who was judge, writer of 
judicial documents and a witness as well, and is mentioned for the years 1181-1229.622 
Although Rashid al-Din claims that an unnamed qadi of Ardabil was put to the sword for 
“executing fraudulent cases,” this is not substantiated by any other source. Given that Rashid 
al-Din had a vested interest in making Ghazan’s government appear effective, it can be 
doubted whether a qadi of Ardabil was really executed as he claims.623 
 
The qadis of Ardabil did feel a challenge to their judicial methods, but it did not come from 
the Mongols; rather, the leader of the Sufi order in Ardabil also claimed the insight and 
equity needed to judge cases fairly, and in fact presented a significant locus of rivalry to the 
local qadis. Shaykh Safi said to Qadi Nasir al-Din of Ardabil: “Maulana, in this city [Ardabil] 
there are libertines, oppressors, drinkers of wine, gripers (‘awanan) and other people who are 
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not on the straight path, but Maulana does not hinder them.”624 He also told him, “Maulana, 
since you know that one should not practice injustice and violence as a qadi, why do you still 
do it? Have you not read that the most high God has created a mill in hell, which is powered 
by the blood of unjust qadis and in which the heads of unjust qadis are crushed into small 
pieces?”625 The qadi al-qudat Shams al-Din Mobarakshah had to hear these words directed at 
him: “The judges (mawali) prevent the people from eating the forbidden food, yet they eat it 
themselves. Will the people not say: ‘If they tell the truth, why do they eat it themselves?’”626 
 
Since the antipathy was mutual, it is likely that insults did not fly in just one direction only. 
Sheikh Safi was often attacked with regards to the wealth of the order, and was accused of 
stealing a quantity of silk during disorders in Gilan.627  
 
In Shiraz, the Baydawi family vied with the Fali-Sirafi family for the position of qadi. 
Although the Mongol general Suqunchaq played a role in this contest, re-instating al-
Baydawi to his position as qadi after he had been deposed,628 it is also apparent that the ulama 
of Shiraz played a major role in selecting a qadi and were able, most of the time, to have their 
favourite candidate as qadi of Shiraz. While Qadi Baydawi’s friendly relations with 
Suqunchaq Noyan enabled him to appeal to him in order to be reinstated, once he had his 
qadiship he didn’t seek the help of Suqunchaq or of any Mongols to carry out his duties.  
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He presumably became judge in Shiraz after his father‘s death in 1274-5, possibly after a trip 
to Tabriz to gain this appointment, but he was removed again in 1278-9, when the governor 
of Fars accepted the young Fakhr or Majd al-Din Isma‘il of the Fali-Sirafi family instead of 
him.629 He travelled to Tabriz, and was restored to office again sometime in 1279-81. Subki 
recounts that  
 
“He entered a school there [in Tabriz] and took one of the back seats because no one 
there knew him. The instructor put to those present a question which he said none of 
those present could solve or repeat. Then Baydawi started to answer. The instructor 
said, “I will not listen until I know that you understand the question.” Al-Baydawi 
said, “You may choose whether I should repeat the question word for word, or give 
the sense of it.” The teacher was surprised and said, “Repeat the question word for 
word.” Then Baydawi repeated it and then gave the solution, and showed that the 
teacher had not stated the problem accurately. Then he confronted the instructor with 
a similar problem and requested him to solve it, but the instructor begged to be 
excused. The wazir [of the empire] happened to be present and called Baydawi to his 
side, and when he found out who he was, he had Baydawi returned to his position in 
Shiraz.”630 
 
Vassaf states that Baydawi was reinstated through the intervention of Suqunchaq Noyan. 
According to Vassaf, Suqunchaq made a partial concession to the assembled ulama who 
preferred a member of the Fali-Sirafi family instead, and appointed joint qadis.631 Vassaf then 
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says that the ulama’s favourite Fali-Sirafi soon took the major role. In any case, Baydawi did 
not remain in office for long and returned to Tabriz.  
 
Therefore, qadis were fully able to operate independently of the Ilkhans, and did so. Only in 
the matter of appointment to office did they sometimes require the support of the Ilkhans or 
provincial governors, as can be seen from the case of qadi Baydawi and some of the qadis of 
Baghdad. It is true that the Ilkhans represented an alterative locus of judicial authority to 
which those who had the resources and the connections could turn. According to the Safvat 
al-Safa, some Kirmani notables and scholars planned to go to the Ilkhanid ordo at Qarabagh 
Arran for a judgment on their case; but when they reached Ardabil, they changed their minds, 
preferring to have their dispute resolved by Sheikh Safi.”632  
 
However, the number of those able to appeal to the ordo was limited, and the crucial point is 
that qadis themselves did not feel any need to modify their practices as a result of the 
‘competition’ from the Ilkhans as judges. In fact, scepticism towards governmental authority 
in matters of law was widespread, as can be seen from this anecdote: 
 
“Sheikh Sadr al-Din said: Once, some slanderers had a serious argument with the 
disciples of the Sheikh. The Sheikh left the city. The band of disciples and admirers 
started the missionary work and accompanied the Sheikh from village to village, until 
in this way he came to the vicinity of Tabriz. The vizier Ghiyath al-Din Mohammad 
Rashidi heard about this. The Sheikh was escorted to Tabriz and accommodated in the 
khanqah of the vizier. There were a great number of people there. The Sheikh 
remained there for a while, but did not bring a complaint [against the slanderers] and 
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 Ibn Bazzāz, S	afwat al-s	afā, p. 716; Gronke, Derwische im Vorhof der Macht, p. 125 
210 
 
when any of the disciples wanted to bring a complaint he did not allow it. He 
remained there for a while and then left. [The disciples of the Sheikh] said: “We have 
been here for a while and we were even in the ordo, yet the Sheikh has not said 
anything [about the slander] and has not allowed us to talk about it.” The Sheikh said: 
“We have a different ordo to which we can appeal! You have not allowed us to go to 
our own ordo. Because we turned towards another ordo, the sublime God was angry 
and has not allowed the matter to progress.” They said, “Sheikh, what should we do 
now?” He said: “If we turn to the heavenly military camp [all will be well],” and he 
returned [to Ardabil]. Not long after, all the slanderers encountered disaster and that 
which was wished came to pass.”633  
 
While this relates to a religious event, it nonetheless illustrates the suspicion of secular power 
(and ‘state law’) which is quite frequent throughout Islamic history. The story, whether only 
embellished or even invented, shows that suspicion of state actors resolving legal issues could 
occur under any circumstances, even a generation after the Ilkhans turned to Islam.   
 
Not seeing the Ilkhans as a higher authority in matters of law meant that Mongol influence on 
them was extremely limited. This was the distinctive nature of the relationship between the 
qadis and the Toluid rulers in Persia, a relationship that was completely different from that 
with local officials in Yuan China.  
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Mongol influence on law in Persia 
 
The result of the self-reliance of the Persian qadis was that, though the Ilkhans imposed, in 
the trials which they themselves judged, many of the same punishments as did the Qa’ans in 
China, there was little widespread influence. Military exile failed entirely to have any wider 
impact, while there may have been some, though very limited, influence of the idea that the 
number of strokes in a beating should end in 7. Confiscation was practised, but only among 
those most closely connected with the Ilkhanid government and not, as in China, at the local 
level. Only the practice of using bloodless execution methods for nobles had wider impact, 
and this was because of cultural influence that started before the Mongol period in Persia. 
 
 
i. Beatings 
 
The significance of the number 7 for Mongols was reflected in beatings in the Ilkhanate as 
well as in Yuan China, as has been noted by Ma’dankan.634 The difference was that in the 
Ilkhanate numbers of strokes ending in 7 were not formalized through any legislation, and 
might not have been reflected in the qadis’ verdicts even if they had been. Therefore, this 
Mongol preference had little wider impact and seldom affected people unless they were in 
direct contact with the Ilkhans. Because of their overall good relationship with the qadis and 
the freedom they allowed qadis to use their own laws on the local level, punishments imposed 
by the Ilkhans remained just that.       
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Use of the number 7 in beatings imposed by Mongols can be seen in several cases.  Most 
examples involve numbers of strokes ending in 7. In 1263 Altagu, who was leading an army 
against Saljuq Shah, refused his counselor and servant Dumar’s advice to massacre the 
population of Shiraz. When a rebellion broke out, he was given 17 strokes for refusing to 
follow the advice.635 Tughan, in the time of Arghun, was likewise given 17 strokes.636 In 
1303 when Ghazan got news of the Mongol defeat in Syria, according to Vassaf, he was 
disturbed. In the year 1303 he prepared a committee of advisors and judged the amirs. The 
Ilkhan ordered that they be beaten with 87, 77 and 37 strokes according to their rank.637 Some 
falconer officers of Ghazan were given 77 strokes each by an ilchi (envoy) for requisitioning 
fodder and provisions when in fact the court had provided for their needs.638 In addition, the 
case of Abatai Noyin involves the number 70; he was given 70 strokes for not having taken 
good care of Jumghur, whom he was meant to bring to Hülegü.639 These examples show that 
the number 7 in beatings was a reality in the Mongol context in Persia.  
 
While there was no formal mechanism for the Mongol practice to be transmitted to Persians, 
it is possible that there was some influence through imitation. A caution needs to be inserted 
here as the numbers 7 and 17 were already influential in the Islamic context, so that use of 
these numbers does not necessarily indicate Mongol influence.640 Therefore, the following 
examples could be a result of Mongol influence, but not necessarily so: Three watchmen in 
the time of Abaqa were given 70 strokes for falling asleep on the job by Baha al-Din son of 
                                                 
635
 Vassaf, p. 192; Vassaf/Ayati p. 112  
636
 Vassaf p. 231, Vassaf/Ayati, p. 139 
637
 Vassaf, p. 414; Vassaf/Ayati, p. 248-9; Rashid, p. 1315; Rashid/Thackston, p. 657         
638
 Rashid, p. 1523; Rashid/Thackston, p. 753 
639
 Rashid, p. 1064; Rashid/Thackston, p. 519 
640
 Melikoff, “Nombres symboliques dans la littérature èpico-religieuse des Turcs d'Anatolie,” pp. 435-445; 
Deny, “70-72 chez les Turcs,” pp. 495-416  
213 
 
Shams al-Din Juvaynī, who was then governor of Esfahan, Tumanat and Iraq.641 Another 
example concerns a Shiite maulana who erased the word ‘not’ from the inscription [ W( ~ا WV:
[O3V:ا W%ا WV3!G] (May God curse those who do not curse Ibn al-‘Alqami642), which in the years 
following the conquest of Baghdad used to be written on the gates of madrasas, houses and 
karavanserais. He received 70 strokes for this offense.643 This episode occurred not long after 
the Mongol conquest of Baghdad and it is conceivable that the chastisers imitated a Mongol 
practice. These examples show that while the Mongol practice of using the number 7 in 
punishments was present in Persia, it may have had some but only very limited influence 
outside of the Mongol context.  
 
 
ii. Military exile 
 
Military exile, another Mongol practice which had enormous influence within China, had no 
wider influence within Persia. This was not because the Ilkhans were not using this 
punishment, but because the qadis were uninterested in Mongol practices and the Ilkhans 
were flexible enough not to insist on others using them.  
 
Ata Malik Juvaynī, who had grown up in a Mongol ordo and served the Mongols and then 
the Ilkhans for many years,644 speaks of sending people for military exile as a custom of the 
Mongols, though he does not mention any specific examples of it being imposed in the 
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Ilkhanate. He clarifies that the person who was being sent was not necessarily expected to 
return. 
 
“It is the custom of the Mongols in the case of a criminal who is worthy of death but 
whose life has been spared to send him into the wars; arguing that if he is fated to be 
killed he will be killed in the fighting. Or else they send him on an embassy to foreign 
people who they are not entirely certain will send him back: or again they send him to 
hot countries whose climate is unhealthy.”645 
 
Confirmation that military exile was used during the Ilkhanate itself comes from Vassaf. He 
comments on the fate of Engianu, the governor appointed to Fars by Abaqa in 1268-9, who 
was accused by his Persian colleagues of overambition and ruining the province. Engianu 
escaped the death penalty, but Ilkhan Abaqa then sent him on a mission to Qubilai Qa’an. 
The reason, Vassaf says, was that this was how Mongols would deal with amirs they were 
angry with: they would send them on the dangerous journey to the Qa’an or send them to 
fight against rebels.646 Vassaf’s testimony implies that military exile was a frequently used 
punishment employed by the Mongol rulers.  
 
In addition, Rashid al-Din also mentions the practice of military exile. “After [October 13, 
1295], Nawroz, Nurin, and Qutlughshah held a special session to investigate the offending 
amirs [who had opposed Ghazan].” After Qunchuqbal was put to death, “Toladai, Chechak, 
and Idachu were beaten, released, and assigned to Khurasan to find expiation for their crimes 
in the field of battle against the enemy.”647 
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Therefore, military exile was used in the Ilkhanate just as in Yuan China. The difference in 
impact can be explained only through the flexible attitude of the Toluid khans coupled with 
the ambivalent reactions of the local qadis themselves to Mongol rule.    
 
 
iii. The death penalty 
 
The principle of not shedding the blood of nobles is the one aspect of punishments which had 
long-term influence in the Ilkhanate. This was due not to direct influence on local qadis but to 
wider cultural influence. The Ilkhans’ use of this principle reinforced prior Turkish influence 
in Persia.648 In addition, this principle affected few people, mostly those at the top of society, 
and the implementation of bloodless executions was also the work of leaders and rulers. It 
would seem to be no accident that the greatest Mongol influence on punishments in Persia 
occurred in the realm of the siyasa, which did not depend on nor require the input of qadis, 
rather than in the realm of Shari’a; though in theory the public realm should also conform to 
Islamic principles.  
 
The idea that nobles’ blood should not be shed had been circulating in the territory of the 
future Ilkhanate for some time, due to Turkish influence. An early example is Caliph 
Mutawakkil putting the Turkish army leader Itakh to death by weighing him down with iron 
chains and possibly making him die of thirst. Then he summoned the judges of Baghdad and 
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the head of the postal service to examine the corpse and witness that Itakh had not been 
beaten or marked in any way.649  
 
It seems that Mongol rule meant that the practice of executing some people without shedding 
their blood continued, although the precise ranks of who was eligible for an ‘honorable’ 
dispatch were changing. Of the Ilkhans who were executed, all were put to death using a 
bloodless execution method. In the year 1284 the Ilkhan Ahmad Tegüder had his back 
broken.650 Geikhatu and Baidu were both strangled. 651 Geikhatu was strangled with a 
bowstring, according to Vassaf.652 This not only reflected concern for not shedding any blood, 
it also used a very symbolic item – the bowstring – to perform the operation. While it is true 
that bows and bowstrings were readily available, its use reflects considerations of power and 
status. It must have been considered a very “honourable” dispatch. Baidu was put to death in 
the year 1295, and as later Ilkhans died natural deaths, it is impossible to verify whether the 
principle of not shedding nobles’ blood would have been applied to them. Nevertheless it is 
noteworthy that none of the sources even suggests that the blood of any Ilkhan was shed.  
 
As for members of the royal family who were not themselves khans, the principle seems not 
to have been continuously upheld. While certain people of importance were executed in 
‘honorable’ ways throughout the Ilkhanate, some members of Chinggis Khan’s Golden 
Family were not. Qonqurtai son of Hülegü had his back broken in Qarabagh in 1282.653 
Around the end of the Ilkhanate, Arpa Khan had Malek Sharaf al-Din Mahmud Shah Inju, 
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Shahzade and other descendants of Hülegü put to death by strangulation.654 On the other hand, 
in the year 1303 prince Horqudaq was decapitated.655  
 
The principle of not shedding the blood of honoured or important people was also respected 
by non-Mongols, as can be seen from the case of Terkan Khatun, the ruler of Kerman, who 
had Soyurghatmish, the son of her husband who had been challenging her position, put to 
death by strangulation.656 In 1327, Ghiyath al-Din the ruler of Herat had Amir Chupan put to 
death with a bowstring.657  
  
 
iv. Confiscation of property or family members of the accused. 
 
The confiscation of the property and / or the family members of condemned individuals was 
also practiced in the Ilkhanate. Unlike in the Yuan dynasty, however, the practice was not 
codified in legislation, and it probably affected mostly government officials and other elites. 
Although it seems probable that it resulted at least partially from Mongol influence, this 
cannot be proven because fining or confiscation of possessions, especially of government 
officials, was common in Islamic lands. 
 
The name of musadara was given to a practice frequent in Islamic lands which entailed “the 
confiscation of the property of statesmen upon their death or dismissal from office.”658 Under 
the Saljuqs as well as under the Mamluks and Ottomans, musadara was frequent. For 
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example Toghril’s vizier, Abu al-Qasim al-Darguzini, “ordered confiscations and caused 
suffering to the great families” of Jibal or Isfahan.659 Many waqfs were even instituted 
partially in an attempt to safeguard family property from confiscation, a strategy which was 
not necessarily effective.660 One personal recollection of a confiscation is as follows:  
 
“I remember the arrival of Qara-Sonqur. His vizier, ‘Izz al-Mulk Abu l-‘Izz al-
Burujirdi was one of the fiends with whom [Abu l-Qasim] al-Darguzini surrounded 
himself when he was in power. He laid his hands on the remainder of our property 
that had escaped the [previous] confiscations. He scattered the members of our family 
and kinsfolk.661 
 
From this example it can be seen that, although musadara theoretically referred to property, 
family members were also sometimes confiscated.  
 
The confiscation of property of government ministers and officials who had fallen out of 
favour or been executed was frequent in the Ilkhanate. Although some of these examples 
report “plundering” rather than “confiscation,” from the Mongol point of view the practice 
has its roots in the vengeance system, and plundering is similar to confiscation.  
 
When hostility broke out between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde, Hülegü ordered that 
not only should the merchants related to Berke Khan be put to death, their possessions should 
also be confiscated and handed over to the treasury.662 In the year 1297, after Hajji Narin, 
                                                 
659
 Durand-Guedy, Iranian Elites and Turkish rulers, p. 258 
660
 Ibid, p. 223 
661
 Bundari, quoted in Iranian Elites and Turkish rulers, pp. 220-1. This event occurred in Isfahan in 1136/7. 
662
 Vassaf, p. 50 
219 
 
Nauruz’s brother was executed, his “tents and flocks were plundered,” according to Rashid 
al-Din.663  
  
The vizier Shams al-Din Juvaynī and his brother ‘Ala al-Din suffered repeated demands for 
money; ‘Ala al-Din died partly because of the stress and anxiety of these requests, while 
Shams al-Din was executed not long thereafter. In fact the torture and extortion demands 
which preceded their deaths seem like a textbook case of musadara, which sometimes aimed 
at recouping the money and property that wealthy ministers had accumulated before they 
were put to death. Rashid al-Din mentions that after the execution of Shams al-Din Juvaynī, 
“Buqa sent Amir Ali to Tabriz to take control of his property and holdings.”664  
 
After the vizier Sa’d al-Dawla was put to death in 1291, Tukal and Toghan, two of the amirs 
who had earlier conspired to have him put to death, acted: 
 
“Tukal and Toghan went to Sa’duddawla’s estates, and the soldiers began to pillage. 
The homes of both Muslims and Jews there were completely ransacked, and the floors 
of tents were dug up in search of buried treasure. At dawn the soldiers moved out and 
created chaos, carrying away everything they found and leaving the people enmeshed 
in turmoil and strife.”  
 
In addition, when Eljighitai, the son-in-law of prince Alafrang, was executed by order of 
Ghazan shortly before Ghazan’s enthronement in 1295, “all he had was given to Bulughan 
Khurasani,” who was one of Ghazan’s wives.665 The vizier Buqa’s property was confiscated 
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by the Ilkhan.666 After the execution of Sa’d al-Din Savaji, also a vizier, in the year 711, his 
property was confiscated.667 Ibn al-Suqai says that after the vizier Rashid al-Din’s death, all 
of his property was confiscated; according to the admittedly late source the Zeil Jami al-
tavarikh, the confiscation included Rashid’s extensive waqf.668 
 
And after the end of the Ilkhanate, after the execution of Ghiyath al-Din son of Rashid al-Din, 
Rashid al-Din’s waqf (which it seems, had survived the first ‘confiscation’) was plundered 
again.669 
 
As in China, confiscation was not limited to the confiscation of possessions. The confiscation 
of people in the Ilkhanate started with several relatives of the Caliph. Although the Caliph 
was executed together with a large number of his family members and other dependents, 
other descendants of his were not put to death670 and were instead confiscated and treated, 
essentially, as war booty. Minhaj-i Saraj puts it this way: 
 
“Hulau seized all the treasures of Baghdad, the enumeration of, and amount of which 
wealth, the pen of description could neither record, nor the human understanding 
contain, and conveyed the whole – money, jewels, gold and gem-studded vases, and 
elegant furniture – to his camp. Such of these as were suitable for Mangu Khan 
[Ka’an], with some of the females of the Khalifah’s haram, together with a daughter 
of the Khalifa, he [Hulau] dispatched towards Turkistan; some [things?] were sent, as 
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presents, and as his portion, to Barka, the Musalman, and some Hulau himself 
retained.”671 
 
Other sources mention that there were three daughters of the Caliph who survived and were 
taken towards Turkestan. One of them, Fatima, presumably committed suicide;672 Khadija 
later married the son of a famous scholar and returned to her native land in 1273-4 with 
Abaqa’s permission;673 the third, Mariam returned to Baghdad and was still living in 1282-
3.674 In addition, the youngest son of the Caliph survived; also treated essentially as war 
booty, he was given to Hulagu’s wife Oljai Khatun, and according to Rashid al-Din later 
married a Mongol woman and had children.675 Ibn al-Kāzarūnī gives the names of four of his 
children, the Caliph’s grandchildren, thus showing that they were alive at the beginning of the 
14th century.676  
 
While the fate of the Caliphal family still played out in an essentially warlike context, later 
examples from Ilkhanate show that confiscation of family members was also used in contexts 
not connected with warfare.  
 
In the case of Buqa, the vizier who was put to death for treachery in 1289, according to 
Vassaf, Arghun:  
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“ordered that his … property be plundered and his followers such as Maju and 
Taghlaq Qarunas and Teghli and Eshek Teghli and Sovana Bakhshi and Tushkne with 
the na’ibs Hesam al-Din Qazvini and Amir Ali Malek Tabriz and the children and … 
be put to the sword and their women and daughters be distributed among the army, 
and he also ordered that those killed be left in the desert/field for the wild animals … 
to eat and this they did. Then every person who had the least connection to him was 
arrested and punished.”677  
 
Taghai, the twelve-year-old son of Hajji Narin and nephew of Nauruz, was saved from the 
death penalty, but became an attendant upon Amir Husain Güregen’s flocks and herds, and 
“His people were given to Bulughan Khatun Khurasani.”678  
 
From this it can be seen that the confiscation of possessions, and sometimes of family 
members and dependents as well, was practiced in Ilkhanid Persia. However due to the 
absence of extant legislation on this issue, it remains difficult to determine to what extent 
such a practice was systematic or to what extent it may have affected people other than 
government officials. Most probably, the influence of this practice was not deep enough to 
have any impact on local practices.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The relationship between qadis and Ilkhans was thus very different from that between 
Chinese local officals and Qa’ans; where the Chinese officials in general wanted to 
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implement the laws produced by the Qa’ans, qadis had their own sources of authority and did 
not always appreciate the Ilkhans’ involvement. While personal relationships between qadis 
and Ilkhans or amirs may have been positive, there was no regular communication about 
legal matters between the central government and the provinces such as was the case in China.      
 
As a consequence, Mongol influence on punishments in Persia is very small; the number of 
strokes in beatings ending in seven may have had some influence but in a limited number of 
cases, while the practice of using bloodless execution methods for nobles took hold, but 
likewise affected a minuscule proportion of the population.  
 
The difference in impact of Mongol punishment methods in China and in Persia should give 
some insight into the attitudes of the Mongols, Chinese and Persians. Since the Ilkhans 
required from qadis political allegiance but not the implementation of Mongol punishments, 
the same Mongol punishments that had great influence in China remained without wider 
effect in Persia. It was only because the Toluids were flexible and accommodating towards 
existing legal systems that the attitudes of the local qadis and local officials in China were 
able to have such a massive impact on the outcome.  
 
This shows that the main reason why Mongol punishments were influential was not because 
the Toluids were trying to impose them on the conquered populations. Although the 
contribution of some rulers and individual Mongols, for example some employed in the 
dazong zhengfu, was important, the main factor was the attitude of those dealing with legal 
cases at the local level. Rather than the Toluids trying to impose their own ways, it is more 
revealing to see the question in terms of whether and how much local officials wanted to be 
involved with the Toluid rulers.  
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Conclusion 
 
This research has shown that it is possible to perceive Mongol law differently from the 
legendary ‘Great Yasa,’ and to discover characteristics which were more enduring and 
influential than many of the substantive Mongol laws themselves. Where the idea of the 
Great Yasa encourages us to focus on the rigid and the unmoveable, it is necessary to move 
beyond to ask how the Mongols’ life on the steppe influenced their perceptions of legality. It 
is for this reason, and not merely because there is no evidence for the Great Yasa as a law 
code, that the concept should be rejected.  
 
Rather, it has been productive to focus on the flexibility of the Mongols’ approach towards 
other laws and legal systems. Flexibility was built into the Mongol attitude towards others in 
the form of the principle of collegiality, which was exemplified firstly through the quriltai, 
but which allowed changes in laws and procedures to take place as long as the key 
stakeholders were all involved in decision-making. The principle of collegiality was so 
treasured by Mongols and by the Toluid rulers that it was influential both in the Ilkhanate and 
in Yuan China, although it had an especially deep impact in China.  
 
The differences in terms of the depth of Mongol influence on law in Persia and China show 
us the importance of the attitudes of those judging legal cases at the local level. In Persia 
where qadis were not so interested in implementing laws produced by their rulers, the Ilkhans 
did not try to force them to accept Mongol laws. In China where local officials believed they 
needed laws from the Yuan emperors, the Mongols obliged, not to the extent that some would 
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have wished, but to the extent that Mongol law left a deep impact in China due to all the 
discussions and negotiations taking place between Mongols and Chinese. It is significant that 
pressures to adopt a unified legal system came from Persians and Chinese rather than from 
the Mongols, and that Chinese scholars’ clamour for the Yuan emperors’ involvement in 
legal matters had the counterproductive effect of ensuring more Mongol influence on the law.    
 
Although adherence to ‘the Yasa’ may have become a kind of identity in post-Mongol 
Central Asia, when one was trying to recapture the prestige of Chinggis Khan and his 
accomplishments, during the building of the Mongol empire and in the Toluid empire, strict 
adherence to all Mongol laws was not part of the Mongol identity. Rather, the principle of 
collegiality may be one of the elements of their legal system which was held the deepest and 
which endured the longest, even when faced with unprecedented pressures from worldviews 
different from the Mongols’.  
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Appendix 
 
The following appendix lists known yarghuchis in the unified Mongol empire, in the 
Ilkhanate and in the Yuan dynasty. Where the individuals are mentioned in the Yuan Shi, the 
Chinese form of their name is given. 
 
A list of yarghuchis in the Ilkhanate has not been attempted to date to my knowledge. In 
order not to omit any relevant information, included in this section are personages described 
in the sources as yarghuchis, as well as those who are not described as yarghuchis but 
nevertheless presided at trials. This is because yarghuchis are not always consistently 
described as such in the sources. 
 
The section on yarghuchis in the Yuan dynasty is based primarily on Jagchid, Menggu shi 
luncong, pp. 293-329, with some additions. Jagchid’s transliterations of the Chinese names 
are indicated in parentheses. 
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Yarghuchis in the unified Mongol empire 
Belgütai 別里古
台 
The first yarghuchi appointed by Chinggis Khan; he was Chinggis’ half-
brother.679   
Shigi Qutuqu 胡
土虎那顏 
The first with a permanent position as yarghuchi, he was Chinggis’ 
foster-son or foster-brother. Members of the keshig were to assist him in 
deciding legal cases. “He conducted very proper trials and treated the 
accused fairly and sympathetically. He often would say that one should 
not confess out of fear. “Do not be afraid,” he used to say, “and speak 
the truth.” It is well known among yarghuchis that from that time until 
the present in the province of Mongolia they conduct inquiries upon the 
principles laid down by him.”680 Later, “In [1234], in the autumn in the 
seventh month, [Shigi] Qutuqu noyan became Zhongzhou (today 
Kaifeng)’s duanshiguan,”681 and he was involved in the 1235 census. 
Guo Baoyu 郭
寶玉 
He first submitted to the Mongols in 1211; after fighting in China for the 
Mongols, he accompanied Subedei and Jebe on their campaign around 
the Caspian and was later appointed yarghuchi. Since he played a role in 
the campaign against the Tangut state and perhaps in the distribution of 
its booty, Buell surmises that he was yarghuchi in the Tangut area. The 
Yuan Shi records him as recommending to Chinggis Khan a five-point 
plan to restore order in China following the Mongol conquest.682 
Hesimaili 曷思
麥裡 (Isma‘il) 
While he was darughachi in Huaimeng, “in [1230] in the sixth month, 
the emperor commanded that Khos-melig become duanshiguan and 
return to the Western territories. The great commander Chahan 察罕683 
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and xingsheng Tiemudie’er 帖木迭兒 memorialized that he should 
remain. The emperor granted their request.”684 
Yuelin 
Tiemu’er (Yol-
temür) 岳璘帖
穆爾 
An Uighur descended from the Uighur minister, Tunyugu. When Ögödei 
became emperor, there were many thieves in zhongyuan (northern 
China), and he filled the role of great yarghuchi. He assisted Olchin in 
garrisoning Shuntian (in today’s Hebei) and other areas, where they 
spread good morality, made the taxes lighter; the thieves disappeared 
and the adulterers reformed, and the zhou (subprefectures) and jun 
(prefectures) became peaceful.685 
Sayyid Ajall 賽
典赤贍思丁 
When Ögödei came to the throne, he became duanshiguan (yarghuchi) 
of Yanjing district (today Beijing). Later, his appointment of two local 
envoys of the imperial prince Toqur, who was garrisoning Yunnan, as 
yarghuchis was part of his strategy to win the prince over and establish 
effective government in Yunnan.686 Saiyyid Ajall told the 
representatives of prince Toqur: 
“You two gentlemen are trusted advisors to the prince, and yet because 
you have no official appointment, you are not allowed to discuss affairs 
of state, so I would like to appoint you as prefectural judges 
[duanshiguan] of the regional secretarial council, but I cannot confirm 
these positions until I have conferred with the prince.”687 
Tang Renzu 唐
仁祖 
An Uighur, he started serving Chinggis Khan when he was 17 years old, 
and later served Tolui. Sorghaghtani promoted him to yarghuchi 
(perhaps already in Ögödei’s time).688 
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Shuhutai 
(Jokhud) 
“When T’ai-tsung [Ögödei] first conquered the central plain the chung-
shu ling Yeh-lü Ch’u-ts’ai asked to be allowed to choose employees for 
the government who were knowledgeable in Confucianism. The 
emperor accepted his proposal. In [1237], the emperor issued an edict 
ordering the tuan-shi kuan (duanshiguan) Shu-hu-t’ai and the senior 
official Liu Chung of the Shan-hsi east lu tax office689 to go through the 
various lu and carry out an examination. The examination was to be in 
three parts on the Lün-yü, the meaning of the classics and tz’u-fu.”690 
Buell comments that cooperation was necessitated because many 
Confucians who would be taking the exams belonged to princes or 
appanage-holders and there were jurisidictional problems.691 
Xieche 斜徹 
(Seche), 
yarghuchi of 
Pingyang dao 
After Güyük was enthroned, he was executed because he was 
“unrestrained and unjust and violating the law;” the xuanweishi 
(pacification commissioner) Weizhong was ordered to put him to 
death.692    
Mahmud 
Yalavach 牙魯
瓦赤 / 牙老瓦
赤 
“Having completed the conquest of the Sarta’ul people, Chinggis Qa’an 
issued an order setting up resident commissioners (darughachis) in the 
various cities. Two Sarta’ul of the Qurumši clan – father and son – 
called Yalawači and Masqut, came from the city of Ürünggeči. They 
told Činggis Qa’an about the laws and customs of cities; whereupon the 
latter, being adequately informed as to these customs, appointed his son 
Masqut the Qurumši, putting him in charge, with our resident 
commissioners, of Buqar, Semisgen, Ürünggeči, Udan, Kisgar, Uriyang, 
Güsen Daril and other cities. He brought back with him his father 
Yalawači and put him in charge of the city of Jungdu of the Kitat.”693 
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The Yuan Shi, however, also refers to him as duanshiguan:694 he was 
made yeke yarghuchi of North China when Güyük came to the throne.695 
Menggeser 忙
哥撒兒 
A member of Toluid’s keshig, having previously served Chinggis Khan, 
he was yeke yarghuchi and senior minister of state (chengxiang) under 
Möngke.  
“When the plot of Širemün and Naqu was discovered shortly after 
Möngke had been enthroned, it was Menggeser who was dispatched to 
investigate the matter, and it was his troops (i.e., contingents from the 
kešig) who surprised and arrested the conspirators. Immediately 
following their detention, Möngke, as a first step toward sorting out the 
entire affair, instructed Menggeser to bring to trial retainers of the 
rebellious princes. A hearing was immediately convened and after 
several days of subtle questioning, as Rašīd al-Dīn expresses it, the 
defendants confessed their traitorous intentions, thereby acknowledging 
the legitimacy of Möngke's claims upon the throne. In the end all were 
found guilty and most were executed.”696 
Hadan 哈丹 
(Qadan) 
“In 1253 at Gun Na’ur, Menggeser was made leader of a thousand and 
Qadan was made a yarghuchi.”697 
Chinqai 鎮海, 
and later his son 
Yashmut 
According to Xu Yuren, Chinqai was appointed yarghuchi during the 
early 13th century, and according to Juvaynī, he participated in the 
investigation of Korguz’s case under Ögödei by compiling a report 
together with the bitigchis.698 His eldest son Yashmut was later 
yarghuchi.699 
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Bujir 不只兒, a 
Tatar 
A hero in battle, his father and he himself served Chinggis Khan. 
Möngke made him yeke yarghuchi of Dadu and the wider region. 
Alongside tax and other duties, “Inspecting matters one day, he killed 
twenty eight people. One of them had stolen a horse and was [initially] 
beaten and released. By chance he [Bujir] came across a knife-seller, [so 
he] turned back to pursue the person who had been beaten, and in order 
to try out a knife, decapitated him. The emperor criticized him and said: 
[…] For all crimes [meriting] death, there must be a thorough judgment 
and [only] following this, carry out the punishment. Today, in one day, 
twenty eight people have been killed. There must [have been] many who 
had committed no crime, but they have already been beaten [or] 
decapitated, what kind of punishment is this? Bujir was astonished and 
could not answer.”700 
Jagchid notes how this demonstrates his immense power, both his power 
over life and death in acting in this way and also in avoiding punishment 
for his conduct.701 
Tuowutuo 脫兀
脫 (Toghto), a 
Mongol from 
the Arula 
clan.702 
Toghto was demoted after complaint by a Jurchen official. Qubilai had 
appointed Zhao Liangbi to the Aboriginal Control Office of Xingzhou. 
“It had been a long time since Xing[zhou] had had a good administrator, 
even though it was a very important crossroads; too many ambassadors 
made the work difficult, and many people were fleeing. Liangbi was a 
very good administrator […] Toghto was sent as a duanshiguan to 
garrison Xing[zhou]. His people […] created animosity and obstructed 
the officials…. When Qubilai travelled to Yunnan, Liangbi hurried by 
horse to find Hulegu to expose the matter; thereupon Toghto was 
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demoted, and the officials belonging to him were deposed; Xing[zhou] 
was managed well and the number of households increased.703  
Hulu Buhua 
(Kulug-bukha) 
Tiemudie’er’s uncle Hulu Buhua (Kulug-bukha) at the beginning of the 
zhongtong years (1260-64) was appointed Junior Chief Councillor of the 
Central Secretariat and concurrently duanshiguan of the Central 
Secretariat.704 
Boluohuan 博羅
歡 
A Mongol duanshiguan of the Manggud (his own tribe). His biography 
also says that in that time all the princes and the ‘ten meritorious 
officials’ had their own duanshiguan.705 
Tuolichi 脫里赤
(Torchi) 
Perhaps Mengeser’s son Torchi.706 Appointed yarghuchi by Arigh Boke, 
who recognized Torchi in the Secretariat for State Affairs of Yanjing 
and also appointed a yeke yarghuchi in Helin.707 
Bulghai A member of Tolui’s keshig, having previously served Chinggis Khan. 
He had wideranging responsibilities and became responsible for state 
policy under Möngke. On the arrival of Rubruck and his companions he 
questioned them.708 When Rubruck’s companion inadvertently hit the 
threshold of a yurt, the guards detained him “and calling someone, they 
told him to take him to Bulgai, who is the grand secretary of the court, 
and who condemns persons to death.”709 “Then my companion was 
brought in and the monk chided him most harshly, because he had 
touched the threshold. The next day came Bulgai, who was the judge, 
and he closely inquired whether anyone had warned us to be careful 
about touching the threshold, and I answered, “My lord, we had no 
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interpreter with us; how could we have understood?” Then he pardoned 
him, but never thereafter was he allowed to enter any dwelling of the 
Chan.”710 Bulghai was put to death in 1264 for having supported Arigh 
Boke.711 
Arghun Aqa 阿
裡侃 
Described as a duanshiguan (yarghuchi) in the Yuan Shi, and as a sahib-
divan in Persian sources. A yarghu held by him is mentioned in the 
Tarikhi shahi.712 
 
 
Yarghuchis in the Ilkhanate 
Shi Tianlin 石天麟, a Chinese A Chinese from Shunzhou, he learned various 
languages and was given a Mongol name. He was in 
the keshig.713 Perhaps because of his linguistic 
expertise, he was chosen to be a duanshiguan and to 
accompany Hülegü’s forces that conquered the 
Ilkhanate, so he was probably a military yarghuchi.  
Ala al-Din Juvaynī, Nasir al-Din 
Tusi 
In 662/1264 they served at the yarghu and execution of 
an official, Najm ‘Umran al-Bajisri.714 
Toladai / Qadaghay Yarghuchi, of 
the Arulat Mongol tribe, and 
Toladai / Qadaghay and Qara Bulaghan were the sons 
of Chaghatai Qorchi of the Arulat tribe who came to 
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Toladai’s brother Qara 
Bulaghan;715 and Uktai / Quday 
Persia with Chormaqan. Qara Bulaghan was a 
yarghuchi according to Rashid al-Din.716 Toladai and 
another amir yarghu, Quday, were involved in the trial 
of Shams al-Din Juvaynī.717  
Suqunchaq Aqa Noyan, son of 
Sodon Noyan (Suldus), and 
Uruq718 
They investigated Majd al-Mulk in 1282. Suqunchaq 
Aqa’s permission (which he initially didn’t want to 
give) was needed for his execution.719  
Noqai Yarghuchi An amir, mentioned by Vassaf.720 
Taghachar  He was yarghuchi under Abaqa and was sent to 
Baghdad to look for the treasure that Ata Malik 
Juvaynī had allegedly amassed there.721 
Amir Baitmish (Qushchi) He was sent to arrest Aruq, and supervised the purge 
following Aruq’s execution. He also investigated the 
case of the Kurdish amir Sejal al-Din al-Zakai.722 
Buqa Chingsang, a Jalayir 
Mongol 
One of Ahmad’s chief officials, he was sent to put 
Arghun to death but instead freed him.  
He led a yarghu of Bibi Khatun and her sons vs. 
Soyurghatmish and his supporters, and kept 
Soyurghatmish from being tortured.723  
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Nüregäi Yarghuchi, of the 
Mangqut clan 
An officer and courtier in Abaqa Khan’s time; Arghun 
sent him to guard the imprisoned Ahmad Tegüder, 
whom he then tried together with Tägänä and 
Qonqurtai’s liege men.724   
Shiktür Noyan, a Jalayir Mongol, 
the second son of Elgai Noyan, a 
commander who came to Persia 
with Hülegü. 
Interrogator during the trial of Buqa; leader of the trial 
of Tughan and other amirs in the time of Geikhatu.725  
Qutlugh-Shah Questioned Nauruz during his trial.726 
Rashid al-Din, a Persian 
descended from a Jewish family 
Involved in the trial of the amirs guilty of defeat in 
Syria in 1303.727  
Bolad Chingsang Involved in the trial of the amirs guilty of defeat in 
Syria in 1303.728 
Unnamed yarghuchis who dealt 
with complaints about taxation 
During Ghazan’s time, they, as well as amirs and 
wazirs, dealt with such complaints. Rashid suggests 
that they were biased in favour of Mongol 
complainants, or at the very least they accepted 
complaints against hakims (governors) and mutassarifs 
too readily.729 
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Todai Yarghuchi, son of Sorghan; 
Noqai Yarghuchi = Buqa 
Yarghuchi, grandson of Sorghan; 
Alghu Yarghuchi, son of Noqai; 
Daulatshah, son of Alghu 
Daulatshah, descendant from a long line of yarghuchis, 
was involved in the trial of Tashtemur together with 
Shaikh-Hasan and Ghiyath al-Din.730 
Ghiyath al-Din, son of Rashid al-
Din 
Involved in the yarghu of Tash Temur, and other 
judicial decisions. Ghiyath studied Islamic sciences 
and had good relations with Islamic scholars. He 
changed inheritance law back to Hanafi principles.731 
 
 
Yarghuchis in Yuan China 
Bohu’er 伯忽兒 
(Baikhur) 
A son of Chinggis’ younger brother Khachi’un, he was made head of 
the yarghuchis in 1270.732 
Zhibi Tiemu’er 只
必帖木兒 
In 1271, when a Branch Secretariat was established in Shaanxi, he 
became the Secretariat’s duanshiguan. Zhibi Tiemu’er was a son of 
Koden, who was a son of Ögödei.733   
Tubushen 秃不申
(Tübshin) 
“In [1286], [...] in the eleventh month, the Central Secretariat’s 
yarghuchi Tübshin was sent off to verify again the finances of Huguang 
Branch Secretariat.”734 
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Halahasun 哈剌哈
孫 (Harqasun) 
In 1287 he memorialized that too many condemned were being 
executed. The emperor agreed that cases should be reviewed by 
yarghuchis and that forced labour was a better option.735  
Yexian (Esen) 也
先 
Having been appointed by the “imperial grandson” Antan Buhua 
(Altan-bukha), he was dismissed in 1289, though he still received his 
paiza.736 
Zhaolietai 
Chawu’er 召烈台
抄兀兒, his son 
Nazhen 那真 
(Nachin), grandson 
Bansa 伴撒
(Bansal) and 
greatgrandson 
Huoluhutai 火魯忽
台 (Goroghutai) 
Zhaolietai Chawu’er, according to the Yuan Shi, initially served 
Chinggis Khan, and warned him that the Halachi (Kharachi), Sanzhi’er 
(Salji’ud), and Yiqiliesi (Yiqilisi) were intending to rebel against him: 
for this service he was given the title of darkhan. His son Nachin served 
Qubilai as yeke yarghuchi, and after his death his son Bansal inherited 
the post. Bansal’s son Goroghutai also inherited the post. Zhenjin had a 
stele engraved for his remembrance.737 
Xiban 昔班, an 
Uighur, yarghuchi 
of the dazong 
zhengfu 
He served Qubilai at his appanange, and was ordered to head the 
bitigchis. In 1260 he became darughachi of Zhending lu, and later 
yarghuchi of the dazong zhengfu (the reference to dazong zhengfu may 
be an anachronism). When Arigh Boke rebelled, the emperor ordered 
Xiban to supervise the transport of supplies to the army.738 
Kou’erji 口兒吉 
(Gorgi) 
He had participated in the conquest of the Song. The Yuanshi says he 
became yeke yarghuchi of the dazong zhengfu after the Song had been 
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pacified, though the reference to dazong zhengfu may be an 
anachronism.739 
Talichi 塔里赤, a 
Kangli 
The Henan Branch Secretariat memorialized that he should fill [the 
position of] duanshiguan [of the army?].740   
Liu Haoli 刘好礼 He came from Bianxiangfu and was possibly a ‘local’ yarghuchi.741 
Wu Yi 吳繹 He served Qubilai’s son Kuokuochu, and then went with the 
pacification commissioner Yuechicha’er to have an audience with 
Qubilai and entered the keshig for five or six years. Later he held posts 
including duanshiguan (yarghuchi) of Central Secretariat and of the 
State Secretariat.742 
Tuo’ersu 脱而速 
(Dorsu) 
A yarghuchi who was put on trial and executed for bribery.743 “In 
[1297] […] in the third month […] the yarghuchi Dorsu received a 
bribe, and his slave reported him; he poisoned his slave [who died], and 
he was put to death publicly in the market. […] In the ninth month [of 
the same year] the bribed goods the yarghuchi had chased after were 
transported to the zhongshusheng.”744  
Boluo Tiemu’er 孛
羅帖木兒 (Boro-
Temur) 
He became a yarghuchi. In the struggle against Qaidu, he and his 
soldiers were surrounded and needed to be rescued.745  
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Asha Buhua 阿沙
不花 (Ashogh-
Bukha) 
In 1293 he heard Dorsu’s case while at the head of the dazong zhengfu:  
“Asha Buhua was from the royal bloodline of the Kangli state. […] 
When he was fourteen years old when he entered Shizu [Qubilai]’s 
service. […] In [1293] Qaidu rebelled. Through an imperial grandson 
Chengzong pacified an army to the north. Ashogh-bukha followed him, 
crossed over the Golden Mountains [Altai], fought with Kanghai 
[Khangghai], and was successful. When Chengzong became emperor, 
he gathered the dazong zheng[fu] to hear the yarghuchi Tuo’ershu 
(Dorsu) to hear about [his] bribes and filth, and ordered that he be 
interrogated. Dorsu concealed his crimes. [Ashogh-bukha] was ordered 
to execute him.”746 
In 1307 when Wuzong took the throne he was also made privy 
councillor of the Central Secretariat.747 
Yuelichi 月里赤 
(Urichi) 
A yeke yarghuchi, he was later appointed to the falconry office.748  
Bie Tiemu’er 別鐵
木兒 (Begtemur) 
Involved in the investigation about the theft of the Song’s emperor’s 
insignia in 1309, together with other officials.749 
Huaidu from the 
Secretariat for 
State Affairs and 
Duo’erji from the 
Chashiyuan 
(Office of 
Sent to investigate a case of anti-Mongol rumours together in 1310.750  
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Surveillance). 
Mailü 買閭  Renzong summoned him and told him to be sure to judge carefully and 
work together with colleagues from the Central Secretariat and the 
Censorate. 751 
Nangjiadai 囊加带 
/ 囊加歹
(Nanggiyatai) 
Sent to judge robbers together with the neishi of the Prince of Jin and 
give recommndations on the appropriate punishments.752 
Tiemu’er buhua 铁
木兒不花(Temur-
bukha)  
He served as censor and yarghuchi of the dazong zhengfu. In 1321 he 
became overseer of the bureau of military affairs. In 1340 a yarghuchi 
named Temur-bukha (the same person?), became junior chief 
councillor of the Central Secretariat.753    
Buyan 不颜  In 1323, on the order of the emperor, he worked with other officials and 
scholars to put together a legal compilation known as the Dayuan 
tongzhi.754 
Bodasha 伯答沙, 
son of Temur Buqa 
and grandson of 
the yarghuchi 
Menggeser.755 
In his youth he was a member of the keshig. In 1327 the yeke yarghuchi 
Bodasha became Grand Guardian;756 in 1328 Wenzong promoted him 
to Grand Tutor757 and at the same time yarghuchi of the dazong 
zhengfu; he was to take the soldiers to protect the northern frontiers.758 
Tulu 禿忽魯 He served four emperors, his first post was that of yeke yarghuchi in the 
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(Tuglug), the son 
of Esen Buqa and 
grandson of 
Boluhuan, the head 
of bitigchis in 
Möngke’s time.759 
[da]zong zhengfu; later he served as minister of the Central Secretariat, 
in the Censorate and as Grand Tutor.760 
 
Kuokuochu 阔阔
出 (Kököchü) 
The Yuan Shi refers to Kuokuochu as a [da]zong zheng[fu] 
yarghuchi.761 He was among those who conspired with several princes 
against Taidingdi. Kokochu went with the others to Shangdu. After 
Taidingdi’s death, Kokochu went (with the others) to aid Dadu. When 
this was discovered, Daulatshah killed them.  
Yonggutai 雍古台
(Ongghutai) 
A dazong zhengfu yarghuchi, after the rebels went to Shangdu, he 
helped move emperor Taidingdi to Jiangling. 762  
Tian Sun and 添孙
Anhui 按灰 
(Alkhui) 
In [1336] the princely yeke yarghuchi Tian Sun died. [...] Anhui 
became dazong zhengfu yeke yarghuchi, to deal with adultery, robbery, 
fraud and deceit everywhere.763   
Yan Tiemu’er 燕
铁木兒 (El Temur) 
In [1337] [the emperor] ordered the prince El Temur to become dazong 
zhengfu yeke yarghuchi.764  
Shuosijian 搠思监, 
a Kereit, the son of 
In 1349 the yeke yarghuchi Shuosijian became Senior Chief Councillor 
of the Central Secretariat and concurrently Overseer of the Bureau of 
Military Affairs. In 1352, the zhongshu pingzhang zhengshi Shuosijian 
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Yilianzhen, the son 
of Esen Buqa.765 
and the yeke yarghuchi Fushou assisted Toghto in conquering 
Xuzhou.766 
Fu Shou 福寿, a 
Tangut767 
In 1352 he was appointed yeke yarghuchi; in the same year, together 
with Shuosijian, he assisted Toghto in conquering Xuzhou.768 Before 
long he went to Jiangnan to serve as Privy Councillor of the Branch 
Secretariat. Later he served in the regional censorate in Jiangnan. When 
Ming dynasty soldiers surrounded Jiqing, he led soldiers to the fight but 
the city could not resist any longer and walls were breached. All the 
officials fled, but when others urged him to flee he was angry and said: 
“I am an important official of this country; I will only survive if the city 
survives; if the city is conquered I will die; where should I go?” 
Soldiers surrounded him and he was killed.769  
Dielimishi 迭里迷
失 
In 1355, the dazong zhengfu yarghuchi Dielimishi was made Privy 
Councillor of the Gansu Branch Secretariat.770 
Yuekuocha’er 月
阔察兒 
(Ugholchar?)  
“In [1355] … the great military officer dazong zhengfu yarghuchi 
Yuekuocha’er left his job because he was wounded in battle. He was 
not seen again.”771 
Duo’erzhiban 朵尔
直班 (Dorji-bal), a 
descendant of 
Muqali in the 
seventh generation. 
In 1341 he was appointed as scholar in the Hanlin academy. […] He 
was appointed as dazong zhengfu yarghuchi. When he listened to cases, 
he was always quoting the law (lüling), finding out the facts. An old 
colleague of his sighed and said: I have been in this post for 40 years, 
when I see the way you deal with the cases, you are almost a god.” […] 
When an imperial prince killed his mother, Duo’erzhiban heard this 
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case with his colleagues, appealed to the court, and made sure the 
perpetrator was punished. Later, higher officials caused his removal 
from this post.772  
Yinashili 易纳室
理, son of 
Yilinzhenban 
(Erinchin-bal), 
Tangut 
His father (Yilinzhenban) had entered the keshig and held a great 
variety of offices, including chancellor at the Hanlin academy; he was 
‘exiled’ to posts in the south while Bayan was minister, but returned to 
court thereafter. Yinashili’s brother Pudashili 普达失理 was also 
chancellor of the Hanlin academy; he himself became yeke yarghuchi 
of the dazong zhengfu.773 
Yuelu Tiemu’er 月
鲁帖木兒 (Ulug 
Temur), a Mongol 
from the Dorbetei 
clan. 
He was dazong zhengfu yeke yarghuchi around the year 1345.774 
Dalimashili 达礼
麻识理 (Darma-
shiri), a Kereit 
In 1366 he was summoned to be dazong zhengfu yeke yarghuchi.775 
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